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WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXV, Number 2 January 1973

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Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Rates: $9.00 per year; $15.00 for two years; $20.50 for three years. Foreign postage, 50 cents additional per year. Single issue, $3.00.

Back issues: WORLD POLITICS is available on microfilm from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Volumes I-XX are available from Johnson Reprint Corporation, 111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003. Volumes XXI on are available from Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

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WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Public Affairs Information Service*, and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Abstracts of articles appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts*, and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

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WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. January 1973. Vol. XXV, No. 2. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

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TECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:

Some Lessons and Perspectives

By KEITH PAVITT*

WITH World War II and the explosion of the atomic bomb, the critical importance of organized research and development (R & D) to weapons development and to international relations became obvious to everyone. It created new problems in national policy, deriving essentially from the mobilization and the close involvement of university science and industrial technology with strategic and quasi-strategic aims. And it changed the rules of the game in international relations by increasing, by many orders of magnitude, the costs of waging all-out war.[1]

The links between R & D on the one hand and economic competition and growth on the other have not been revealed in quite the same spectacular manner. But they have been growing steadily in importance since at least the end of the last century, starting with the foundation of the chemical and electrical industries and the first industrial laboratories. Even during the economically depressed 1930's, R & D in American industry increased by 12 per cent annually in real terms. Between 1966 and 1971—a period that included three years of economic recession, government cutbacks in funding, and growing public hostility toward science and technology—industry-financed R & D in the United States still went up annually by about 5 per cent in real terms.[2]

In other advanced countries, the growth of industry-financed R & D has been even more rapid. In the five non-Communist countries with the largest R & D efforts (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), it increased by nearly 10 per cent, in

* The author is indebted to the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, where—as Visiting Lecturer—he wrote the following article.

[1] See, for example, Robert Gilpin, *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy* (Princeton 1962); Raymond Aron, *The Great Debate* (New York 1964).

[2] James Worley, "Changing Direction of Research and Development Employment Among Firms," Table I, in Richard Nelson, ed., *The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity* (Princeton 1962); National Science Foundation, *National Patterns of R & D Resources*, NSF 70-46 (Washington, D.C. 1971), 2.

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real terms, between 1961 and 1967. In 1961, industry-financed R & D had been at a level of just under three-quarters of total expenditures by these five governments on defense, nuclear, and space R & D. By 1967, the level was equal to these governmental R & D expenditures. In other words, in 1968 industrial competition and growth requirements replaced strategic competition and defense requirements as the biggest single determinant of the allocation of scientific and technological resources in the non-Communist world.[3]

Certainly, in important sectors like energy, aerospace, and communications, the distinction between strategic and economic requirements is not very clear. Both are met by very similar technologies and often by the very same industrial firms. Moreover, the pace of development of one is dependent on the pace of development of the other. Thus, the successful efforts in defense technology that were mounted in the United States after 1940 benefitted considerably from American industry's strength in civilian technology, just as the more recent successful development of the "Viggen" fighter aircraft in Sweden no doubt benefitted from the technological sophistication and worldwide awareness of Swedish civilian industry. Conversely, American civilian technology in communications, nuclear energy, and aircraft benefitted from the government's forced-draft development of defense and space technology in the late 1950's and 1960's.

None of this belies the growth in importance of industry-financed civilian technology. This growth has posed new problems and created new challenges at a number of levels: to the industrial firm, where product innovation through R & D has become a major weapon in competition, but where the management, control, evaluation, and exploitation of R & D cannot be based on methods used in other fields of business activity;[4] to the discipline of economics where, in spite of strong resistance, considerable progress has been made in integrating science and technology into growth and trade theory;[5] to the national policy-maker, who must design policies that will enable his country to take the best advantage of science and technology for both growth and competition; and to the diplomat, who, in the middle 1960's,

[3] Yvan Fabian, Alison Young and others, *R & D in OECD Member Countries: Trends and Objectives* (OECD, Paris 1971). This is the first comprehensive comparison of trends in R & D expenditures in the 1960's in the industrialized non-Communist countries.

[4] Keith Pavitt and Solomon Wald, *The Conditions for Success in Technological Innovation*, Part II, E (OECD, Paris 1971).

[5] See, for example, National Science Foundation, *A Review of the Relationship Between Research and Development and Economic Growth/Productivity* (Washington, D.C. 1971).

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suddenly had to make himself familiar with such things as the brain-drain, the technology gap, the multinational firm, and international technological cooperation.

In the following discussion, we shall concentrate on the last two aspects, namely, on how the growth of civilian science and technology has interacted with national policies and international relations in the 1960's, and on what lessons for the 1970's can be drawn from the experiences of various countries.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

There were two main strands in public policy concerning industrial science and technology in the 1960's. The first was to ensure the rapid diffusion and effective use of new technology so as to promote the growth in national productivity considered necessary for social stability and political acceptability. Originally there had been the mistaken belief that the contribution of technology to national growth could be increased simply by augmenting national expenditures on R & D. This ignored the fact that nationally developed technology amounted to only a small proportion of what was available, and that, at least in the industrialized Western countries, technology flows easily across national boundaries. Since the mid-1950's, the international diffusion of technology—through licensing agreements, direct foreign investment, and trade in producers' goods—has been increasing at a rate of more than 10 per cent a year.[6]

However, studies by economists have shown that a significant proportion of the growth in productivity levels in the advanced Western countries can be attributed to qualitative improvements in labor and capital—in other words, to education and the diffusion of new technology.[7] It is probably safe to assume that "technical progress" is built into the Western system of economic development and that, in addition to the steady growth of the world's industrial R & D, the continuous upgrading of skills and continued industrial investment have been key elements in the process.

The experience of the Eastern European countries, however, suggests that these elements—while necessary—are not sufficient. In these countries very high priority is given to R & D, to education, and to industrial investment. Yet such evidence as there is suggests that economic growth rates—even though comparable to those in Western

[6] OECD, *Gaps in Technology: Analytical Report*, Book IV (Paris 1970).

[7] See, for example, Edward Dennison and Jean-Pierre Poullier, *Why Growth Rates Differ* (Washington, D.C. 1967); also fn. 5.

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countries—owe very little to qualitative improvements in capital and labor.[8] Moreover, there is ample evidence of lags in the application of specific technologies, such as computers.[9]

This state of affairs could be the result of a conscious policy of priorities: for example, the backwardness of Russian chemical technology might simply be a reflection of the relatively small importance attached to consumer goods where many plastics and synthetic fibres find their eventual use; and the general backwardness of civilian technology could be attributed to the high priority given to defense. It could also reflect inefficiencies in the exploitation of foreign-developed technologies: as the general level of technology, and specifically Russian needs, has become more sophisticated, the traditional policy of stripping down foreign machines and of reading foreign patents and blueprints has become an increasingly ineffective substitute for exchanges of "know-how" and close, person-to-person contacts. In addition, it could reflect the futility and inefficiency of centralized decision-making and on-paper planning of scientific and technological advance and application.

In this context, it is interesting to contrast the American and Russian experience in defense and civilian technologies. Faced with rising defense costs, the U.S. Government tried, in the 1960's, to plan a rapid advance in defense technology more effectively by making early choices among possible technological configurations on the basis of detailed paper analysis, thereby eliminating "duplication" in research and advanced development. The result was the F-111. In the U.S.S.R., competition among alternative designs has been actively encouraged with, it appears, good results, and the United States has reverted to a policy of "fly before buy."[10]

In the civilian sector, however, the reverse has been happening. In the USSR, lines of technical development to be pursued tend to be established centrally, and attempts are made to cut down the number

[8] The best general sources on Eastern European (mainly Russian) science and technology are: OECD, *Science Policy in the USSR* (Paris 1969); Radovan Richta, *Civilization at the Crossroads* (Prague 1968); Michael Boretsky, *Comparative Progress in Technology, Productivity, and Economic Efficiency: USSR versus USA*, and *The Technological Base of Soviet Military Power*, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, D.C. 1966 and 1970 respectively); Christopher Freeman and Alison Young, *The Research and Development Effort in Europe, North America and the Soviet Union* (OECD, Paris 1965); UNESCO, *Statistics on Research and Experimental Development Activities, 1967* (Paris 1970).

[9] Ivan Berenyi, "Computers in Eastern Europe," *Scientific American*, CCXXIII (October 1970).

[10] For an admission of the weaknesses of the previous U.S. system, and intentions for the future, see David Packard's speech to representatives of defense firms on August 11, 1971 (Department of Defense News Release No. 689-71).

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of different types of producers' goods incorporating new technology; whereas in the West, technological initiatives are decentralized and competitive, and producers' goods are highly differentiated.[11] It seems that the U.S.S.R. still has to find the functional equivalent of the capitalists' oligopolistic competition in producers' goods for putting cost-effective technology to use.

The Russian authorities are well aware of these deficiencies and have taken measures to try to correct them. As a necessary prelude to a considerable increase in the importation of Western technology through direct agreements with Western firms, the U.S.S.R. has adhered to the Paris convention on the protection of industrial property. Most of these agreements have been with European and Japanese firms, a fact that has led to successful pressure by American firms on the U.S. Government to liberalize its regulations on the exportation of technology to Communist countries.[12]

It is doubtful that this infusion of Western technology will, in and of itself, make the use of Russia's civilian technological resources more efficient. The U.S.S.R. has not demonstrated the Japanese ability to import foreign technology, to diffuse it rapidly and—with a combination of absorptive R & D, cheap but educated labor, and strong competition within a large home market—to improve it and to export the resulting products at competitive prices a few years later. This means that, when considering such agreements, Western firms probably do not fear that they would be creating Russian competition against themselves in a few years' time. But the U.S.S.R. is short of hard currency, which means that the terms that it can offer are not too generous. There may be growing possibilities for barter agreements, in which Western firms subcontract component manufacture and assembly operations and take advantage of the cheap but well-educated Eastern European labor force. However, insofar as Western firms are multinational and anxious to retain full control over integrated, worldwide operations, they may be reluctant to license their technology in Eastern Europe for fear that Western European countries and Japan demand the same treatment as Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, the U.S. Government seems reluctant to liberalize the

[11] For a description of the characteristics of "research-intensive" industries in the West, see William Gruber and Raymond Vernon, "The Technology Factor in a World Trade Matrix," in Raymond Vernon, ed., *The Technology Factor in International Trade* (New York 1970); for a description of the USSR's "uniform-technology" policy, see Bruce Williams, *Technology Investment and Growth* (London 1967), 147.

[12] For a list of Russian purchases of Western plant and equipment, see Marshall I. Goldman, "More Heat in the Soviet Hothouse," *Harvard Business Review*, XLIX (July-August 1971), 15, exhibit IV.

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exportation of its computer technology to Eastern Europe completely. But although the importance of computers cannot be denied, the combination of indigenous backwardness and the difficulty of getting access to foreign developments may have made the Russian authorities see in computers virtues and attractions that may dissipate quickly upon more intimate acquaintance. Great hopes seem to be placed in the Ninth Five-Year Plan on the use of computers and other paraphernalia of "advanced management" techniques to improve economic performance.[13] One proposal—to create a vast network of linked computer information systems in order to improve the central planning of the economy—appears to ignore not only the tremendous technical difficulties of such an undertaking, but also the not very reassuring Western experience to date with "management information systems."[14]

The Russian authorities have, over the past few years, taken a series of measures intended to improve the results of their civilian R & D. In particular, they have tried to improve the links between industrial R & D and manufacturing operations, and to heighten the rewards for successful inventors. But little progress seems to have been made in creating competition among industrial firms, or in giving industrial firms autonomy in product development and product pricing. Perhaps one can understand the reason if one accepts Professor Burns's conclusion that technology is more successfully developed and applied in an "entrepreneur-centered" system than in a "management-centered system," and if one thinks of the consequences for power relationships within the U.S.S.R. of moving from the latter to the former:

> In management-centered organizations the problems and tasks facing the concern as a whole are broken down into specialisms. Each individual pursues his task as something distinct from the real tasks of the organization. . . . "Somebody at the top" is responsible for seeing to its relevance. . . . Operations and working behaviour are governed by instructions and decisions issued by superiors. This command hierarchy is maintained by the implicit assumption that all knowledge about the situation of the firm and its tasks is, or should be, available only to the head of the firm. . . .
>
> Entrepreneur-centered systems are adapted to unstable conditions, when problems and requirements for action arise which cannot be broken down and distributed among specialist roles within a closely defined hierarchy. Individuals have to perform their special tasks in the light of their knowledge of the tasks of the firm as a whole. Tasks lose much of their formal definition. . . . Interaction runs laterally as

[13] New York Times, February 15, 1971, p. 2.

[14] Alan Westin, "Information Technology and Public Decision-Making," in *Program on Technology and Society*, Harvard University, Sixth Annual Report, 1969-1970, 65.

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much as vertically. . . . Omniscience can no longer be imputed to the head of the concern.[15]

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

The second strand of public policy toward industrial science and technology has been to try to ensure that, because of the direct economic benefits involved, national technology be competitive in world markets in at least some sectors. It has also been the policy to maintain or induce a strong effort in fundamental science, which in turn permits the monitoring of worldwide developments in science and technology. There has been another powerful motive, namely, to avoid complete technological dependence on foreign sources, and thereby to satisfy what Professor Vernon has described as "powerful psychic and social needs on the part of élite groups . . . including the desire to avoid a sense of dependence on outsiders."[16] Such an objective might sound trivial, and it has in fact led to some unrealistic and unsuccessful policies. But the history of 1776 and since shows that nations are made of the stuff that Professor Vernon describes.

This concern about foreign technological domination was widely expressed in Europe in the 1960's, when it was feared that the huge American lead in aerospace technology would spread to other technological sectors and that, through the medium of American multinational firms, Europe would become technologically depleted: in other words, that a technologically "unipolar" system would develop, which —even if it enabled Europe to be materially well off—would lead to the concentration of both R & D activities and high-level decision-making in the United States. But the most recent OECD statistics show that in fact quite the reverse has been happening. Throughout the 1960's, the relative weight of the United States in the Western World's science and technology was steadily decreasing. (See Tables 1 and 2.) By 1967, the U.S.A. still maintained considerably more R & D in the aerospace industry, mainly in response to the national defense and space programs; but in nuclear energy and in industry-financed R & D, Europe was undertaking about the same amount as the United States. Furthermore, throughout the 1960's, Europe steadily improved its trading position in high-technology products, and European firms continue to be active in most areas of advanced technology.

[15] Tom Burns, "*The Innovative Process and the Organization of Industrial Science*," in Main Speeches, European Industrial Research Management Association, Conference Papers, V (Paris 1967); cited in Pavitt and Wald (fn. 4), 61.

[16] Raymond Vernon, "The Multinational Enterprise: Power versus Sovereignty," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIX (July 1971).

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In other words, Europe appears to have responded very effectively to the "American challenge." But, in spite of the hopes of many, the challenge did not lead to a more concerted and integrated continent-wide response. Individual European countries have been able to do very well on their own in science and technology. Certainly, in the expensive scientific field of high-energy physics, successful cooperation is continuing in spite of budgetary difficulties and a small and unusual flurry of scientific nationalism from Germany. But in expensive sectors of technology, European cooperation has been a failure, mainly because of unwillingness to pay the political price to make such cooperation successful—namely, greater technological interdependence and agreement on political objectives.[17]

Ironically, it is now in the United States that debate and discussion concerning a European and Japanese technological "challenge" is most animated. Whereas the Europeans were concerned about U.S. foreign investment, American concern is focussed on the steady erosion of its trading position in high-technology products.[18] The same policy measures are now being advocated here as in Europe in the 1960's: R & D subsidies to industry, mergers, and protection against foreign competition.[19] However, just as European perceptions of the American technological challenge were often exaggerated in the 1960's, and the response of European governments misplaced, so the European and Japanese challenge may today be exaggerated in the United States, and the proposed responses may be unproductive.

In particular, as has been argued by Nelson and Eads, it is unlikely that government subsidies to specific, commercially-oriented technical ventures in industry will improve the technological competitiveness of American industry.[20] We have already noted the steady and continuing increase in industry's expenditure on R & D in all Western industrialized countries, including the United States; this suggests that industry is now well aware of the advantages of financing R & D activities. Furthermore, the experience of European countries in the 1960's suggests that it tends to remain to governments to finance projects which

[17] For a fuller discussion, see Pavitt, "Technology in Europe's Future," *Research Policy*, I (August 1972).

[18] See Michael Boretsky's paper, presented before the National Academy of Engineering, Symposium on Technology and International Trade, October 1970; also, Philip Boffey, "Technology and World Trade: Is There Cause for Alarm?" *Science*, CLXXII (April 2, 1971), 37-41.

[19] See "The U.S. Searches for a Realistic Trade Policy," *Business Week*, July 3, 1971.

[20] Richard Nelson, "World Leadership, the Technological Gap and National Policy," *Minerva*, IX (July 1971). George Eads and Richard Nelson, "Governmental Support of Advanced Civilian Technology: Power Reactors and the Supersonic Transport," *Public Policy*, XIX (Summer 1971).

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private sources do not consider worthy of support. Although there have been occasional successes, no government agency set up to support industrial R & D has made a commercially respectable profit. And it is interesting to note that Swiss industry, which ranks among the most technically sophisticated in the world, is strongly opposed to direct government-financing of industrial technology.[21]

What happened in the European aircraft industry shows very clearly that government money almost inevitably ends up in unprofitable technical ventures. In the 1950's and 1960's, European firms were facing much larger technical and market risks in developing civil aircraft than their American counterparts, given the latter's privileged access to a much larger military market and the close links between military and civilian technology. In consequence, private money went less readily into aircraft development in Europe than it did in the United States, and the substitution of European governments' money rarely enabled the European firms to overcome their fundamental technical and market disadvantage. For example, even with considerable financial support from the British Government, the aero-engine firm Rolls-Royce went bankrupt trying to compete against engines whose prototype had already been developed in large part with U.S. Government money. However, the worm has turned and, ironically enough, it is now the aerospace industry in the United States that is conjuring up a European challenge as a justification for greater government support.[22] But, as the figures in Table 3 show, this challenge is not realistic: aerospace is the one area where the R & D effort of American industry is overwhelmingly greater than that of European firms.

Another argument advanced to justify greater government support to the American aerospace industry is that the defense programs of the United States no longer give the impetus to civil aircraft development that they have given in the past, and that alternative methods of stimulating civil aviation technology are therefore required.[23] But although industry did, and obviously should, exploit in the civilian sector the forced-draft technological change induced by defense and space programs, it does not necessarily follow that the forced-draft can or should be maintained once defense and space programs have slowed down. It was such thinking that led the U.S. Government to be drawn into an expensive commitment to finance the SST. Given the European experience, the rejection by the U.S. Congress can be inter-

[21] OECD, *Reviews of National Science Policy: Switzerland* (Paris 1971).
[22] See *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, May 31, 1971.
[23] *Ibid.*, June 21, 1971, p. 15.

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preted not as a vote against technological progress, nor as a triumph of ecology over economics, but as a refusal to begin the type of financing of civilian technology that leads to commercial failure.

The real problem lies elsewhere—in adjusting to the reduction in the demand for new aerospace technology that is the result of the relaxation in tension between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the end of the space race, changing patterns of requirements of the aircraft industry, and public boredom with and even hostility to technology spectaculars. It takes political temerity to let advanced-technology companies fail. Only Mr. Heath has done it so far with Rolls-Royce. As long as little effort is made by the government to alleviate the very real human costs of letting aerospace activity run down, each country's industry is bound to use spurious arguments—whether they be related to the balance of payments, maintaining a stake in advanced technology, resisting foreign challenges, or ensuring security of supply—to justify its continued existence.

Furthermore, it is very doubtful that "international cooperation" can be the solution to the problems of the aerospace industry. Given its economically depressed state, such "cooperation" will often be nothing more than a euphemism for each government trying to get other governments' money and markets for its own industry. Even if, as in the proposed United States–European cooperation on the Space Shuttle, the aerospace industries of various nations cooperate, share the work, and present joint proposals to a number of governments, very big difficulties will remain, given the commercial and/or strategic importance of certain parts of aerospace technology. Thus, while the United States will be very reluctant to become dependent on foreign technology, this will be precisely the objective of foreign countries—and often in the very areas which the U.S. Government and U.S. industry would least like to see in foreign hands. For this reason, proponents of transatlantic aerospace cooperation in general are likely to have considerable difficulties in agreeing when it comes to settling the details.[24] On the other hand, opponents of large-scale government commitments to aerospace are much more likely to be able to make common cause in order to try to avoid international agreements which, as the Anglo-French agreement on the Concorde shows, make large-scale programs even more difficult to stop, once started.

The fears of European nations and the United States about each other's technological challenge may be exaggerated and used to justify

[24] Burl Valentine, "Obstacles to Space Co-operation: Europe and The Post-Apollo Experience," *Research Policy*, 1, No. 2.

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continued government support of defense-related industries, but Canada may have a real problem of foreign technological domination. Manufacturing industry—and particularly high-technology manufacturing industry—is mainly owned by U.S. firms. Technology and the current Canadian concern for greater industrial independence are closely interwoven. The achievement of greater independence requires that Canadian industry develop specialized technological strengths which are competitive in world markets. And if it is true that United States firms are undertaking less R & D in Canada, Canadian scientists and engineers will have to depend increasingly on the existence of Canadian-owned firms in high-technology industries for finding productive employment.[25]

Under these circumstances, Canadian policy for science and technology has not unnaturally been a subject of intense discussion and debate over the past few years, and a good part of this discussion has been focussed on government machinery for formulating such a policy.[26] However, as Robert Gilpin has pointed out, formal government machinery cannot be a substitute for industrial entrepreneurship, nor for the close and informal relationships among industry, the universities, the civil service, and the banking community—these being the essential ingredients for the successful exploitation of technology in world markets.[27]

At a time when Canadians are intensely concerned about maintaining their independence, it may seem perverse to suggest that the most effective way to foster the above ingredients might well be to lower the external tariff, thereby increasing Canadian industry's exposure to worldwide competition. Yet the three small European countries which do have very strong civilian science and technology—the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland—are all countries with low industrial tariffs.[28] Their situation must be compared to that of France, where very little in the way of commercial benefit came out of the flowering of French technical inventiveness at the turn of the century—possibly because of the heavy protection afforded to French industry and the inefficiency and sleepiness that this allowed. When, after 1958, French industry was exposed to foreign competition for the first time for nearly one hundred years, there was considerable concern that this would lead to

[25] Peter Meyboom, *Technological Innovation in Canada*, Economic Development Division, Department of Finance (Ottawa 1970).

[26] OECD, *Review of National Science Policy: Canada* (Paris 1970)

[27] "Science Policy for What: The Uniqueness of the Canadian Situation," mimeo, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (Princeton 1971).

[28] See Pavitt and Wald (fn. 4), 52-56.

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foreign technological domination. Yet the most important and lasting feature of France's technological resurgence has not been the large-scale, government-financed programs where prestige was often a more important consideration than commercial viability, but the very considerable increase in French industry's own expenditures on R & D. International competition appears to sharpen the businessman's mind wonderfully, and it soon becomes evident to him that good technology and good science are essential components of commercial success.

THE INTERNATIONAL IMPERATIVE: SPECIALIZATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE

It will be abundantly clear from what has been said above that national policies for science and technology are very heavily influenced by the international framework within which they are undertaken. For the Western, advanced countries, this framework has offered not only opportunities for economic growth and commercial success in world markets; it has also imposed increasingly severe constraints on what national scientific and technological programs can expect to remain viable. It rarely makes economic sense to conduct R & D that has already been done in another country, precisely because there is more than enough interesting and useful R & D to be done, and because scientific and technological knowledge flows easily across national boundaries. And, assuming that the efficiency of R & D is higher when there is competition, international competition—through judgment of international peers for science, and through judgment of the international market for technology—is a convenient way to keep national science and technology efficient.

Thus, in science and technology as in trade, a case can be made in the industrially advanced countries for a policy of specialization within a framework of international competition and exchange. And, in science and technology as in trade, the case for internationalism can be made, not on the basis of traditional patterns of behavior, nor of some messianic intentions for the future, but on the basis of national self-interest in participating in such a system.

Events in the advanced Western countries have proven during the 1960's that the case for such specialization, competition, and exchange is a compelling one. It has been exceedingly difficult to sustain national programs that are second-best in civilian technology. The British have found this out in the aircraft industry, where the cost of developing and operating uncompetitive British designs has become very high.

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Similarly, the French Government decided to buy American-designed nuclear power reactors because—even after considerable public expense—the nationally developed system would have been too expensive to operate; now, certain agencies of the French Government are also having second thoughts about the large-scale government support being given to French technology in color television and computers.[29]

This international imperative will be felt in other countries in the 1970's. Germany was kept out of the strategic technologies after the second World War, and benefitted considerably from concentrating its resources on civilian technology. During the 1960's, however, the German Government appears to have been increasingly eager to buy its way into aerospace technology. But it is unlikely that Germany will be any more successful than Britain and France in maintaining a large, commercially viable R & D effort in this sector. Similiarly, since the second World War, Japanese industry has been very successful in moving into new sectors of civilian technology through buying licenses from foreign firms which are unable to penetrate the heavily protected Japanese market by means of exports or direct investment. Under the strong pressures from foreign governments to open the Japanese market to foreign firms, it will become increasingly difficult for Japanese firms to obtain licenses from foreign firms on terms as favorable as they have been in the past. Even Japanese scientific and technological resources are likely to reach limits, and a more conscious policy of specialization will impose itself.[30]

But it is perhaps in the United States that the imperative of specialization will make itself most keenly felt in the 1970's. As we have seen, industry-financed R & D in the United States is still increasing steadily; and, if only because of the close links between national capabilities in science and in technology, a case can be made for steady and growing government support for American academic research.[31] But the United States no longer exclusively carries the burden of making sure that the world has enough science and technology to solve its problems. The total amount of academic and industrial research being done is still increasing fast, even if the U.S.A. is making a relatively smaller contribution to the total. The objective sometimes expressed in the United States of being "second to none" in all sectors of science

[29] See Robert Gilpin, "Technological Strategies and National Purpose," *Science*, CLXIX (July 31, 1971), 441-48. L. Stoleru, "Quand l'Etat se mele du marché," *Le Monde*, June 25, 1971.

[30] See Nicolas Jéquier, *Le Défi Industriel Japonais* (Lausanne 1970).

[31] For a detailed discussion of the links between national capabilities in academic science and in industrial technology, see Pavitt and Wald (fn. 4), Part III.

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and technology is both costly and unnecessary. It makes economic sense for the U.S.A. to become relatively more dependent on the world system: in academic science through increased opportunities for foreign travel and study for American research workers; and in technology through increased licensing of foreign technology, foreign direct investment in the United States, and imports of producers' goods.

By comparison with the United States, most other countries live, and will continue to live, with a considerably greater degree of dependence on foreign science and technology—without their indigenous capabilities or their economic vigor being impaired. Furthermore, Germany saw a much more traumatic change in its scientific and technological ambitions as a result of the second World War, and Britain experienced a slower but equally fundamental change during the 1960's. This did not happen without some pain and some discord, but neither did it destroy either nation's scientific and technological strength.

THE ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC GOODS

A relatively new factor influencing national policies toward industrial R & D reflects, in one sense, the success that R & D has had in promoting economic growth. This is the growing concern about the effects of technological progress and economic growth on the physical and human environment. However, diametrically opposed conclusions are often drawn as to what the implications are. For some, technological progress and economic growth must be stopped if we are to prevent the depletion of raw materials on our "spaceship earth," or to avoid death through asphyxiation or overcrowding. For others, there exists an "ecological challenge" and/or a "social challenge," which requires a scientific and technological effort equivalent in scale and nature to the Apollo program. Both of these conclusions are probably wrong.

Certainly, if economic growth were no longer considered a desirable policy objective, the *raison d'être* of about half the R & D undertaken in the world would be removed.[32] But although the opponents of economic growth may often be intelligent, articulate, and far-sighted, they are also a materially well-off minority. It is very doubtful indeed that their admonitions not to become as well off as they are will be listened to with much sympathy by economically less fortunate groups in both the advanced and less developed countries. And, though they may be intelligent and far-sighted, so was Thomas Malthus, who—

[32] See Fabian and others (fn. 3).

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because he left out of his calculations the possibilities of technological progress in agriculture—made some very erroneous predictions about the future of the world. Shaky predictions of doom may be made today because of the assumption that the relationship between production levels and pollution levels is necesssarily positive and because of non-recognition of the effects of the price mechanism on the degree of recycling of raw materials and on technological progress which saves on their use.[33]

However, R & D will certainly be essential to effect a reduction in pollution and, if necessary, to economize on the use of raw materials. There is also the chance to remedy the justified criticism that, although science and technology have been made to respond in a very successful manner to the needs of individual consumers, of industrialists, and of the military, this has not been the case with regard to the growing needs for public goods and services like health, mass transportation, and urban development.

But does the answer to these problems lie simply in spending more money on R & D in these new social areas? Certainly, government expenditures in North America and Western Europe have been increasing rapidly, but in 1968 they nowhere amounted to more than 7 per cent of national expenditures on R & D, and in many cases to considerably less.[34] Perhaps more revealing is the fact that the United States has been spending a higher percentage of its GNP on Research and Development on health, pollution, and urban and social services than have Western European countries. Yet, such information as there is shows that, in Northern European countries at least, the standards of health care, urban amenity, and social service are higher than in the U.S.A.

This considerable variation across the Atlantic in the impact of socially oriented R & D[35] suggests either that science and technology cannot really help very much in these areas, or that there is difficulty in applying the science and technology. The practice of the industrial sector suggests that three ingredients are essential if science and technology are to be applied in a socially responsive manner: a need which is expressed in monetary terms; entrepreneurship; and money costs that reflect social costs. Insofar as the social needs are most acute among

[33] For a fuller discussion, see Pavitt, "A European's View of the Environmental Crisis," mimeo, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (Princeton 1971).

[34] See Fabian and others (fn. 3).

[35] With economically motivated R & D there are no similar variations in efficiency across countries. See Pavitt and Wald (fn. 4), Annex A.

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the poor, or more generally in urban regions, a significant transfer of resources may be required to ensure that money demand reflects social demand; entrepreneurship thrives on competition and freedom of entry, which may require the breaking up of traditional patterns of relationships between local political authorities and local suppliers; and getting money costs to reflect social costs may mean the imposition of heavy penalties on those who cause pollution and congestion.

All these problems are fundamentally political—in other words, they involve moving resources, burdens, and power from one group in society to another. They cannot be conjured away by "technology assessment," "cost-benefit analysis," "social engineering," "systems analysis," or other social science equivalents of the "technological fix." Until they are solved, there may be very little that science and technology will do to help.

All this does not, of course, absolve policy-makers in the field of science from their responsibility to stimulate the R & D which could help solve these problems: for example, there is immediate need for fundamental research on ecosystems, for a concentrated effort to find cost-effective substitutes for persistent pesticides, and for stimulating the general state of the art in ground transportation technology. But it is very doubtful indeed that these new programs will lead to projects of the same scale and nature as the big defense and space projects of the 1950's and 1960's. For example, the development of the high-speed passenger train in Britain which, if successful, will revolutionize intercity transportation there, has drawn heavily on aeronautical skills but will cost only about $15 million, including two prototype trains—far less, in other words, than development costs for a passenger aircraft.[36] In fact, much of the R & D required will be rather mundane, decentralized, and form a part of wider tasks, such as government scientists and engineers drawing up industrial pollution standards and helping enforce them; industrial scientists and engineers designing and building equipment with an eye to an additional, environmental constraint; management experts finding relatively simple means of improving prenatal health care for the urban poor.

Unfortunately, there is the danger that government-supported, "socially oriented" R & D programs will become mainly a means of keeping high-energy physicists and aerospace engineers in jobs, or of avoiding politically painful actions such as the enforcement of pollution standards, or of trying to find uses for clever and sophisticated technologies developed for other purposes. But the long-run viability and

[36] David Hamilton, "Advanced Passenger Train Revealed," *New Scientist and Science Journal*, L (June 10, 1971), 624-25.

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growth of R & D that responds effectively to social and environmental needs will ultimately depend on meeting the political conditions set out above. To the degree that they are met, past experience has shown the capacity of science and technology to respond rapidly to new demands. But predicting if and when they will be met is far more difficult than predicting the future course of technology itself. Science and technology can create opportunities. Whether and how these opportunities are exploited depends on political choice. In this sense, it can be argued that each society gets the science and technology it deserves.

These emerging social and environmental problems have lent themselves particularly well, over the past few years, to large splurges of international pontification. They have helped divert attention from other policy problems related to science and technology where severe tensions sometimes exist among nations. Everybody can agree easily in an international forum that what is needed is a cleaner environment and a better quality of life. The problems in attaining this end exist mainly *within* countries rather than *between* countries. Some new international action obviously is required: making arrangements for joint programs of ecological research and for environmental monitoring; preventing environmental regulations from becoming barriers to international trade; stopping one country from fouling up another's environment; exchanging relevant experience and information on how to deal with the various problems.

However, although the direction of R & D efforts as well as of international relations will increasingly be affected by policy measures to deal with these "imperfections" of the market system with regard to the environment and public goods, it is far from certain that these measures will have a major impact on the pace and direction of government funding of R & D in the 1970's; or that, after the Stockholm Conference of 1972, their effects on international relations will be quite as considerable as has sometimes been claimed. Indeed, it is likely that both national R & D efforts and international relations will continue to be affected more significantly by another "imperfection" in the market system, namely, the conditions of access to enriched uranium technology and rocket launcher technology.

ENRICHED URANIUM AND ROCKET LAUNCHERS

Enriched uranium and rocket launchers are key inputs into the generation of nuclear power and the operation of applications satellites. They are also key components in a nuclear strike capability. The tech-

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nologies were first developed for this latter purpose, mainly in the United States, which as a result has a virtual monopoly of both in the non-Communist world. But in spite of the fact that the U.S. Government makes both enriched uranium and rocket launching services available to foreign countries for civilian uses on a nondiscriminatory basis, a certain uneasiness persists. In sectors as sensitive to the functioning of the national economy as energy and communications, nation-states are naturally reluctant to be completely dependent on a foreign monopoly supplier, however enlightened and well-intentioned he may be.

Furthermore, the Western European countries and Japan are less willing now than they were ten years ago to be satisfied simply with American assurances on supply. In the intervening period, the key importance of these two technologies for the future has become clearer, and the general desire for diminished dependence on the United States has become greater. Europe is increasingly committed to developing its own lines of nuclear power reactors, and does not wish to be irrevocably dependent on its strongest competitor for its supply of nuclear fuels. In rocket launchers, Europe does not have the same ambition to compete with the U.S.A., but some countries are very concerned about the degree to which dependence on American launchers might affect the future development of intra-European communications. In addition, Europe and Japan now have much greater technical and financial resources than they had ten years ago, so that the temptation to redevelop the technologies indigenously is now a real one. Such redevelopment would ensure security of supply, but it would be expensive. Opinions differ within and between countries on whether it would be worth the extra cost to do so. This means that what finally is done depends to a considerable degree on the position taken by the U.S. Government.

Here, a restrictive attitude towards foreign access to and control of the two technologies might at first sight appear to be most attractive to American commercial and security interests, but it may in fact have a result precisely opposite to the one intended: it could encourage those groups in Europe and Japan who support indigenous redevelopment. If these groups were successful, it would probably result in a reduction of commercial outlets for U.S. industry, and—even if the developments were undertaken for ostensibly non-military purposes—there would be a wider number of strategic options open to both Europe and Japan. On the other hand, if the U.S. Government were to take a more liberal position, giving foreign countries greater access to American

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technology, but only for civilian uses, some commercial outlets for U.S. industry could be maintained, and the probability of the development of independent capabilities would be reduced.[37]

CONCLUSIONS

When, during the 1960's, the United States and Soviet Russia were engaged in the space race, the U.S. Government pouring enormous and growing sums of money into university science, and American firms invading Europe's high-technology markets, it was fashionable to argue that the "imperatives of modern technology" had made the European nation-state obsolete and irrelevant, that European technology was hopelessly managed, that the scale of modern technology made European countries too small to be efficient, and that Europe must change its ways and unite politically, if it were not to be technologically depleted. Yet, now that we have statistics on trends in R & D expenditures in the 1960's, we can see that the U.S.A. has been losing its preponderance in the Western World's science and technology. We can also see that countries like Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands were able to run effective programs in both science and technology despite their smaller size.

Certainly, a number of countries still have difficult problems to solve in adapting to modern technology: better links between the universities and industry are still needed in France, Italy, and Japan; France has to continue to ease itself out of some expensive but unrewarding R & D programs; Germany will have to go through the same, sad learning experience in big technology as Britain and France; Canada must find effective means of encouraging industrial entrepreneurship; Italy and Japan will have to deal more effectively with the social consequences of rapid technological advance; and all European countries must decide whether or not they are willing to pay the political cost of greater specialization and interdependence that is necessary for effective programs in certain expensive technologies.

Yet it is possible to argue that by the end of the 1960's, both the small and medium-sized industrial powers of the Western World had more or less made their peace with modern technology, and that in the 1970's it will be the two superpowers that will have the greatest difficulties

[37] For indications of current thinking on these problems in the U.S. Government see statements by Pollack, Frutkin, and Kratzer in *A General Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Cooperation in Science and Space of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, 92nd Cong., First Sess., May 18, 19, and 20, 1971. (Washington, D.C. 1971).

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in doing so. In the United States, it may be hard to accept the relative decline of American scientific and technological prowess; to admit that none of the contemporary challenges—ecological or urban, German or Japanese—justify the same level and type of government support of R & D as the strong pressure to respond vigorously to a perception of a strategic and political threat by a foreign power; to generate the resources and mechanisms for the investments and regulatory activities necessary to deal with the social consequences of technological change. In the U.S.S.R. it may become increasingly difficult to resolve the conflict between a growing need to apply technology effectively in industry and agriculture as well as defense, and the upheaval in the present patterns of power and control within the U.S.S.R. that would result from creating the conditions for this to happen.

The above discussion has been concerned with only a small proportion of the world's population. Nothing has been said about the less developed countries. Some may consider this unsurprising: very little R & D is done there, and nearly all the R & D done in the advanced countries is not related to the needs of the less developed ones. The prime objective of industrial R & D is to save on already expensive labor and to respond to the rising needs of societies whose affluence is already considerable. No Western government devotes more than 2 per cent of its R & D budget directly to the problems of the less developed world; most countries devote much less.

During the 1960's, multinational firms showed a growing tendency to set up component manufacture and assembly plants in the less developed countries to take advantage of lower labor costs. In particular, the experience of the electronics industry in Southeast Asia suggests that—labor unions in the advanced countries permitting—such activities will be considerably expanded in the future: provided that the population has primary education, labor costs are considerably lower than productivity levels by comparison with the advanced countries. But, although this trend could make an important contribution to meeting foreign exchange needs, its effect on the huge employment problem of the less developed countries is less striking, since the possibilities for making existing production methods more labor-intensive are strictly limited.

This is but one example of the much wider problems, namely, that the present pattern of the world's R & D is directed to making labor-*saving* production methods more efficient, although the less developed countries need more efficient labor-*using* production methods. There may be

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also the problem that technological progress in the advanced countries leads to substitution and economies in the use of raw materials, and thereby turns the terms of trade against the less developed world that is dependent on the export of raw materials. The present Malthusian contention about the depletion of natural resources could have the dangerous effect of accelerating such a trend. There is also the established fact that the introduction of health and sanitation technology, without concurrent action to establish birth control, has led to the population explosion in the less developed countries, and to the attendant difficulties of raising living standards.

Some scientists are shocked and surprised when it is argued that the present world pattern of R & D has been detrimental rather than helpful to the material well-being and welfare of the less developed countries.[38] They may even become offended when the disastrous effects of introducing health and sanitation technology are pointed out. Certainly, it was and is a noble objective to stop people from dying prematurely, but the attainment of noble objectives can have unforeseen and harmful consequences. This seems to be well recognized with regard to the environment: we are today treated to a continuous stream of homilies about how the production of goods and services can cause us to spend too much time in traffic jams and can stop us from swimming, sailing, and fishing in lakes. But these harmful effects are trivia by comparison with the net harmful effects of contemporary technology on the less developed countries. It would be naive to expect that R & D efforts directed to the needs of the less developed countries would of themselves lead to salvation, but such efforts would not do any harm and might even do some good. Only the Canadian Government has so far made the promotion of such R & D an explicit objective of its national science policy.

> Thou has committed fornication
> —but that was in another country,
> and besides the wench is dead.[39]

[38] For a convincing presentation of this argument, see Charles Cooper, "Science and the Underdeveloped Countries," *Problems of Science Policy* (OECD, Paris 1968).

[39] Christopher Marlowe, *The Jew of Malta*, Act IV, scene 1.

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TABLE 1

COMPARISONS OF NATIONAL R & D EXPENDITURES IN 1961 AND 1967 (U.S. = 100)

Country	*Government-Financed* 1961	1967	*Industry-Financed* 1961	1967	*Total* 1961	1967	*Total per capita* 1961	1967
U.S.A.	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
France	10	19	10	16	10	18	40	71
Germany	8	13	15	22	10	17	34	55
Japan	5	10	17	22	10	15	19	30
U.K.	19	15	25	24	21	18	74	67

TABLE 2

COMPARISONS OF NATIONAL R & D EXPENDITURES IN 1963 AND 1967 (U.S. = 100)

Country	*Government-Financed* 1963	1967	*Industry-Financed* 1963	1967	*Total* 1963	1967	*Total per capita* 1963	1967
U.S.A.	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Canada	2	3	3	4	2	4	24	34
Belgium	1	0	3	3	1	1	27	26
France	12	19	12	16	12	18	49	71
Germany	10	13	18	22	13	17	42	55
Italy	2	2	5	5	3	3	11	12
Netherlands	2	2	5	6	3	4	50	57
E.E.C. Total	26	37	43	51	32	42	35	46
Austria	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	12
Norway	0	1	1	1	0	1	21	30
Sweden	2	2	4	4	2	2	61	60
U.K.	17	15	25	24	21	18	73	67
E.F.T.A. Total*	20	17	29	29	24	22	63	59
Japan	6	10	18	22	11	15	21	30

* Switzerland, Denmark, and Portugal excluded.

SOURCES FOR TABLES 1 to 3: Yvan Fabian, Alison Young, and others, *R & D in OECD Member Countries: Trends and Objectives* (Paris 1971); *International Survey of the Resources Devoted to R & D in 1967 by OECD Member Countries: Statistical Tables and Notes: Volume I: Business Enterprise Sector,* OECD document DAS/SPR/70.7 (Paris 1970).

In compiling the Tables, it has been assumed that, at conventional exchange rates, the costs of performing R & D in Europe are 60 per cent of what they would be in the U.S.; in Japan, 55 per cent of U.S. costs.

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Table 3

Comparison of Industry-Financed R & D in 1967 (U.S. = 100)

Country	*Aircraft and Missiles*	*Electrical Products and Instruments*	*Chemicals, Drugs, and Petroleum Products*	*Non-Electrical Machinery*	*Ferrous and Non-Ferrous Metals and Fabricated Metal Products*	*Transportation Equipment, Excl. Aircraft*	*Food and Drink, Textiles, Rubber*	*Other*	*Total Manufacturing*
United States[a]	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
U.S.A. per capita	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
France[b]	14	16	17	11	11	17	23	28	16
Germany	2	30	36	20	48	28	10	10	26
Belgium	0	2	4	1	6	0	3	5	2
Italy	.[c]	4	7	1	4	13	10	3	5
Netherlands[d]	.	14[e]	10	.	.	.	13	4	7
Total E.E.C.	15	67	75	33	69	58	57	49	56
E.E.C. per capita	16	71	80	35	74	62	60	53	60
United Kingdom	14	30	22	24	29	22	47	43	25
Sweden	.	5	2	6	12	2	5	8	4
Norway	.	1	0	0	2	0	1	2	1
Denmark[f]	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1[i]
Switzerland[g]	.	.	13[h]	.	.	.	.	.	5
Austria[a]	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	1	1
Total E.F.T.A.	14	36	39	31	44	25	53	53	37
E.F.T.A. per capita	38	95	96	83	116	67	138	142	85
Japan	.	27	27	15	50	23	42	44	24
Japan per capita	.	53	53	30	97	44	81	86	48

a. 1966 data used for U.S.A. and Austria.
b. Data corrected to exclude funds from government.
c. A dot indicates that the figure for the sector is included in another sector or in a total.
d. Total intramural expenditures on R & D.
e. Machinery assumed to be all electrical.
f. Denmark excluded in all but total manufacturing; population of E.F.T.A. adjusted.
g. Switzerland excluded in all but total manufacturing and chemicals and drugs; population of E.F.T.A. adjusted.
h. Chemicals and drugs assumed to be 60% of total manufacturing.
i. Total intramural expenditures on R & D.

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TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE IBERIC-LATIN TRADITION: The Corporative Model

By HOWARD J. WIARDA*

Introduction

IN the early 1960's a great deal of "scare" literature was produced concerning Latin America. The titles and subtitles of many of the books and articles written during the period help bear this contention out: "The Eleventh Hour," "Reform or Revolution," "Evolution or Chaos."[1] The concern of scholars and public officials, stemming principally from the Cuban revolution, was that Latin America was about to explode in violent upheaval, that unless democratic reforms were quick in forthcoming, the Latin American nations would soon be the victims of Castro-Communist takeovers. The "one-minute-to-midnight" mentality shaped not only a great deal of official thinking and policy with regard to Latin America during the 1960's, but also permeated,

* Prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1971. This paper is part of a larger study which seeks to develop a general framework for the analysis of socio-political change in Latin America. Some of the ideas presented here have previously been explored in preliminary fashion and in different contexts in the author's "The Latin American Development Process and the New Developmental Alternatives: Military 'Nasserism' and 'Dictatorship with Popular Support,'" *Western Political Quarterly*, XXV (September 1972); "Law and Political Development in Latin America: Toward a Framework for Analysis," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, XIX (Fall 1971); and "Elites in Crisis: The Decline of the Old Order and the Fragmentation of the New in Latin America," in Jack M. Hopkins, ed., *Political Ethics of Latin America* (New York, forthcoming). For efforts at applying the model, see also the author's "The Catholic Labor Movement in Brazil: Corporatism, Paternalism, Populism, and Change," in H. Jon Rosenbaum and William Tyler, eds., *Contemporary Brazil* (New York 1972); and *Dictatorship, Development, and Disintegration: The Political System of the Dominican Republic* (forthcoming). A preliminary version of the paper was presented at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. Useful commentaries on the earlier draft and on some of the ideas presented have been provided by Kenneth Erickson, Abraham F. Lowenthal, Terry L. McCoy, Keith Rosenn, Philippe C. Schmitter, Ronald M. Schneider, and Iêda Siqueira Wiarda. The responsibility for the views expressed, however, rests solely with the author.

[1] These titles and subtitles are familiar enough in the literature that there is no need to provide the full references. In any case, these examples are cited only as illustrations of a larger *genre* of literature in which similar themes are expressed.

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in varying degrees of sophistication, the large body of development literature dealing with the area.

More recently the counter-arguments have gained prominence. Latin America, in the words of John Mander, is an "unrevolutionary society," a seemingly inherently and permanently conservative region.[2] The peasants, the workers, and the students have not proved very revolutionary; revolutions and guerrilla movements have achieved neither widespread support nor great success; the old-time Communist parties are by now outdated and tired bureaucracies; the traditional structures and institutions have not collapsed but have demonstrated remarkable resilience; and the profound social revolution predicted for the area has not occurred and probably will not.[3] Midnight has not tolled—or if it has, little has happened; the choice of reform or revolution has proved to be a false, or at least not an all-inclusive, choice. In Washington, this interpretation of the essentially conservative nature of Latin America, and particularly of the absence of threatening Castro-like movements, has been reflected in a new period of official neglect and indifference.

None of these scenarios, or models, accurately delineates the nature of the Latin American development process. The eleventh-hour theme is probably useful for arousing student interest in the area, for securing aid funds from a reluctant Congress, and for raising the level of public concern regarding Latin America; but it does not reflect the sociopolitical realities of or main forces at work in the Latin American countries, or in Spain or Portugal. Moreover, the scare tactics and verbal overkill that accompanied this era have now produced the inevitable reaction in the form of public and official unconcern and a body of literature that, in seeking to correct past misinterpretations, overcompensates by focusing solely on the static, conservative aspects of Latin American development. Unfortunately, this approach does as much injustice to the complexities involved as does the earlier one of reform-or-revolution. These interpretations have not only inaccurately portrayed the Iberic-Latin development process but, in so doing, they have

[2] Mander, *The Unrevolutionary Society: The Power of Latin American Conservatism in a Changing World* (New York 1969).

[3] See especially the two volumes edited by Claudio Véliz, *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America*, and *Obstacles to Change in Latin America* (London 1967 and 1965, respectively); Luis Mercier Vega, *Roads to Power in Latin America* (New York 1969); Harry Landsberger, "The Labor Elite: Is It Revolutionary?" in Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., *Elites in Latin America* (New York 1967), 256-300; and Joan Nelson, *Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Nations* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969).

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rendered a disservice to our better comprehension of this culture area.[4]

This brief critique of some of the conventional wisdom regarding Latin America serves as the point of departure for the main theme of the paper: that there are some unique aspects to the process of socio-political change in the Iberic-Latin tradition that do not correspond to the models ordinarily used to analyze national development. These nations are not particularly well served by Rostow's "stages of growth" analysis, by Easton's and Almond's systems theory and the functionalist development literature, or by class analysis and the "power elite" paradigm.[5] Rather, because of their peculiar tradition and antecedents, the Iberic-Latin nations are subject to special imperatives and interpretations and have evolved some distinctive developmental patterns that seldom find expression in our studies of the history of political thought or the literature on social and political change. Indeed, it may well be that the Iberic-Latin tradition represents a "fourth world of development," a peculiar way of managing the great transformations of modern times, that has not yet received the attention it merits.[6] It is toward

[4] For the argument that Spain and Portugal should be included as part of a single Iberic-Latin culture area, see Lawrence S. Graham, "Latin America—Illusion or Reality: A Case for a New Analytic Framework for the Region" (unpub., University of Texas 1969); also, the numerous writings of Kalman H. Silvert regarding what he terms the "Mediterranean ethos," discussed and cited in full below.

[5] Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis" (introductory note). For some additional critiques of the literature of development as it applies to Latin America, see Alfred Stepan, "Political Development: The Latin American Tradition," *Journal of International Affairs*, XX, No. 2 (1966), 223-34; Milton I. Vanger, "Politics and Class in Twentieth Century Latin America," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XLIX (February 1969), 80-93; Mercier Vega (fn. 3); Véliz, *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (fn. 3), Introduction; Juan Marsal, *Cambio Social en América Latina: Crítica de Algunas Interpretaciones Dominantes en las Ciencias Sociales* (Buenos Aires 1967); Susanne J. Bodenheimer, *The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm —Surrogate for Latin American Studies* (Beverly Hills 1971); and N. Joseph Cayer, "Political Development: The Case of Latin America" (unpub. Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts 1972).

[6] The development literature of the last decade has largely ignored or dealt only uncomfortably with the place of Latin America in these various schemes. The nations of Latin America can hardly be called "new states"; they are not "non-Western"; they do not often identify or think of themselves as a part of the "Third World"; and there is considerable doubt as to whether they are "emerging" or "developing." For an argument parallel to the one offered here—that Latin America should be regarded "as something of a Fourth World, with characteristics of its own which entitle it to be studied in its own right and not forced to conform to whatever generalizations can be made about the Third"—see J. D. B. Miller, *The Politics of the Third World* (London 1967), Introduction. See also John D. Martz, "The Place of Latin America in the Study of Comparative Politics," *Journal of Politics*, XXVIII (February 1966), 57-80; Merle Kling, "The State of Research on Latin America: Political Science," in Charles Wagley, ed., *Social Science Research on Latin America* (New York 1964), 168-213; and Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, LX (September 1966), 66.

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the explication of the Iberic-Latin developmental model that this paper is directed.

The Traditional Structure of Iberic-Latin Society

The Iberic-Latin nations were largely bypassed by the great revolutions associated with the making of the modern world. The Protestant Reformation, the rise of capitalism, the scientific revolution, the rise of socially more pluralistic and politically more democratic societies, the Industrial Revolution and its many-faceted ramifications—all of these had little effect on the nations of the Iberic-Latin culture area. They remained cut off and isolated from these modernizing currents, at the margin of the ideological trends and socio-political movements taking place elsewhere in Europe, fragments and remnants of a peculiarly Iberic-European tradition dating from approximately 1500, with a political culture and a socio-political order that at its core was essentially two-class, authoritarian, traditional, elitist, patrimonial, Catholic, stratified, hierarchical, and corporate.[7] Given the times and the circumstances, it should not be surprising that the Latin American region should also be structured on the model and as an extension of the Iberic metropoles; what is remarkable is the durability and perseverance of this structure into the present. For despite the recent accelerated onslaught of modernization, the traditional political culture and institutions have proved permeable, accommodative, and absorptive, bending to change rather than being overwhelmed by it, and thus in many respects retaining their traditional essence even under the strains and currents set loose during this century. Since the weight of history and the past is still so heavy in virtually all the Iberic-Latin nations, and since what seems to have evolved is a unique, peculiarly Latin mode of coping with the process of change, let us examine this traditional structure in detail.

THE THEORETICAL DIMENSION

One looks in vain in the standard works on political theory for more than brief mention of the Iberic-Latin tradition. They treat of medieval Christian thought; but, aside from Machiavelli, once in the modern era attention turns to the Northern and more dynamic developing areas of Europe: Locke and the Anglo-American experience, Rousseau and

[7] See Louis Hartz and others, *The Founding of New Societies* (New York 1964), especially the essay, "The Heritage of Latin America," by Richard M. Morse, 123-77.

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the Revolution, the Germans Kant and Hegel. By the nineteenth century the focus has become even more circumscribed, treating of English utilitarianism and liberalism, Socialist thought, and the ideological concomitants of rising nationalism and industrialization. Later, we may trace the evolution of democratic thought, the varieties of socialism, and the ideological underpinnings of modern totalitarianism. All of these are peculiarly Western conceptions, however, conceptions born of a particular part of Western Europe. The point merits further elaboration, but it seems likely that part of the bias and ethnocentrism that pervades the literature of development stems from this conception of the evolution of political thought in the West and from our selectivity as to which themes and movements are worthy of mention and support, and which are not. In structuring attention along these lines, however, we miss an important thread of thought that remains dominant in the Iberic-Latin nations, that lies at the heart of their peculiar national histories and development processes, and that, because we ignore or reject it out of hand, contributes to our miscomprehensions concerning the area. As Morse suggests in explaining the deficiencies of Latin American studies in the United States, ours has been a Protestant and is now a pluralist nation, and our academic disciplines are of an increasingly secular and scientific orientation, with the result that we are "insensitive and vaguely hostile to the *sociological* and *psychological* foundations of a Catholic society."[8]

If modern political analysis in the Northern European and Anglo-American tradition was to lead to the glorification of the accomplished fact and of political pragmatism, to materialism and the success theory, and to a unilinear, stage-by-stage conception of development, which was also derived principally from the experiences of these nations, then Iberic-Latin culture can surely claim as its basis a moral idealism, a philosophical certainty, a sense of continuity, and a unified organic-corporate conception of the state and society. This conception derives from Roman law (one can still profitably read Seneca for an understanding of the Iberic-Latin tradition), Catholic thought (Augustine, Aquinas), and traditional legal precepts (the *fueros* or group charters of medieval times, the law of the *Siete Partidas* of Alfonso the Wise). In comprehending the Iberic-Latin systems, one must think in terms of a hierarchically and vertically segmented structure of class and caste stratifications, of social rank orders, functional corporations, estates,

[8] Richard M. Morse, "The Strange Career of Latin American Studies,'" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Studies*, CCCLVI (November 1964), 11; emphasis in original.

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juridical groupings and *intereses*—all fairly well defined in law and in terms of their respective stations in life—a rigid yet adaptable scheme whose component parts are tied to and derive legitimacy from the authority of the central state or its leader. The foundations for these systems lie in what Morse has called the "Thomistic-Aristotelian notion of functional social hierarchy,"[9] and they find their major expression in the political thought of Spain's Golden Century.

In pursuing paths other than those of Protestant or secular thought, such thinkers as Vitoria, Soto, Suárez, Molina, and Mariana, the chief intellectual architects of the sixteenth-century Spanish state and of the transfer of its essential features to the New World, laid the foundations of a modern theory of Christian society.[10] In contrast to the separation of politics and morality, which dates from Machiavelli and which we usually take to be the beginning of modern political analysis, the integration of the ethical and the social remained the ideal of Spain. Empirical facts had to show the credentials of logic, rightness, and relation to abstract justice. From the modern, secular viewpoint, such scholasticism shackled Spanish thought and removed the Iberic-Latin nations from the mainstreams of modern history. But perceived in another, less utilitarian light, it helped give Spanish life its firm moral pattern, its philosophy of behavior and dominant political culture, and its peculiar mode of adjusting to the pressures of modernization.

Vitoria and Suárez stand as the great system builders on which the Spanish empire and Iberic-Latin society were constructed. Their genius lay in fusing the older Thomistic conception and the system of juridical estates derived from Spanish customary law with the newer concept of absolute, state-building royal authority. There were important differences among the several writers mentioned, to be sure,[11] but what is more striking are the common, unifying themes. All assume an ordered universe, all adopt the Thomistic hierarchy of laws, and all base their theories of state and society on Christian assumptions. All share, furthermore, a disdain for the common man; what they mean by popular government is feudal and aristocratic, based upon a restoration of the privileges or *fueros* of the Middle Ages, the power of the traditional estates, dominated by "natural" elites, and without popular suffrage.

[9] Morse, "Recent Research on Latin American Urbanization: A Selective Survey with Commentary," *Latin American Research Review*, 1 (Fall 1965), 41. See also John Henry Merryman, *The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America* (Stanford 1969); and Wiarda, "Law and Political Development" (introductory note).

[10] The argument here follows that of Mariano Picón-Salas, *A Cultural History of Spanish America* (Berkeley 1968), 39-40.

[11] Bernice Hamilton, *Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain* (Oxford 1963).

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Their view of society and the state is an organic one—that government is natural, necessary, and ordained by God for achieving harmony among men. This conception is an almost inherently conservative one. In contrast to contract theory which, except in Hobbes, is individualistic, democratic, liberal, and progressive, organic theory subordinates human law to natural and divine law, is more tolerant of authority, slights the individual in favor of group "rights" or a superior "general will," accepts and justifies the status quo, reserves extensive powers for traditional vested interests, and leads inherently toward a corporate system which subordinates man to some allegedly higher end and unity.[12]

The best form of government therefore is an enlightened monarchy or an all-powerful executive; there can be no "separation of powers" or "checks and balances" on the U.S. model. Rather, a monistic structure is required to keep peace and maintain the "natural" order. Extensive powers are also reserved for such corporate entities as the Church, the municipalities, the landed and commercial elites, the guilds, the military hierarchy, and other vested and chartered interests. Organic theory in both Church and state rejects liberal individualism and the materialistic and secular conceptions that accompanied development in northern Europe. Although this repudiation does not *necessarily* follow from the organic, Catholic, and scholastic premises, it certainly has a powerful basis in them.[13]

It is not surprising that this view of the proper ordering of sociopolitical relations should be articulated and strongly established in sixteenth-century Spain, Portugal, and their colonies in the New World; what is surprising is that it should endure so long. In the metropoles, with their conservative, non-revolutionary traditions, it persisted through the decline of Spanish power in the seventeenth century, the Bourbon reforms of the eighteenth, the divisive currents of the nineteenth, and the period of challenge and conflict in the twentieth—only to be re-established in almost pristine form in the Spain of Primo de Rivera and Franco, and the Portugal of Salazar and Caetano. In Spanish-Portuguese America it not only survived some three centuries of colonial rule but also, in slightly reordered and rebaptized form, the separations from the mother countries in the early nineteenth century, the tempestuous histories that followed (in which *restoration* of the Spanish system often remained the operating ideal), and on into

[12] See especially the analysis in Guenter Lewy, *Constitutionalism and Statecraft During the Golden Age of Spain: A Study of the Political Philosophy of Juan de Mariana, S.J.* (Geneva 1960), 49-50.

[13] *Ibid.* See also Hamilton (fn. 11), Introduction and Conclusion.

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the period of accelerated industrialization, social change, and ideological challenge of the present. Despite these newer pressures—discussed in greater detail later on—one still finds powerful echoes and manifestations of the earlier corporate-organic framework in virtually all contemporary regimes and institutions in Latin America and in their underlying political-cultural foundations. As Newton comments, sixteenth-century Spanish political theory endowed the state "with a remarkable stability, a stability achieved through the delicate balancing of opposing and ultimately antagonistic forces, . . . a system admirably designed, out of very disparate components and different traditions, for the preservation of the status quo."[14]

Space does not permit elaboration of all the nuances and challenges to this dominant tradition. The Laws of the Indies, derived from both the *Siete Partidas* and the newer sixteenth-century concepts, provide a remarkable early example of and bulwark for this tradition, albeit modified and reinterpreted many times over. In the eighteenth century, the newer ideas of empiricism and the Enlightenment began to have their impact, but their influence was superficial, limited chiefly to a small circle of royal advisers and an occasional daring intellectual.[15] In the early nineteenth century came the break with Spain and Portugal, but in the New World this implied mainly a redefinition and reformulation of the classic Iberic-Latin tradition, not its repudiation. Historians have long argued that the Wars of Independence were not true social revolutions because the fundamental nature of society remained largely intact; now, as the research of Dealy has demonstrated, we know there was also precious little change in the political order.[16] The constitutional forms were representative and democratic, but in substance the non-democratic, elitist, corporate, hierarchical, authoritarian heritage was retained almost intact. The direction of political thought in Latin America maintained a remarkable continuity both before *and* after 1810.

By now, however, the commercial success of the English, the growth of the natural sciences and technology, the inspiration of representative rule in North America, the glitter and glory of France, and the ideals of the Revolution, together with the restlessness for change on the part of the Latin American creoles themselves, had begun to have their

[14] Ronald Newton, "On 'Functional Groups,' 'Fragmentation,' and 'Pluralism' in Spanish American Political Society," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, L (February 1970), 12.

[15] Arthur P. Whitaker, ed., *Latin America and the Enlightenment* (Ithaca 1961).

[16] Glen Dealy, "Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XLVIII (February 1968).

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impact. New, agonizing questions were asked: Who are we? Spanish? New World? What? What shall be our relations with North America, Europe, Spain, or Portugal? How did we become what we are, and what is our destiny as a continent and as a people?[17] In the absence of restraints imposed by the Spanish Crown on the questioning of established truths and as a result of contact with the outside world, the dominant tradition was subjected to the increasing challenge of new ideas and conceptions. In Spain and Portugal, this was also a period of unprecedented challenge to established ways and frequently one of bloody conflicts. In both the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America, subsequent intellectual history would hence be written in terms of the dialectical interplay between the prevailing organicist-corporatist framework and the gradually more numerous adherents of alternative systems.

Throughout the nineteenth century, liberalism was the foremost challenger in the attack on corporate privilege.[18] Its impact varied from country to country, but one can safely say that liberalism was seldom very successful and nowhere dominant. Positivism, with its emphasis on order and progress, was accommodated and assimilated within the prevailing tradition. Later, the ideologies of socialism, communism, nationalism, social democracy, Christian democracy, populism, developmentalism, Third-Worldism, and others also made their presence felt. Except in rare, probably unique circumstances, however, such as Cuba and possibly now Chile, the older tradition has been able to maintain its paramountcy even in the face of these challenges. It has done so by absorbing that which is useful from the newer currents and rejecting the rest. Much of the traditional, organic-corporatist philosophy has thus been retained, albeit in somewhat diluted form, while its challengers have been repeatedly thwarted or co-opted. This is what Anderson means by his characterizing Latin America as a "living museum,"[19] for in the absence of any genuine social revolution in all but two or three of the Iberic-Latin nations (which would have resulted in the discarding of the older structures), virtually all the systems of society that have ever governed men's affairs continue to coexist—a blend of Thomism, divine-right monarchy, feudalism, autocracy, republicanism, liberalism, and all the rest.

[17] These questions form the common threads in the writers considered in W. Rex Crawford, *A Century of Latin American Thought* (New York 1966), Introduction.

[18] Charles A. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821–1853* (New Haven 1968).

[19] Charles W. Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," Occasional Paper No. 2, Graduate Center for Latin American Studies, Vanderbilt University (February 1964); incorporated into his book, *Politics and Economic Changes in Latin America* (Princeton 1967), chap. 4.

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This discussion of the dominant Iberic-Latin ideological tradition has up to now portrayed it as a generally conservative, reactive, closed ideology that has shut out those currents it could not usefully absorb. This, however, is only partially true. As a set of what we might term traditional and non-revolutionary beliefs, the Iberic-Latin heritage has indeed often been a reactive one, filtering out (albeit quite selectively) the "dangerous," heretical ideas of Protestantism, empiricism, the Enlightenment, rationalism, liberalism, socialism, and the like. But, beginning in the mid-to-late nineteenth century there began to be articulated in the Iberic-Latin nations a new developmental ideology, uniquely attuned to their own tradition, positive, progressive, and serving as the Iberic-Latin counterpart to the modernizing ideologies that had evolved elsewhere. This tradition remains almost wholly ignored in our intellectual histories, but it is crucial for an understanding of Iberic-Latin development.[20]

Spain, Portugal, and their former new-world colonies had by then begun to be affected by industrialization, urbanization, accelerated social change, and the newer ideological currents of that period. Their major thinkers—such as Donoso Cortés, Balmes, Menéndez, Antonio, Unamuno, Maeztu, Ortega, to cite only some of those most prominent in the Spanish tradition—began to grapple with the same fundamental questions that concerned Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and other, more well-known writers. The Iberic-Latins built upon the new and reformist currents emanating from the Church and also drew upon their own historical tradition. Still within the corporate-organic mold, they sought to fashion a framework for thought and action blending the traditional regard for order and hierarchy with the newer imperative of change and modernization. They attempted, for instance, to deal with the phenomenon of mass man by erecting corporate structures that provided for class harmony rather than conflict, structured participation rather than rootlessness and alienation. Representation was generally to be determined by functions (labor, business, agriculture, religion, etc.) rather than through divisive interest groups and political parties. The state was to regulate and harmonize the entire process. In this way, the Iberic-Latin nations sought to face up to modern realities, but without sacrificing the organic-corporate structures of the past.[21]

[20] See the discussion by the editor, Kalman H. Silvert, in *Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development* (New York 1967), 360.

[21] The literature is remarkably extensive even though much of it is largely ignored. For Spain, see the flawed but useful study by Francis G. Wilson, *Political Thought in National Spain* (Champaign, Ill. 1967), as well as the original writings of the authors mentioned. For Portugal, there are also numerous historical writings, some of the best

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By the third and fourth decades of this century these ideas had been diffused widely, not only in Spain and Portugal, but also throughout Latin America. They helped give rise to a variety of at least semi-modernizing movements—the corporate state of Portugal, the *Falange* in Spain, the *Estado Novo* in Brazil, integralism and Christian Democracy in a variety of countries, *Peronismo* in Argentina, the MNR in Bolivia, the PRI in Mexico, and numerous others. Despite the significant differences that marked these regimes and movements, the common ingredients were at least equally impressive: a common historic and philosophic tradition, some agreed-upon assumptions about the way the socio-political order ought to be arranged, new but similar social and political forces to be dealt with, and a shared predisposition not to destroy the old order but to inherit it, bending it sufficiently to accommodate the newer forces while maintaining inviolate the essential corporate, hierarchical, and elitist structures. With World War II, many of these movements and corporately organized schemes suffered ignominy and were discredited; some were overthrown, others rebaptized under different names, still others continued much as before. It matters little what labels are applied, however; the important fact is that the same fundamental and historical conception of the state and society still remains, powerful and almost all-pervasive, finding contemporary expression in the ideology and actions of old-style *caudillos* and new-style military "Nasserists," in the evolving structure of the PRI, in the traditional authoritarian regimes and in the newer "syndicalist republics," perhaps even in revolutionary Cuba and Chile. There is obviously room for considerable variation within this framework, but there can be no doubt that it remains crucial for a proper understanding of the Iberic-Latin tradition.[22]

More work remains to be done in this area—a project in which the present writer is currently engaged. However, it should be stressed that

written by the present premier, Marcello Caetano. The literature for the Latin American nations is also extensive; see, among others, Picón-Salas (fn. 10); Crawford (fn. 17); and Harold E. Davis, ed., *Latin American Social Thought* (Washington, D.C. 1963). A volume that shows the parallels and continuities in these various national traditions is Fredrick B. Pike, *Hispanismo* (Notre Dame 1971).

[22] For the relationship of this Iberic-Latin heritage to contemporary political movements, see especially Charles W. Anderson, *The Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy-Making in an Authoritarian System* (Madison 1970). For some early and formative efforts, see Howard J. Wiarda, *Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic* (Gainesville 1970); Wiarda, *The Brazilian Catholic Labor Movement: The Dilemmas of National Development* (Amherst 1969); and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford 1971). For some intriguing comparisons, see Roland Sarti, "Fascist Modernization in Italy: Traditional or Modern?" *American Historical Review*, LXXV (April 1970), 1029-45; and Henry Ehrmann, *Politics in France* (Boston 1968), chaps. I and II.

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the movements mentioned here were and are by no means all wholly reactionary or "fascistic"; they often represented and continue to represent forward-looking, dynamic efforts at achieving modernization. They attempted to evolve a uniquely Iberic-Latin ideology and mode of action, one which sought to deal with contemporary pressures while preserving those traditional features that are considered valuable in their own heritage. It is this strand of thought which our studies of political theory and of social change have neglected but which must be recognized if we are to comprehend the Iberic-Latin development.

There is, thus, a distinctively Iberic-Latin model and political tradition of development whose complex dimensions fail to accord with our more familiar developmental paradigms and whose functioning these other models are, by themselves, incapable of fully explaining. Some aspects of this framework may be ideologically distasteful to us, but as scholars and/or developmentalists we ignore what is probably the still-dominant conception within the Iberic-Latin tradition at the cost of continuing to misinterpret fundamentally the experience and present-day realities of the nations that are a part of this culture area. What is required, therefore, is a counterpart volume for Iberia and Latin America of, say, Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America*, a study which traces and analyzes these dominant political-cultural variables and provides us with that integrative view of the whole Iberic-Latin tradition that is so sorely needed.[23]

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL DIMENSION

The Iberic-Latin socio-political tradition goes hand in hand with the religio-cultural tradition. Again, a good starting point for the discussion is to picture the Iberic-Latin nations as structured horizontally in terms of distinct and fairly rigid layers and vertically in terms of a number of corporate elites and *intereses*, with the Crown or the central state apparatus controlling and guiding its various components. Historically, each corporate entity as well as each "class" in the hierarchy had its own responsibilities, status, and special privileges (*fueros*), corresponding to natural law and to God's just ordering of the universe. Men were expected to accept their station in life; there could thus be little ques-

[23] The reference is to Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution* (New York 1955). Various fragments for a similar study of Latin America may be found in the work of many of the scholars cited here: Adams, Anderson, Dealy, Graham, Hale, McAlister, Morse, Newton, Silvert, Véliz, and others. Many of these writings and ideas are brought together in Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *Political Development: The Latin American Experience* (tentative title, forthcoming).

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tioning of the system and little mobility. Little change could or did take place. The Crown rested at the apex of the socio-political pyramid, regulating, through its power over financial affairs and its authority to grant charters and legal recognition, the corporate and group life that swirled about it. These units related to each other through the central administration, rather than directly or across class lines. The Iberic-Latin model of political authority is thus essentially a traditional-patrimonialist one, where the wealth of the realm, its subjects, etc., are all a part of the ruler's own domain.[24]

The institutions of the two metropoles—a corporate and hierarchical social order, an authoritarian-patrimonialist polity, an exploitive, "milk-cow," semi-feudal–early-capitalist, "colonial trader" economic system, a fixed and immutable religion and law—all formed part of the structure that Spain, and in a more easy-going form Portugal, first established at home and then transplanted to the New World.[25] Institutions that would soon be anachronistic and dying in the rest of Europe and North America remained largely intact in the Iberian peninsula and in Latin America, where they not only received a new lease on life but thrived and persisted. This, of course, is not to say that no change took place within the prevailing structure, but that changes were generally accommodated within the prevailing system. As Newton concludes, "the social and political patterns and juridical legitimation of the corporate regime remained substantially intact to the eve of independence."[26]

Though the separation from the mother countries in the early nineteenth century brought on a severe politico-administrative legitimacy crisis, no sharp changes occurred in the basic structure of society. Indeed, the wars of independence were largely conservative movements, designed to preserve corporate privilege and elite, centralized rule against the revolutionary, democratizing currents then at work. The apex of the pyramid had been lopped off, but the underlying base and the governing mores and institutions remained intact. Once the legitimacy vacuum created by the withdrawal of Spanish and Portuguese authority had been filled by the creole aristocracies, *caudillos*, and

[24] Patrimonialism was one of Weber's forms of traditional authority. See Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City, N.Y. 1962), 334-60. For a fascinating application to the Portuguese-Brazilian tradition, see Raymundo Faoro, *Os Donos do Poder: Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro* (Pôrto Alegre 1958). See also Ronald Glassman, *Political History of Latin America* (New York 1969).

[25] Magali Sarfatti, *Spanish Bureaucratic-Patrimonialism in America* (Berkeley 1966); and L. N. McAlister, "Social Structure and Social Change in New Spain," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XLIII (August 1963), 349-70.

[26] Newton (fn. 14), 26.

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armies, the traditional structure reasserted itself. New institutional arrangements were grafted on; but in essence the hierarchical patterns of class and caste, the system of *fueros* and corporate privilege (now extended to include the national armies), the seigneurial system of *patrón-clientela* relations, the power of the Church and of a preeminently Catholic religio-political culture, the patrimonialist political structure—all these elements of the Iberic-Latin tradition were mainly unaffected by independence.[27]

The nineteenth century was characterized by the attempts to create nations out of the disparate, fragmented factions that made up society. This was the classic era of Latin American caudilloism, of rival men on horseback vying for national power and galloping in and out of the National Palace with frequent regularity. By the 1880's and 1890's, the long quest to restore order and unity had largely succeeded in virtually all the Latin American nations; power had been consolidated in the hands of the oligarchic interests, the merchant-entrepreneurial elements that were closely bound up with them, and a new breed of order-and-progress *caudillos*. A period of stability, prosperity, and national infrastructure-building ensued. These changes helped stimulate the economic "take-off," gave rise to a greater variety of social groups than had existed in the old stratification system, and provided new escalators of social mobility. But again, these changes—and those that followed in the twentieth century—were accompanied by little fundamental reordering of the basic structure of power and society. Through the techniques of adaptation, accommodation, and co-optation, the two-class, corporate-patrimonialist system remained unaltered except in peripheral ways. The established groups adjusted readily to the shift from the self-sufficient *hacienda* to the capitalistic plantation or commercial enterprise; and usually they were able to co-opt the rising merchant-business elements into their own system of dominance—or to go into these activities themselves, thus welding the older and the newer basis of wealth and power.[28]

Later, the franchise was extended to the rising middle sectors, greater respect was paid to the classic nineteenth-century freedoms, and a variety of new middle-class associations and parties emerged. From roughly the 1920's onward, new pressures were felt upon the traditional elitist structure, and in several countries the new bourgeois parties and

[27] Dealy (fn. 16); William H. Beezley, "Caudillismo: An Interpretive Note," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, XI (July 1969), 348; and Orlando Fals Borda, "Marginality and Revolution in Latin America, 1809–1969," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, VI (1970–71), 63-89.

[28] Warren Dean, *The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880–1945* (Austin 1969).

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movements came to power. But the pervasiveness of the dominant political culture and legacy remained strong: the new middle sectors lacked any sense of class consciousness, they aped and imitated elitist ways, and, once in power, they acted in much the same way as had the traditional elites. Eventually they forged an alliance with these elites or were fused into the dominant elitist structure so as to preserve the privileges and place in the system that they had recently won against the rising pressures from the awakening masses.[29] A number of new corporate interests were thus accommodated and some new institutional pillars grafted on, but the basic order of society and polity remained largely intact.

More recently some other interests have begun to make their presence felt. From the 1930's on, organized labor, usually incorporated in the form of official, government-controlled syndicates, directed and often organized by the elitist and middle-sector ruling groups, was assimilated into the prevailing structure. Now, albeit in the same paternalistic fashion, it has become the peasants' turn. The extension of the labor laws to the rural areas, the enactment of agrarian reform laws, the structural innovations in the countryside being carried out in Peru and elsewhere provide ample illustration of this. Frequently these changes in labor's or the peasants' position have been introduced as a result of structured violence, or the threat of violence, emanating from the workers and rural masses themselves; but more often than not they have come about through the action of the ruling elements who were seeking to ensure their hegemony and control of the change process. Moreover, once these techniques of structured violence and frequently revolutionary posturing have helped the labor and peasant leaders to secure their place in the system, the tendency has been for them also to become conservative and guard their positions against new encroachments.[30]

Change in the Iberic-Latin context, as Morse states, has been not so much a matter of "fundamental" change in the European or North American sense (that is, implying a revolutionary transformation, the substitution of one ruling class for another, or the obliteration of the past) as it has been the mediating and gradual accommodating of the accoutrements and rallying cries of industrial civilization to a political

[29] Jane-Lee Woolridge Yare, "Middle Sector Political Behavior in Latin America," (unpub., University of Massachusetts 1971).

[30] This phenomenon may help to explain the differences between Henry Landsberger, who today proclaims Latin American labor to be conservative, and Víctor Alba and Robert J. Alexander, who, drawing their evidence from an earlier period before labor had consolidated its position, proclaim it to be revolutionary.

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culture that remains in its essence Ibero-Catholic, creole-feudal, and patrimonialist.[31] A number of adjustments were made, but the basic pattern of ownership and wealth was perpetuated, the fundamental two-class structure of society was continued, past values and behavioral norms were preserved, the system of *fueros*, patronage, and privileges was retained, and the structure of power and society has remained hierarchical, elitist, authoritarian, and corporative. Some new social groups were assimilated, but this has generally been accomplished under the tutelage and containment of the older ruling groups and norms. These latter elements have also been the chief beneficiaries of development. Thus, as an ECLA study has concluded, the "traditional structure" of Latin America, "far from having been rigid and impenetrable, has had sufficient permeability for a good many of its component parts to be modernized, without this having implied a swift and radical process of 'modernization.' "[32]

The Process of Change

We have been considering the religio-theoretical aspects of Iberic-Latin political culture and have provided an overview of the socio-political system and its modifications, but we have not so far addressed ourselves explicitly to an analysis of the process of change.

In keeping with the Catholic-Thomistic conception, society and the state in the Iberic-Latin context are thought of as an organic whole with a profoundly moral purpose. Attempts are thus made, through personal and family ties, the *compadrazgo*, and personal identification with the leader, to construct various linkage mechanisms so that a sense of "belonging" is engendered and all are integrated into the prevailing structure. Branches, associations, and official syndicates now exist for nearly everyone. The national system is often conceived of in terms of the family metaphor—implying strong, benevolent leadership, assigned, accepted duties, privileges, status, and a purpose greater than the sum of its individual parts. It is now the state, replacing the Crown, that serves as the instrument of national integration, incorporating diverse groups, guilds, and interests, and functioning as the regulator and filter through which the legitimacy of new social and political forces is recognized and through which they are admitted into the

[31] Morse (fn. 9), 41; see also Morse's essay in Hartz (fn. 7), and his "Toward a Theory of Spanish American Government," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XV (1954), 71-93.

[32] Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), *Social Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period* (United Nations, April 15, 1964), 6.

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system. Power tends to be concentrated in the executive and in the bureaucratic-patrimonialist state machinery; the President is viewed as the personification of the nation with a direct identification with and knowledge of the general will of his people. The bureaucracy serves to dispense the available goods, favors, and spoils to the deserving. The traditional *patrón*-client relationship thus remains strong, with the government and its many agencies playing the role of national *patrón*, replacing the *caudillos* and local *hacendados* of the past. The same paternalistic *clientela* system persists, dressed up in new and more "modern" forms, but retaining its traditional substance and mode of operation.[33]

The same traditional hierarchical, corporative, elitist, and authoritarian orientation and structure is also still present today, modified by twentieth-century changes but by no means destroyed by them.[34] Politics still centers around the old, hierarchically organized and vertically compartmentalized system of corporate *intereses* and elite groups, now expanded and broadened somewhat to include the newer elements, but still authoritarianly controlled from the top and linked together directly through the government. The "corporative framework" thus refers to a system in which the political culture and institutions reflect a historic hierarchical, authoritarian, and organic view of man, society, and polity.[35] In the corporative system the government controls and directs all associations, holding the power not only to grant or withhold juridical recognition (the *sine qua non* for the group's existence) but also access to official funds and favors without which any sector is unlikely to succeed or survive. Group "rights," or *fueros*, hence take precedence over individual rights; similarly, it is the "general will" and the power of the state that prevail over particular interests. The government not only regulates all associations and corporate bodies, but also seeks to tie those that have earned their place in the existing system into a collaborative effort for integral national development. Obviously the system works best where the number of interests is small

[33] See Claudio Véliz, "Centralism and Nationalism in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, LXVII (October 1968), 68-83, and John D. Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," *American Political Review*, LXIV (June 1970), 411-25.

[34] The analysis here draws heavily on the excellent discussion of corporatism in James Petras, *Political and Social Forces in Chilean Development* (Berkeley 1969), esp. pp. 5, 199-203, 209-19, and 247-48. See also the Introduction in John J. Johnson, ed., *Continuity and Change in Latin America* (Stanford 1964).

[35] The definition used here is derived from Faoro (fn. 24), and Kenneth P. Erickson, *Labor in the Political Process in Brazil: Corporatism in a Modernizing Nation* (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Columbia University 1970).

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and within a context of shared values, but it is not necessarily incompatible with a growing pluralism of ideologies and social forces.

In the virtually inherently corporative systems of the Iberic-Latin nations, the effort is made to ameliorate social and political conflict—to deal with it bureaucratically rather than to provoke divisiveness and breakdown. Administration supersedes politics in both theory and practice; thus, society is represented functionally, in terms of its component segments, and organized bureaucratically, with the government seeking to maintain the proper balance between the various interests and to coordinate them into the state apparatus.[36] Political issues are dealt with more through the process of elite integration and the granting of access to the spoils and privileges that accrue with acceptance into the system, rather than through program enactment and implementation. The greatest need is social and political solidarity; there can be no room for divided loyalties, autonomous political organizations, or challenges to the system's fundamental structure. The personnel of government may shift, new groups and ideas may be assimilated, and the elites may rotate in power (thus giving the appearance of change more than its substance); but the essentials of the socio-political order and the base on which it rests must remain steadfast.[37] The newer groups may be co-opted, but they cannot challenge or seek to topple the system *per se*. Those that do are likely to be crushed—unless their goal is merely the limited one of trying to demonstrate a power capability and the right to be admitted as a bargaining agent in the larger system. This kind of limited and usually carefully-orchestrated violence may be tolerated, even accepted; a movement aimed at toppling the entire structure, in contrast, can expect to and will probably be suppressed.[38]

Considerable change can and does take place within the corporative system, but it usually comes from the top downward rather than as a result of grass roots pressure from below. A culturally-conditioned form of "democracy" may be established, as in Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, Chile, or Costa Rica, but its structure is that of a tutelary or guided democracy directed from above. The state system is founded on a structure of institutionalized popular movements. An attempt is thus made to transfer the traditional elitist values to the rising newer groups through example and education. First the business-commercial

[36] See Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago 1964).

[37] The concepts of the "ruling class" and "circulation of elites" are derived from the Italian sociologists, Mosca and Pareto. See also Fals Borda (fn. 27).

[38] See James L. Payne, *Labor and Politics in Peru* (New Haven 1965).

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elements were "civilized" in this way, then the rising middle sectors, and now the lower or popular classes. That helps explain the persistent presence, in the Iberic-Latin context, of government-supported and -run trade unions, political parties, peasant leagues, professional associations or "colleges," etc. Through these agencies, which often are bureaucratic appendages of the state, the prevailing systems have sought to institutionalize and thus contain the rising social forces. Middle- and now lower-class elements are offered marginal benefits and a stake in the system as a means of defusing discontent and of putting them directly under the paternalistic direction of the state. "Agrarian reform," for example, has become more an instrument of social control than of social change. In this way the dominant elements have skillfully managed the historic unfolding of the development process, channeling it in preferred directions and either co-opting or snuffing out new challenges to their power and way of life.[39] Through adaptation, the traditional order, instead of being overwhelmed or discarded as development has gone forward, has profited from it, proving to be remarkably resilient and even strengthening itself in the process.

It is the duty of the state and its *líder* to organize public opinion and maintain the proper societal equilibrium through the delicate balance of domestic interests and, increasingly in the 1960's, foreign pressures. Decisions are usually made by a cadre of elite-group representatives, linked by formal and informal ties to the administrative hierarchy and centering, ideally, in a single individual who personifies the national values, knows the general will, and is the best and most qualified leader. The United States Ambassador and the various U.S. mission heads may at times also be included in this coterie. Traditionally, patronage, status, favors, and access to the channels of influence and wealth, rather than concrete benefits, have served as the chief media of political currency; now, however, at least lip service (and sometimes more than that) must be paid to program enactment and implementation. Patronage, privileges, even programs are doled out by the state to groups and individuals who might otherwise attempt organized opposition, in exchange for support and acquiescence to official policies.[40] Thus, the public service becomes a huge "social security" system, a haven for friends, relatives, party hacks, and dissident oppositionists, as well as for a large part of the middle class and now increasingly the labor and peasant leaders, who are in effect "bought off" by being

[39] Petras (fn. 34).

[40] Erickson (fn. 35), chaps. I-II; James L. Payne, *Patterns of Conflict in Colombia* (New Haven 1968).

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put on the public payroll. Effective program implementation is difficult by a bureaucracy for which this has traditionally been a secondary function.[41]

The corporate framework helps maintain the traditional structure while concurrently providing for limited change through the co-optation of new social and political units into the administrative apparatus of the state system. Corporate structures, reinforced by a political culture grounded on hierarchy, status, and patronage, enable the traditional socio-political forms in the Iberic-Latin tradition to hang on so tenaciously. The corporative framework helps preserve the status quo, but it also provides for the gradualist, incremental accommodation to newer currents. It helps keep the pressures for change in check by minimizing the possibilities for disruption and full-scale revolution.[42] The corporative state may thus respond to modernization and adopt those "modern" aspects that are useful and can be controlled; but in seeking at the same time to preserve certain traditional attitudes and institutions, it may reject the social and political concomitants that ordinarily accompany the modernization process.

It should be emphasized that corporative structures and value systems are nothing new in either Spain, Portugal, or Latin America. They did not originate in the 1920's and 1930's when the corporative states and certain "integralist" ideologies acquired self-consciousness, power, and a full-blown statement of political philosophy, but stretch back for centuries to ancient and medieval political theory and organization and were later transferred to the New World by the metropoles. In the warp and woof, the dialectic of Iberic-Latin development, they have been reformulated and updated many times, but the basic organic-corporate-elitist structure of the socio-political system has remained steadfast.

In the Iberic-Latin political systems new social groups and political forces, new ideas and new institutional arrangements may be appended in a continuous fusion-absorption process; but, owing to the absence of genuinely revolutionary transformations in that tradition, old ones are seldom completely discarded.[43] Only in Mexico, Cuba, and perhaps Bolivia and Peru have there been sharp breaks with the past which destroyed the power of the traditionally privileged elites; in the rest of

[41] See Lawrence S. Graham, *Civil Service Reform in Brazil: Principles versus Practice* (Austin 1968), and Robert E. Scott, "The Government Bureaucrats and Political Change in Latin America," *Journal of International Affairs*, XX, No. 2 (1966), 289-308.

[42] Erickson (fn. 35); Faoro (fn. 24).

[43] The argument here and in the following paragraph is derived from Anderson (fn. 19), Morse (fns. 7, 8, 9), and the ECLA study (fn. 32).

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the countries, and even in some of those that have had revolutions, the traditional structures remain strong. In the socio-political structure as well as in the theoretical base, one is reminded of Anderson's "living museum" concept. Organizational forms that have died off or have been discarded elsewhere in the West continue in the Iberic-Latin context to exhibit a remarkable durability and viability, adapting and coexisting with the newer currents spawned by industrialization and modernization.

As a result of the tenacity of these traditional socio-political institutions, there has been limited "development" in the Iberic-Latin nations in either a Marxian or an Almondian sense. The Iberic-Latin political process has involved not the transcendence of one "class" or "stage" over another, but the combination of diverse elements—rooted in distinct historical periods—in a tentative working arrangement. The question has been not so much one of "development" or "modernization" but of reconciling, in Morse's words, the static and vegetative features of the older, patrimonial-corporate state with the imperatives of a modern, urban, industrial order. The traditional order has not been as rigid as is usually pictured, but flexible, permeable, and capable of absorbing a variety of newer currents—without undermining the traditional structures in the process. It has assimilated those features of modernity that were necessary and could be controlled, but it has rejected the rest. As the newer elites and social forces have been absorbed into the dominant system, the number of participants has slowly increased, but the system itself has changed little. Hence, in virtually all the Iberic-Latin nations there has grown up a series of layers of distinct social and political forms, each superimposed upon the other, with new elements continuously being appended and adapted to an older tradition, but without that older tradition being sloughed off or even undergoing many fundamental transformations. These distinct but overlapping layers originate in different historical eras, but in the Iberic-Latin tradition they have been combined and blended. It is the genius and ongoing challenge of politics and politicians in these nations that they have been able to function and accomplish anything at all of a developmental sort, given the heterogeneous, frequently crazy-quilt political systems in which they must work.

In seeking to explain these aspects of the Iberic-Latin process of change, Richard Adams has fashioned a theory of what he terms "secondary development."[44] Secondary development refers to the course

[44] Adams, *The Second Sowing: Power and Secondary Development in Latin America* (San Francisco 1967).

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development takes when it enters an area that was previously an isolated hinterland of the industrial revolution and of the modern world. Development in Latin America does not *follow*, as a matter of successive stages, the development patterns of Western Europe and North America, but involves the *adaptation* of an older order to some newer forces. This is a process of derivation, assimilation, and reorganization, not of innovation. Secondary development, in Adams' formulation, implies the importation and adaptation of more modern social and political organizations and techniques and their superimposition on an already established socio-political order, rather than the replacement of the one by the other.

In Anderson's terms,[45] the key dilemma in the politics of these nations is and has been to find a formula for reaching agreement among various "power contenders" whose power is unequal and whose interests and life-styles are almost totally incompatible because they emerged from and pertain to quite different historical epochs. Characteristically, the political process involves manipulation and almost constant negotiation among these several power contenders, for elections are tentative and but one means to power, and they do not carry the definitiveness they do in the Anglo-American context. The shuffling and reshuffling of the delicate power balance is almost an every-day preoccupation. The distinctive flavor of the change process is that new power contenders may be accommodated and admitted to the system if they accept and conform to its rules, but old ones are not eliminated. However, because these various elites and *intereses*—including landowners, businessmen, the Church, the army, middle sectors, students, labor, peasants—emerged from different eras, with distinct expectations and uneven bases for their power and legitimacy, the attempt to fashion an accommodation among them is exceedingly difficult. The job of the President, who must juggle and reconcile these contending forces and maintain the equilibrium between them, is complex and uncertain.

One comes to think, writes Newton, in terms of "multiple currents of cultural evolution moving at different rates to uneven rhythms, regressing as well as advancing, submerging as well as predominating, intersecting and interacting fortuitously within the framework of a given metropolis, a given institution, or indeed, a given personality structure."[46] Some modernization is possible within this context, but only within circumscribed limits. Politics, Anderson says, thus involves

[45] Anderson (fn. 19).
[46] Newton (fn. 14), 27.

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the capacity to combine heterogeneous and incompatible power contenders and capabilities in a conditional and continuously shifting coalition. Frequently these efforts involve what to North Americans appear to be some incredible marriages of convenience, alliances that defy not only all "reason" but also our conceptions of ideological consistency, or the stretching or interpretation of the law and constitution so as to render them all but meaningless. Yet it is precisely these features—the application of a little "grease" here or a little "cement" there, a delicate compromise, accommodation, or favor, the exercise of patronage and mutual obligation—that help account for the distinctive flavor of the process of development in these countries, and that give them their dynamism and capacity to respond. If we wish to understand this process, the focus of scholarly inquiry ought also to be toward this direction: Rather than seeking to bring to bear categories and concepts derived from a different tradition and to apply them to societies where they do not fit, scholars must try to comprehend the Iberic-Latin systems on their own terms and in their own context, the way traditional institutions have been modified to meet the exigencies of modern times as well as how the modernizing groups have used traditional institutions to further their own ends.[47] These mechanisms, which lie at the heart of the Iberic-Latin change and development process, frequently bear little correspondence to the paradigms and grand theory in the literature of political sociology and political economy.

Kalman Silvert's analysis of what he terms the "Mediterranean ethos" or "syndicalism" also closely parallels the present framework.[48] This ethos is founded upon a value system dedicated to hierarchy, order, and absolutes. The urge toward corporatism provides another manifestation of this ethos, since the organization of men by functions is in accord with the historical tradition and actualizes the love of order and hierarchy, serves to contain divisive class conflict, and avoids the hated liberal and materialistic values. It also provides for the slow and at least partial adaptation of traditional, patrimonial society to urbanization, industrialization, and modernization. An effort is made to bring into harmonious coexistence those characteristics venerated

[47] This is the special merit of Erickson's study (fn. 35), and of Schmitter (fn. 22).

[48] See Silvert's "National Values, Development, and Leaders and Followers," *International Social Science Journal*, XV (1964), 560-70; "The Politics of Social and Economic Change in Latin America," in Paul Halmos, ed., *The Sociological Review Monograph: Latin American Sociological Studies* (Keele, Staffordshire, February 1967), 47-58; *Expectant Peoples* (fn. 20), 358-61; *The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America* (New York 1966), chaps. 1, 2, and 17; and *Man's Power* (New York 1970), 59-64 and 136-38.

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from the past and those considered valuable in the modern world. The good society is still pictured as one in which each individual is rooted and secure in his life station, where representation is determined by functions and status and not as the result of mere citizenship, where decision-making is centered in the hands of corporate, sectoral elites who are harmonized and coordinated into an organic whole, and where the state exercises firm but benevolent authority over the whole scheme. The "City of God" still takes precedence in many respects over the "City of Man," but since a modern society can no longer exist on this simple bi-institutional basis, the Iberic-Latin response has been to erect new institutionalized pillars to accommodate the changes taking place. Each pillar remains highly striated by social class, with recruitment into the upper levels still largely a function of social position. As Silvert concludes, "The major social purpose of the syndicalist approach is to find a way of subsuming the new class complications of modernization to hierarchy, preserving a kind of Latin 'Führerprinzip,' leaving inviolate the privileges and power of the traditional, and thus escaping the secularization and, to their eyes, immorality of the nation state."

The Crisis of the Traditional System

What we have termed the corporative framework for the analysis of socio-political change in Iberia and Latin America has exhibited remarkable staying power. At present, however, the traditional system is experiencing a crisis of major proportions which may sweep away the regime of hierarchy, elites, and special privileges once and for all.[49]

We may use as our point of departure Bernice Hamilton's assertion that "the fabric of natural law of the 16th century could only remain unshaken in a homogeneous, fairly static society with no major cleavage on moral principles, or in a primitive community which had little disturbing contact with the outside world."[50] These conditions obviously no longer apply in the Iberic-Latin nations. They are no longer homogeneous or static; major cleavages have emerged as to the proper way of ordering society and polity; and contact with the outside world, as well as deep foreign involvement in their internal affairs, has helped break down the traditional isolation. Since World War I particularly

[49] The discussion here is derived from Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis" (introductory note), 25-30 and 50ff. For further evidence, see the documents and essays collected in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?* (New York 1968), and in Irving L. Horowitz, Josué de Castro, and John Gerassi, eds., *Latin American Radicalism* (New York 1969).

[50] Hamilton (fn. 11), 158.

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(to use an arbitrary and approximate cut-off date), the pace of change has been accelerated, new social forces have emerged, the older basis of legitimacy has been increasingly challenged, and the foundations on which the ancient order rested have been progressively undermined.

The older power bases—and the religious, social, behavioral, and economic foundations on which they rested—are in decline.[51] These include the village community, the *hacienda*, the Church, caudilloism, the extended family, the landed oligarchy, the traditional cadre-type parties, and so on. Meanwhile, new power bases have emerged, including the educated *técnicos* and professionals, organized labor and peasants, mass-based political parties, more professionalized and development-oriented militaries, the "new" Church, and the like. The situation is complicated by the presence of various external influences—principally that of the United States, but also encompassing that of a myriad of international agencies and other foreign pressures —in the domestic politics and social programs of these countries. This is a factor with which the neatly patterned system of adding new pillars and power contenders, as described by Silvert and Anderson, does not adequately come to grips. The fact that new interests have emerged who have organized themselves around principles not previously considered the only right or legitimate ones for the society, that the old interests and corporate units are themselves undergoing transformation, that new values and organizing principles are competing for men's minds, that government is being called upon to perform services that it had never provided before, that foreign pressures and influences have multiplied—all these and other changes have added a new, complex, and increasingly conflicting dimension to the Iberic-Latin potpourri.

Politics has become progressively more class-, issue-, and interest-oriented. The traditional mechanisms for accommodating and adapting to change have also begun to break down. The Brazilian *jeito*, for instance, which may loosely be translated as "grease," and which has traditionally served as a many-faceted means to ease the cumbersome turning of the wheels of government, is no longer, under conditions of "no-nonsense" military rule, quite the effective instrument that it was before. The pace of change is becoming so rapid and its extent is so great that the traditional techniques of adjustment, accommodation, and co-optation are proving inadequate. The participation crisis is reaching revolutionary proportions, the level of new demands and expectations has far outstripped the capacity of

[51] See the discussion in Adams (fn. 44).

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the political systems to cope with them, and the older corporate-elitist structures are proving incapable of handling the new pressures that have suddenly been thrust upon them. The present Iberic-Latin political panorama has tended to become a profoundly fragmented and unstable one, marked by the absence of any single consensus, by the tenacious attempt of the traditional elements to hang on to their wealth and power, by the rising revolutionary sentiments of the newly mobilized, and by the weakness and ineffectiveness of those who might occupy the middle ground. We are witnessing the erosion and at least partial eclipse of the old order—without the emergence of a sufficiently strong or legitimized new order to take its place.

It is difficult to maintain the ideal of the nation as an organic "family" when the common basis of understanding on which the older solidarity was based no longer exists, when the earlier idea of the "harmonization" of classes is giving way to class conflict, when the number of interests or pillars in the corporate structure has multiplied beyond the capacity of the traditional mechanisms to control them, when issues are no longer confined to small elitist coteries but reach further down into the social pyramid and now involve the early stirrings of mass-mobilizationalist politics, when new educational and ideological formulas are replacing the paternalism and accepted truths of the past, and when increased national divisiveness and polarization have set in. A framework of order and stability has increasingly been superseded by a philosophy of change. New ideologies, new interests, and new institutional forms organized internally, coupled with new pressures from the external environment, have combined to provoke a challenge of unprecedented proportions to the older, established institutions.

In spite of all these changes, the traditional organic-corporate-elitist-patrimonialist order in the Iberic-Latin nations remains remarkably strong and viable. With one or two exceptions, it is probably still the dominant mode throughout the countries of this culture area. Moreover, its capacity for weathering the present crisis and challenge, as it has weathered others in the past, should not be underestimated. There is considerable evidence of the capacity of the dominant elites to continue mobilizing workers and peasants into official appendages of the traditional corporate structure and thus to defuse mass discontent and maintain their own privileged positions, to manage the pressures from the United States and other external influences chiefly to their own advantage, to articulate new developmental ideologies

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and to erect new institutional arrangements that provide more the appearance of change than its substance, to continue to direct and control the essentials of the entire process of change and modernization. Though, as committed "developmentalists," we may prefer other forms of change, and though our scholarly analyses, often exhibiting what we might call wishful political sociology, may focus on those groups and institutions that seem to offer the best hope for rapid modernization or democratization, it is the older and still venerated tradition that remains dominant, whose structure and methods of adaptation and assimilation have not been adequately studied, but which we ignore at the risk of our continued misunderstanding of the Iberic-Latin nations.

Conclusion and Implications

The first part of the 1960's saw a great outpouring of books and articles which offered a generally hopeful and optimistic view of the development process in emerging nations; in the later 1960's there was considerable disillusionment with this view and more and more questioning of the assumptions and biases on which the model rested. By this time, we are safe in concluding that, for all the fresh perceptions and stimuli to research which the general development literature has provided, it has subjected not only Latin America but much of the so-called Third World to too hasty interpretation and over-generalization. The echoes of Marxian and Weberian theory, both based on the common assumption of the dissolution of traditional societies before the onslaught of industrialization and modernization, have reverberated widely, too widely, far beyond the examples of those nations, principally of Western Europe, on whose developmental experience these two paradigms were essentially based. The assumption of both of these models is that traditional societies are hardened shells, capable only of remaining obdurately unyielding or else shattering into pieces. The fact is, however, that many traditional societies, and particularly those of the Iberic-Latin nations, have proved to be remarkably permeable and flexible, assimilating at various points more "modern" and more "rational" elements, but without thereby losing their characteristic features.[52]

Granted that much of the work in comparative political develop-

[52] J. P. Nettl and Karl von Vorys, "The Politics of Development," *Commentary*, XLVI (July 1968), 52-59. One cannot help but be reminded of Japan, where many traditional patterns have similarly been retained at the same time that more modern features have been absorbed. See also Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago 1967).

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ment provides new and sometimes perceptive insights, the proposition presented here is that the Latin American nations, as well as their two mother countries, Spain and Portugal, are subject to special imperatives as offshoots of a Catholic, Iberic, patrimonialist, semi-feudal Europe *circa* 1500. Until recently these nations had never experienced the full force of the great revolutionary movements that we associate with the rise of the modern era; moreover, their traditional institutions, because of their capacity for accommodation and assimilation, have not been swept away under the impact of the process of contemporary change, but have remained largely intact and, indeed, quite viable even to this day. It is time to put away the concept of a unilinear path to development, to re-examine the narrow and frequently ethnocentric models on which these interpretations are based, to begin to study the Iberic-Latin nations on their own terms rather than through the lenses of some universal scheme that, upon close inspection, turns out to be far less comprehensive than its advocates have posited.[53] In the Iberic-Latin context the issue may even now be not the either/or one of reform or revolution, of tradition versus modernity, but of adjustment, adaptation, accommodation, and continued muddling along. This remains not so much a matter of class conflict, in a Marxian sense, or of transcendental development, from a North American point of view, but of reconciling, largely on an *ad hoc* basis, the conflicting currents—traditional and modern—that continue their interplay within the Iberic-Latin culture, and of assimilating those desirable features of the modern, industrial world to a way of life that retains much of its traditional essence.[54] Perhaps it is appropriate here to suggest something of a *verstehen* approach to the study of these foreign areas, for it is clear that future developments in comparative politics are not likely to take place at the level of grand, universal theory-building, but at a lower level and by culture areas.[55]

The framework employed here implies that the process of change in the Iberic-Latin tradition has been and remains a fairly, but by no means wholly, conservative one. The corporative structure tends to serve the interests of the dominant elites by subordinating the rising social forces to the authority of the elite-dominated central state apparatus. The characteristically Iberic-Latin model of development seeks to preserve as much as possible of the traditional order by structuring

[53] These questions are explored in Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis" (introductory note).
[54] The interpretation here is derived from Morse (fn. 31).
[55] For a somewhat parallel argument, see Kenneth L. Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Instability," *Western Political Quarterly*, XVII (September 1964), 432ff.

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the participation of these new power contenders under its control and direction.[56] But although the change that takes place within this mold often seems inordinately slow and circumscribed, one should not assume that no change at all is possible. Change in the Iberic-Latin context, we have emphasized, has occurred through a special and often unique process, usually gradually and incrementally, through adaptation and assimilation, within a framework that combines and seeks to reconcile traditional and modern elements, rather than implying the transcendence of one over the other, or of one "class" or "stage" over another. In the past, change in Latin America has mostly come discontinuously and usually not as the result of any major quantum leaps forward, or even through much purposeful action. Change has come, ordinarily, by fits and starts, through the repeated crises and alternations of government that Latin America is popularly known for, through shifting coalitions, cabinet changes, barracks revolts, new re-alignments, and the circulation of elites. In all of these changes some subtle shift in the balance of power is usually implied—the accommodation of new groups and new ideas, the demonstration by a new power contender of its power capacity and hence of the legitimacy of its claim to be incorporated into the dominant corporate power structure. Change takes place not so much as the result of any great or glorious revolution, but through continuous shifts in the constellation of socio-political forces, through disintegration and *ad hoc* rebuilding, from various forms of structured and unstructured violence that seldom reach the dimensions of a full-scale revolution. This may not, by North American standards, be a very "rational," ideologically consistent, or model-conforming way to achieve development, but it is development nevertheless, cumulative and thus eventually of a structural sort.[57] Moreover, it does seem to correspond, more realistically than the models that have often been employed in the past, both to the peculiar nature of the historic Iberic-Latin development process and also to the present realities of power and society in these nations.

One final consideration merits mention, and that involves the outcome of the process we have described. At this point, based on the analysis and conclusions presented, we might well arrive at a fairly hopeful and at least modestly optimistic prognosis for the future development of the Iberic-Latin nations. Up to a point, indeed, some

[56] Erickson (fn. 35), 3, 26, 98, 339; Mander (fn. 2).

[57] See especially Douglas A. Chalmers, "Crisis and Change in Latin America," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXIII, No. 1 (1969), 76-88; Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America* (fn. 19); and Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America* (New York 1965).

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optimism may be justified, but only up to a point. For, as the process we have been describing unfolds, as new ideologies, new frames of reference, and new power contenders are constantly added on without the older and anachronistic ones being cast off, there comes a time when a kind of saturation and national paralysis set in, when the number of corporate interests and ideologies becomes so large and divergent that they are no longer manageable or reconcilable, when, therefore, in the absence of any common consensus or of a dominant ruling coalition, the national fabric begins to unravel, when crisis becomes a constant and virtually everyday fact of life, when an almost Hobbesian war of all against all ensues, and when national politics becomes a situation of seemingly permanent disintegration and conflict. The future of the Iberic-Latin nations lies not in Bolivia or even Cuba, and probably not in those others that have been mentioned as possible developmental models, but more likely in Argentina or perhaps Uruguay, by all indices among the most "modern" of the Latin American nations, but which, precisely because they are so socially differentiated and with such a wide variety of groups and interests competing in their political arenas, have also progressed further along the path to virtually permanent national breakdown.[58] The result of the process of change in Latin America is unlikely to be the final triumph of a new order and epoch over the old one, nor a more-or-less peaceful transition from traditional to modern. More probably it will entail a series of eruptions and blockages, a continuation of the present system coupled with a deterioration of its capacity to manage and accommodate to change in the traditional fashion, a rise in tension and society-wide praetorianism, and a long-term condition of spiraling discord, institutional paralysis and decay, and recurrent breakdowns.[59]

[58] It is not coincidental that Kalman H. Silvert's title, "The Conflict Society," stems chiefly from his research in Argentina. On the same theme, see also Kenneth L. Johnson, *Argentina's Mosaic of Discord, 1966–1968* (Washington 1969), and Roberto Ortigueira, "La disintegración, estado normal de países en desarrollo," *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* v (October 1963), 471-94, also based on the Argentine example. One is also reminded of Ortega y Gasset's perceptive *España Invertebrada*, published in 1922. The Italian experience may provide an additional example of this syndrome.

[59] On praetorian societies, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968), chap. 4. For an application to Latin America, see Riordan Roett, "The Quest for Legitimacy in Brazil: The Dilemma of a Praetorian Army," paper prepared for the 1970 Annual Conference of the Midwest Association for Latin American Studies, University of Nebraska, Lincoln. A good general discussion is S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* XII (July 1964), 345-67; also see his *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966).

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THE SALIENCE OF GAINS IN THIRD-WORLD INTEGRATIVE SYSTEMS

By LYNN KRIEGER MYTELKA*

INTEGRATION theorists are increasingly turning their attention away from an examination of the relationship of gains to the integration process and towards the elaboration of complex models in which the salience of the former is obscured. As this variable appears to influence the durability of integrative systems among third-world countries and, by entering into actor calculations of alternatives, effects changes within the integrative system, an analysis is warranted which places the relationship of gains to the integration process in bolder relief. Although the emphasis here is on integrative systems among third-world countries, the analysis suggests that rational theories of actor behavior that stress the relationship of gains to the integration process may offer a fruitful approach to the comparative study of integrative systems among developing *and* developed countries.

One point of terminological clarification might with justification be made at the outset. No single definition of integration has gained widespread acceptance among integration theorists. Since it is of little consequence for the argument presented here, however, whether any particular definition of integration is specified, it is preferable that our notion of an "integrative system" encompass as much of the variation in definitions as possible. The term integrative system will refer to any system within which one can, at a minimum, identify a distinctive and purposeful pattern of common attitudes, mutual interactions, and/or collective decision-making activity. For the most part, however, the discussion will center on one particular type of integrative system, the customs union.

Causal Factors in Integration Theory

Despite this lack of definitional censensus, within each of the two dominant schools of thought—the cybernetic and the neofunctional—the main thrust of theory since the late 1950's has been to clarify and extend the list of forces or conditions which slow down or accelerate

* The author wishes to thank Andrew Axline, Charles Jeanneret-Grosjean, Jean Kirk Laux, Patrick McGowan, Edward L. Morse, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., for their penetrating criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.

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the integration process.[1] The need for extension arose, in particular in the neofunctionalist case, because initial models were limited by their source in "the modern pluralistic-industrial democratic polity."[2] Across such polities transactions flowed, interest groups formed, and linkages between noncontroversial functional tasks were made.

Studies of the integration process in Latin America and Africa, however, revealed that developing countries rarely generate a full range of economic, social, and political interests or the middle-level cadres to articulate and aggregate them. In these polities legitimacy is often withheld from the expression of conflicting ideologies and interests, and accorded instead to the pursuit of policies that reduce pluralism. A narrow elite structure and a vast gap between mass and elite levels of political awareness with respect to the integration process and its consequences gives to the leadership in these areas a relatively high degree of freedom to determine the scope and direction of policy.[3] For the most part, African, Latin American, and Asian economies are nonindustrialized and dependent on the export of raw materials and agricultural products to Europe, North America, and Japan rather than on trade among themselves. The characteristically high relative scarcity of collective goods[4] in such systems, moreover, renders the distributive problem so acute that what in Europe are noncontroversial matters, amenable to technocratic bargaining, become in developing countries highly politicized issues which the *dramatis personae* of the political system are called upon to negotiate.[5]

[1] As, for example, in the debate over whether European integration has, as Karl Deutsch once maintained, "slowed down since the mid-50s. . . ." Karl W. Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment," *APSR*, LX (June 1966), 355. Or, despite his criticisms of Deutsch, in Donald Puchala's observation that transaction theorists continue the search for "exactly what causes, accelerates, or reverses transaction flows. . . ." Donald J. Puchala, "International Transactions and Regional Integration," *International Organization*, XXIV (Autumn 1970), 762.

[2] Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing," *International Organization*, XXIV (Autumn 1970), 628.

[3] The primary constraints are those imposed by a lack of resources, by external penetration, and by a subordinate international status, rather than by considerations of role or competition.

[4] A collective good is "any good that cannot be withheld from any member of a specified group once it is supplied to one member of that group." Collective goods are costly and cannot be supplied through market mechanisms because such mechanisms are defined in terms of the supply of goods to individuals on an exclusive basis. See Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Oran R. Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods* (Princeton 1971), 2.

[5] Similar generalizations and supporting evidence can be found, for example, in Roger D. Hansen, "Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts," *World Politics*, XXI (January 1969), 242-71, and his *Central America: Regional Integration and Economic Development* (Washington, D. C. 1967); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Peace in Parts* (Boston 1970); Lynn K. Mytelka, "Interstate Relations in a Regional

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As comparative case studies proliferated, the parsimony of the original models gave way to pressures for the inclusion of new variables to take account of these differences. Taken together, at least twenty identifiably different independent variables have been proposed by theorists of the neofunctionalist and transaction schools to account for changes within an integrative system. Many of these additions were of substantial theoretical importance; but the enumeration of all groups, structures, and processes which could be traced in at least one specific setting resulted in the elaboration of extremely cumbersome and undifferentiated models.[6] It is my contention, therefore, that parsimony was sacrificed to comprehensive explanation before serious efforts had been made to assess the portion of total variance explained by each additional independent variable.[7] A similar charge can be leveled against transaction theorists who have proliferated indicators and measures of transaction flows without specifying either the dimensions being tapped or the relative importance of one type of flow as compared to others.[8]

Even more important, I would argue that, as such models have expanded, theorists have tended to play down one of their original and most valuable conceptual insights—the relationship of gains to the integration process. For example, Ernst B. Haas has observed that functionalism "is based essentially on a utilitarian calculus: man will seek his rational advantage in maximizing his physical welfare by cooperating with other men when necessary."[9] In comparing instances of successful amalgamation, Karl Deutsch and his associates made the observation that everywhere there existed, prior to amalgamation, expectations of rewards and gains and that, where efforts at amalgamation were successful, they were followed by a tangible "downpay-

Organization: The Case of the Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Johns Hopkins University 1971).

[6] Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America," in *International Political Communities: An Anthology* (Garden City, N.Y. 1966), 259-99, lists nine independent variables. Ten independent variables are believed to affect the newly isolated dependent variable, "actor integration strategies," in Philippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration," *International Organization*, XXIV (Autumn 1970), 836-68, and fourteen variables are given in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model," *ibid.*, 796-835.

[7] One unsuccessful attempt to assign weights to neofunctionalist variables is reported in Mario Barrera and Ernst B. Haas, "The Operationalization of Some Variables Related to Regional Integration: A Research Note," *International Organization*, XXIII (Winter 1969), 150-60.

[8] The exception is a recent article by James A. Caporaso, "Theory and Method in the Study of International Integration," *International Organization*, XXV (Spring 1971), 228-53.

[9] *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford 1964), 20.

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ment."[10] Downpayments were of some importance in the European Economic Community (EEC) as well; initial gains from trade apparently played an important role in intensifying the commitment of EEC states to a rapid dismantling of tariffs.[11]

Where an actor's behavior is rational,[12] expectations of gain, immediate, tangible, absolute gains, and differential gains between participating actors are likely to influence decisions that expand or contract the integration process. Thus, Philippe Schmitter suggested that "Actors who perceive their returns from integration as equitable—in line with anticipated returns and in proportion to those of others—will *not* reevaluate their integrative strategies (unless forced by less satisfied actors). . . . Only actors dissatisfied with the equity of returns will promote or reconsider alternative strategies. . . ."[13] Even with relative symmetry and constancy of gains among actors in an integrative system, integration inevitably implies some losses. As Johan Galtung has pointed out, even though the relative gains and losses may remain in the same numerical proportion for any given actor, "what is forgotten is the changing nature of these relations over time when pluses are increasingly taken for granted and frustration due to the minuses accumulates."[14]

References to gains, as these examples illustrate, are scattered. Despite the earlier recognition of the importance of this variable to changes within the integrative system, no existing model of the integration process stresses this variable relative to others. Yet there is no doubt that gains are of major importance to the integration process among developing countries.

In this essay, therefore, I would like to go back several steps in model building and take another look at conditions *sur le terrain* in third-world countries; from there I will build up just part of the way by suggesting some minimal conditions for the maximization of gains in integrative systems among such countries. This emphasis on the maximization of gains should become clearer from the analysis which follows.

[10] *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton 1957).

[11] See, for example, Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford 1963), 7-8.

[12] An actor's behavior is rational where the actor evaluates alternatives on the basis of his preferences, where preference orderings are consistent and transitive, where the preferred alternative is always chosen, and where alternatives are evaluated in terms of expected-value calculations (the value one places on an event times the probability the event will actually take place). Frohlich and others (fn. 4), 26.

[13] Schmitter (fn. 6), 858.

[14] "Structural Theory of Integration," *Journal of Peace Research*, v, No. 4 (1968), 386.

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Gains and Losses in Third-World Integrative Systems

A first and very important observation concerning the integrative process among developing countries is that the motivation for integration and the objective of integration is not more or less integration, but rather the realization of economic goals. Integration in many developing areas of the world is, in fact, a paradigm for industrialization.[15]

A second essential observation concerns the leadership in these integrative systems and its perspective on integration. A small group of political leaders constitutes the primary agent of integration among most of the developing countries. Since this leadership is nationally based, it tends to evaluate gains from integration in national terms. The recognition of this factor led to the inclusion of "perceived equity in the distribution of benefits from integration" in the recent writings of those whose major work has been in the field of third-world integrative systems.[16]

The severity of the economic problems faced by each of these sets of national leaders and the lack of resources available to them predisposes the leadership in integrative systems among developing countries to seek immediate and dramatic gains from integration. The leadership, in sum, is characterized by its desire for immediate gains in the industrial sector of the national systems which it represents.[17]

[15] Discussing the formation of the Latin American Free Trade Association, for example, Haas and Schmitter observed that many of the participants "were not primarily interested in long-range integration for its own sake." Although they also note that the "primary inducement" for certain of these countries was not industrialization and that only "some countries shared the view of ECLA that the industrialization of the region would be accelerated by the creation of a preferential market . . . ," we would nevertheless argue that the goal of industrialization through integration would stand high in all preference orderings. Haas and Schmitter (fn. 6), 280-81. In the case of the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), interviews with ministers, experts, and secretariat officials who participate in the collective decision-making process revealed that industrialization was overwhelmingly the most important single reason cited for undertaking an integrative effort. Mytelka (fn. 5), 315-17; see also Sidney Dell, *Trade Blocs and Common Markets* (London 1963), chap. 6, devoted to an analysis of common market aims in developing countries.

[16] See, for example, Nye (fn. 6) and Schmitter (fn. 6).

[17] Reciprocity is often a crucial element in all such systems. In LAFTA, for example, bilateral tariff negotiations were intended to lead to reductions in which "the expected benefits of the reductions must be roughly the same for the same parties." Haas and Schmitter (fn. 6), 281. Similarly, the debate over imbalances in intra-regional trade and industrial location policy in the East African Community and the UDEAC reflects this concern for "national" gains. See, for example, Philip Ndegwa, *The Common Market and Development in East Africa*, rev. ed. (Nairobi 1968); Donald Rothchild, "Experiment in Functional Integration," *Africa Report* (April 1968), 42-46, Paul-Louis Prevost, "L'Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale," *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines*, xxxiv (October 1968), 64-92; Mytelka (fn. 5), chaps. 7, 8, 9.

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Integration is a means to this end and not an end in itself. A similar observation might with some justification be made about the integration process in Europe. There, for example, we might argue that integration was a means to the ends of peace, economic reconstruction, and perhaps a reduction of United States influence in postwar Europe —depending upon the set of national leaders we are examining and their particular preference orderings.

This pragmatic approach to integration in the Third World has two principal consequences for the integration process. First, it results in a situation in which integration has no legitimacy apart from the legitimacy it would or could acquire as a result of the accomplishment of these development goals. A second consequence of this pragmatic approach to integration is that it reinforces a tendency to measure the utility of sacrificing national options and freedom of action, present or future, against tangible gains. To the extent that the present integrative system permits the achievement of national development goals, it is likely to be further strengthened. Spillover potentialities, as suggested by Haas, might also be increased. But to the extent that these goals are not being realized, and under the conditions of immediacy specified by the leadership, the legitimacy of the integrative system will be seriously questioned and the probability is high that such challenges will result in disintegration.

What is the likelihood that gains, as anticipated by the national leadership, will be realized in integrative systems as they are presently constituted among developing countries? To answer this question, we must first look at the effects of present economic structures on the probability that rapid gains can be realized from integration. Second, we must examine the effects of asymmetrical levels of development and variable growth rates among participants on the probable distribution of such gains as may result from integration.

Most third-world countries are highly dependent upon the industrialized world for development capital; the less well-endowed the country in natural resources or human skills, the less likely it is that it will attract capital from foreign sources. In all but a few of these countries, moreover, economic growth has been limited not only by the lack of development capital but by the small size of the national market, where market size is not only a function of population but of purchasing power.

Throughout history, trade has been a major stimulus to economic growth. Many of the limitations on economic development imposed by small national markets, therefore, could be overcome by trade. This

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need to enlarge national markets in order to increase trade and enhance the possibilities for industrialization would, it has been argued, stimulate the creation of regional common markets, and thus begin the process of integration.[18]

But the development of trade, one of the primary gains from this approach to integration, was itself a problem. The real obstacle to intraregional trade was not the presence of tariff barriers or the absence of transportation, but the structural conditions of third-world economic systems. These economies were products of an international division of labor; the task of supplying agricultural commodities and raw materials to the industrialized countries of the world had, for the most part, been allocated to them by natural advantage and colonial fiat. In turn, third-world industrial needs were met by European, Japanese, or North American trading partners.

Although comparative advantage in economic terms lay with the third-world countries as producers of raw materials and with the industrialized countries as purveyors of manufactured goods, deteriorating terms of trade and the consequent widening gap between "rich" and "poor" nations vitiated the promise of economic development through the proceeds of international commerce for most third-world countries.[19] It thus appeared that in the Third World's relations with the industrialized countries the benefits of comparative advantage accrued to those who were comparatively more advantaged to the detriment of those who were comparatively less advantaged. Increasingly, moreover, it became apparent that industrialized countries sought to impede the transformation of present trade relations through the manipulation of their tariff structures on imports from third-world countries. Effective tariffs, by favoring the importation of raw materials over manufactured or processed goods, discouraged still further the industrialization of third-world countries by closing to them the lucrative markets of many industrialized countries.[20]

The solution suggested by the Economic Commission for Africa, the Economic Commission for Latin America, the Economic Commis-

[18] See, for example, UNCTAD, *Trade Expansion and Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries*, Doc. No. TD/B/68/Rev. 1 (Geneva 1966); F. Kahnert and others, *Integration économique entre pays en voie de développement*, OECD (Paris 1969).

[19] Raul Prebisch, *Towards a New Trade Policy for Development*, Report of the Secretary-General of UNCTAD (United Nations 1964); Pierre Jalee, *The Pillage of the Third World* (New York 1968).

[20] Harry G. Johnson, *Economic Policies Towards Less Developed Countries* (London 1967); Reginald H. Green, "U.N.C.T.A.D. and After: Anatomy of a Failure," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, v, No. 2 (1967), 243-67.

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sion for Asia and the Far East, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, as embodied in their proposals, was the enlargement of national markets through regional integration.[21] Yet the very structure of production and trade in the Third World, conditioned as it has been by the historical role played by these countries, impedes the realization of immediate or dramatic gains from integration. When integration is conceived, as it most often has been, as the liberalization of trade by the creation of customs unions or common markets, gains from integration under existing conditions will be forthcoming only slowly and in the long run, though sacrifices must often be made immediately.[22]

A high rate of return on the initial investment in integration is improbable for most participants in third-world integrative systems, and a low rate of return is the frequent lot of some of these member-states. The explanation lies in the initial economic asymmetry between the partners. Where such asymmetries are marked, equity and balanced growth within the integrative system are not automatic consequences of the integration process.

Looking at regional inequalities within each of the member-states in a third-world integrative system, Gunnar Myrdal observed that "If things were left to market forces . . . industrial production, commerce, banking, insurance, shipping and, indeed, almost all those economic activities which in a developing economy tend to give a bigger than average return . . . would cluster in certain localities and regions, leaving the rest of the country more or less in a backwater."[23]

Since Myrdal made this observation, substantial evidence has accumulated which suggests that the creation of customs unions, the usual first step in the integration process, duplicates the within-country experience at the system level. Distinguishing between Myrdal's "spread" effects of integration (the tendency to minimize development differentials within the integrative system), and his "backwash" effects

[21] See, for example, ECAFE, "Towards Integration in Asia," *Journal of Development Planning*, No. 2 (1970), 115-53; United Nations, ECA, *Report of the West African Industrial Coordination Mission*, E/CN.14/246, *Report of the ECA Industrial Coordination Mission to East and Central Africa*, E/CN.14/247, *Report of the ECA Industrial Coordination Mission to Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia*, E/CN.14/248, and later ECA studies.

[22] This view is held by, among others, Hiroshi Kitamura, "Economic Theory and the Economic Integration of Underdeveloped Regions," in M. S. Wionczek, ed., *Latin American Economic Integration* (New York 1966), 59-63.

[23] *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* (London 1957), 26. This clustering of economic activity in African capitals and port cities is quite evident within UDEAC where Brazzaville and Douala are the main economic poles, and in the East African Community where Nairobi has historically dominated.

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(those forces operating within integrative systems which increase intra-regional disparities), Bela Balassa concludes that in developing areas of the world, "backwash" effects are likely to predominate because "the limited amount of new investment goes primarily to regions where the availability of related industries and social and economic overhead capital offer higher returns and that the spreading of advances made in more developed regions is hindered by the lack of an adequate interregional transportation and communication system, as well as by sociological and psychological rigidities."[24]

Not only may some of the member-states fail to secure an equitable share in the industrial development of the enlarged market, but those countries which do not naturally attract new industry may find themselves, for a time, bearing two additional costs of integration. First, the existence of a common external tariff encourages the importation of manufactured goods from within the integrative system rather than from abroad.[25] Where the industrially more advanced of the member-states may be able to exploit the protective cover of a common external tariff to develop exports to its partners, the industrially less advanced partners find themselves once again in the position of net importer. In such cases it is not unusual to find that the commercial balance of the industrially less advanced member-states is increasingly in deficit, that industries in these states must now compete locally with products imported from their partners, and that the absence of customs duties and taxes on goods now traded internally, although formerly imported from without the integrative system, results in a net revenue loss for the importing state.

Second, inefficient production, low productivity, and continued need to import capital and semi-finished goods for use in the manufacturing process increase the costs of production in the developing countries

[24] *The Theory of Economic Integration* (Homewood, Illinois 1961), 201. The concepts of "spread" and "backwash" effects were introduced by Myrdal (fn. 23), 27-35. There is, for example, a perfect correlation in rankings of the Central American Common Market and East African Community Countries on two indicators of development—size of the gross domestic product and total number of industries.

[25] The notions of "trade diversion" and "trade creation" were developed by Jacob Viner in *The Customs Union Issue* (New York 1950). He argued that the major rationale for the formation of customs unions lay in the welfare benefits of trade creation, that is, the shift of imports from a higher-cost producer outside the customs union to a lower-cost producer within the customs union. The importance of static effects has more recently been challenged, with those studying integrative systems in the Third World arguing for the formation of customs unions on the basis of dynamic (growth) effects. See, for example, R. F. Mikesell, "The Theory of Common Markets as Applied to Regional Arrangements among Developing Countries," in Roy Harrod and Douglas Hague, eds., *International Trade Theory in a Developing World* (New York 1965), 205-29.

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over what they are in the countries from which these products were previously imported. For the importing countries within the integrative system, higher costs of production are translated into the higher prices they pay for the manufactured goods of their partners. In a way then, the industrially less advanced member-states, those which do not attract new industry and must import manufactured goods from their partners in fulfillment of the integration bargain, are being asked to subsidize the industrial development of the industrially more advanced member-states.

The conception of integration as a paradigm for industrialization and the anticipation of immediate and dramatic gains in the industrial sector for the participating national systems are thus open to serious challenges within integrative systems that are based on the customs union or the common market model. These challenges are posed primarily by the limitation on rapid gains imposed by present structures of production and trade and by the notable tendency of such systems to exaggerate economic asymmetries, produce unequal gains among the participants, and unbalance the relationship between gains and losses for certain of the participating third-world countries.[26] Given these conditions, it is unlikely that the goals of the national leadership within such integrative systems will be realized in the immediate future. If transformed into frustration with the integration effort, the failure to realize, at least in part, the goals articulated by the leadership directly threatens the durability of integrative systems among third-world countries. If such systems cannot endure long enough to begin to affect fundamentally the structures of production and trade, thereby bringing about the fuller realization of the participants' goals, then, as Jacob Viner long ago concluded, one cannot predicate the creation of integrative systems of this type on the positive gains which will result from the operation of dynamic factors in the long run.[27]

Not only does this brief analysis of the gains and losses in third-world integrative systems introduce a disquieting note into economic analyses of integration, but it casts doubts on the utility of placing as

[26] Robert Loring Allen, in "Integration in Less Developed Areas," *Kyklos,* XIV, No. 3 (1961), 319, observed that "Great disparities in the stage of economic development or structure of the economies, dominance by one or two countries in the integrated region, or an extremely low level of economic development will tend to keep economic benefits at a minimum."

[27] The reasoning behind the conception of integration for development is largely based on the assumed dynamic effects that will result over time from integration, as opposed to the shorter-run static effects that are generally regarded as negative in third-world integrative systems.

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much emphasis as most transaction and neofunctionalist analyses do on social learning of integrative behavior to accelerate the integration process once it has begun. In each of these latter two approaches, social learning is conceived as a product of continuous interaction, communication, and transaction over time between populations, through informal and formal communications channels, and/or among elites, especially decision-makers in institutional settings. Where integrative systems do not outlast their first few years, social learning may not be able to play a significant role. On the other hand, this variable might well find its explanatory powers increased if it is included as a factor in later stages of an integration process.

Rational Theories and the Analysis of Gains

On the basis of the foregoing analysis it is evident that a major factor enhancing the viability and, consequently, the durability of integrative systems among third-world countries is the capacity of the integrative system to maximize the potential for gains in the immediate future and minimize conflicts that may arise as a result of excessive sacrifices, i.e., sacrifices unmatched by corresponding gains. What might we conclude to be some minimal conditions for the maximization of gains in third-world integrative systems? Two areas of renewed research suggest themselves in the light of the above.

First, attention might be shifted away from the present emphasis on the creation of comprehensive integrative systems of the customs and economic union type to a more limited form of integration—one that can be tailored to the needs of the particular political and economic systems it will include. Within such integrative systems, collective decision-making processes could be created, but their scope would extend only to those activities in which immediate gains can be realized.[28] No general conditions would then be laid down to specify which sector must begin the integration process. The guideline, a sector or set of activities that will maximize immediate gains for the participants, could result in radically different approaches to integration among third-world countries.

This approach to integration is not new. Sectoral integration as here outlined closely approximates the earlier (now largely ignored) thinking of Ernst Haas. Moreover, a sectoral approach to integration poses no direct contradiction to transaction theory since the leadership,

[28] For example, the Tan-Zam railroad: although the gains are more political than economic, they are likely to occur within a short period of time following completion of the line.

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if it is anxious to advance the integration process, can deliberately set out to improve the communications capacity in those crucial areas where it is necessitated by the creation of an integrative system.

Second, if we were to persist in the belief that multi-sectoral integration of the customs and economic union type are in the long run more viable because within such systems the possibilities for trade-offs in gains and losses across issue areas are theoretically maximized, then the optimal integrative system among third-world countries would consist in the creation of a minimum winning coalition.[29] For our purposes, a minimum winning coalition is defined as the smallest number of participating member-states which will enable the goals of the participants to be satisfied through gains attributable to the collective effort, while at the same time minimizing the potential for loss or for unequal gain.[30]

In theory and in practice not all coalitions are able to produce the same payoffs. Some will be more profitable to form than others, and some will be more profitable to form for some than for others. Assuming the participants know the payoffs for each of the possible coalitions that can be formed, these two factors will constitute the basis for their choosing which coalitions to form and which coalitions not to form.

In integrative systems the zero-sum condition in which the sum of what the winners gain is equal to the sum of what the losers lose does not hold, since the pie of gains is assumed to be expanding, however slowly.[31] Perfect information, however, is everywhere an illusion; non-zero sum games are no exception. It can thus be argued that a primary task within nascent integrative systems among third-world countries is to maximize the availability of information which, within a definable margin of error, should permit the calculation of gains and losses,

[29] The notion of a minimum winning coalition is borrowed from William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven 1962).

[30] Or, as Chester Barnard put it, "The survival and successful functioning of any organization depends on . . . its ability to satisfy the common group needs which are its reason for being [and] . . . its ability to provide individual members with a satisfactory balance between costs and benefits of participation. . . ." C. I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass. 1945), 56, cited in C. S. Manno, "Majority Decisions and Minority Responses in the UN General Assembly," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, x (March 1966), 1-20.

[31] With respect to certain decisions, industrial location for example, it appears that one party gains the industry at the expense of the others; often such decisions are interpreted in this fashion by the participants themselves. If such an industry is intended to supply the enlarged market with a hitherto unsupplied good, if it can be taken as a factor in economic development, if—as the market for this good expands—other such industries can be created in other of the sub-units of the integrative system, then the single decision becomes part of the set of decisions unbound by the zero-sum condition.

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thereby enabling the participants to negotiate compromises in order to maximize gains for each of them.

In applying this notion of a minimum winning coalition to the initiation of integrative systems, we might hypothesize that in order to build minimum winning coalitions from among the total number of available coalition partners, one must be able to calculate the following for each proposed set of participants:

(1) the sum of the probable maximum gains that can be made available for distribution among the participants over a restricted period of time, for example from one to five years;
(2) the probable losses, in absolute terms or in terms of unequal gains, which may occur for each of the participants during this time period;
(3) the proposed distribution ratio, itself a function of the probable level of side payments from present or future gains, being offered within the integrative system to compensate for losses or unequal gains.[32]

The likelihood that the participants in a nascent integrative system among third-world countries will be able to define an adequate and acceptable distribution ratio at the outset is slim, given the fact that the offer of side payments involves, in many cases, a substantial willingness to sacrifice which may or may not be initially present. However, in view of the attitudinal and situational factors in such countries, as outlined above, I would suggest three conditions that are likely to maximize the possibility for rapid economic gains and to minimize losses in the short run, thereby reducing the importance of side payments in multi-sector integrative systems of the customs and economic union type.

Where the same currency is in use among the member-states or where currencies in use are freely convertible, larger market size, defined in terms of total monetary demand, will maximize the likelihood of economic gains within the integrative system. The rapidity with which such gains will become available for distribution, and the minimization of additional costs, however, depends upon the presence of an adequate transportation system. Maximum market size must therefore be qualified to include maximum transportation facilities, operational-

[32] Side payments might include promises of future action, cash payments, and such private goods as personal prestige and titular offices. However, the scarcity of resources, offices, etc. would make side payments something of a sacrifice for those offering them.

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ized in terms of the number of miles of navigable interstate waterways, roads, and railroads between major population centers in each of the proposed member-states. Finally, each of the preceding conditions must be compatible with still another condition: the smallest degree of asymmetry among the member-states. Asymmetry among the proposed participants can be calculated in terms of the smallest standard deviation from the mean on a composite index of economic development in the modern sector; it is this sector and principally the industrial component within it which is likely to be most affected by the integration process and which, in turn, is most likely to affect the integration process. Where participants articulate standards of self-evaluation and comparison with partners, these indicators should be used to constitute the composite index. This third condition is derived from the need *to minimize losses or the perception and actuality of unequal gains* within the integrative system.

The notion of a minimum winning coalition can also be usefully applied to decision-making within an integrative system. The emphasis on minimum size is in keeping with the arguments Mancur Olson offers in support of his proposition that both the likelihood of approaching optimality in the level of supply of a collective good and the minimization of free-rider tendencies decrease as the size of the group increases.[33] Thus, Olson contends that the larger the group, the smaller the fraction of total group benefits that any individual or sub-set of the larger group receives, and hence the less adequate the reward for any group-oriented action. Under such conditions no individual or sub-set will obtain enough of the collective good to bear the burden of providing even a small amount of it. However, Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young argue that where arrangements for marginal cost sharing exist, smaller benefits to an individual or sub-set will not determine action. "Rather an individual will decide on the size of his contribution for the provision of a collective good on the basis of an expected-utility calculation of his benefits. This calculation will be based not on his fraction of the group's benefits but on the actual value to him of the good (or some change in the quantity of the good supplied), the probability that it will be supplied, and the cost to *him* of providing it."[34]

Olson's line of reasoning would appear to approximate more closely the way gains are evaluated in third-world integrative systems. Never-

[33] Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 48.
[34] Frohlich and others (fn. 4), Appendix I, 146-47.

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theless, there are instances in which the latter type of calculation was undoubtedly operative.[35] The application of rational theory to integration, therefore, might well require a blending and substantial modification of these propositions. The logic of such theories, however, is extremely attractive.

Given the present pragmatic view of integration among third-world leaders, only those integrative systems which demonstrate their utility in terms of the maximization of rapid gains and the minimization of losses are likely to be maintained. The creation and durability of third-world integrative systems thus appears to be strongly influenced by numerous factors related to the salience of gains. The following might be cited in particular:

(1) the extent to which the leadership perceives a probability of net national gains;
(2) the extent to which there are tangible immediate gains;
(3) the extent to which gains are increasing over time;
(4) the extent to which equity in the distribution of gains is perceived;
(5) the extent to which gains are increasing proportionately faster than losses.

Refocusing our attention on conditions that maximize gains and minimize losses within integrative systems among third-world countries and, in a larger sense, on theories that emphasize the relationship of gains to the integration process is an important area for future research.

[35] The decision to extend the trans-Cameroonian railroad northward towards Chad without awaiting Chadian collaboration is one such example.

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PEN, SWORD, AND PEOPLE: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political Institutions

By EDWARD FEIT*

BUREAUCRATS perceive politics bureaucratically. They would wish it to be an orderly process. Therefore, when officers of "new" or "developing" nations take power, they seek to legitimize the administrative state. Their model is bureaucracy, but government and administration are found to be very different from the model. Organization does not meet all problems; neither does the issuance of "the right orders." The goals of administration cannot be achieved without the active compliance of much of the population. What is more, compliance must be active: passive acceptance alone is not enough. A substantial number of people must work actively for what are considered national ends. So, to maintain their rule, military officers and their administrative allies, once they are in power, must do more than organize. They must create institutions that assure active participation of the "masses"—especially in the towns—without having to use the limited powers of coercion available to the state. The ways in which military regimes seek to institutionalize themselves, and the lessons implied for polities in general, constitute the theme of this article.

I

Institutions must be distinguished from organizations. An institution may be organized, and an organization can become institutional, but the two are not necessarily the same. Like an institution, an organization has stable and recurring patterns of behavior. The added dimension of an institution is that these patterns and behaviors are *valued*.[1] The problem can thus be stated simply: how do military regimes manage to get their organizations valued by the people? This, as so many other simple questions, is hard to answer. A military regime, on taking power, falls heir to institutions that have failed for some and are valued by others. It faces demands by the disprivileged for a change in the in-

* A version of this paper was presented at the 67th Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 7-11, 1971.

[1] The definition of institutions is derived, in part, from Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430.

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stitutions, but it cannot govern without many who still value them. On the one hand, therefore, everything must be changed, and on the other, nothing must be changed. The "revolution of rising expectations" must be reconciled with the demand for reestablishment of the compassionate community which the peasant—recently become a townsman—has left behind in the village.[2] This must be done without changing the fundamental distribution of power. *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* must be reconciled on several levels.

I would suggest that institutions, given an organization, result from the interplay of three related and mutually reinforcing processes: the co-optation of new elites into the old system of elite bargaining; the ritualization of political processes; and the condensation of this ritualization through conditioning to the regime's symbols. This separation of the strands does violence to their fundamental unity, but it is necessary for analysis. The demands of brevity call for further violation; therefore, I will here deal with only the second and third strands of institutionalization.[3] Our discussion can then be focused on the relationship of institutionalization to the psychodrama of community and fulfillment.

The creation of institutions means training all of the people to know their roles and to believe that their actions are rational and beneficial. Through rationality and benevolence, the symbolism of politics attains the power to reassure the participants. To hold attention, the regime's actions must, in addition, be frequent and dramatic, comprehensible to all classes and conditions, and should appeal to transcendent principles of social order.[4] As all politics contains conflict, conflict and reconciliation are made part of the ritual. The inevitable struggle for scarce resources, power, and status is controlled through limiting the range of permissible acts by which it can be waged. The effectiveness of institutions can thus be judged by the extent to which they *succeed in making ritual out of conflict*, and their decay by the extent to which their inner conflicts can no longer be contained. The importance of symbol and ritual thus calls for further examination.

Anthropologists have done much to establish empirically the na-

[2] Mehmet Beqiraj, *Peasantry in Revolution* (Ithaca 1966), 5-6, 21.

[3] The co-optation of elites is very ably discussed in Charles W. Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America* (Princeton 1967), chap. 4; Eldon Kenworthy, "Coalitions in the Political Development of Latin America," in Sven Groenings and others, eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior* (New York 1970), 103-40.

[4] The present article owes much to the work of Hugh Dalziel Duncan; see especially his *Symbols in Society* (New York 1968), 65-67.

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ture and importance of symbol and ritual.[5] For our purposes, rituals are collections of symbolic behaviors, and the symbol is the smallest unit of the ritual that retains a specific structure. Ritual, then, is prescribed formal behavior for occasions not given over to technological routine but to belief in mystical beings and mystical powers.[6] In politics the mystical beings are of this earth—they are the leaders gifted with the power to rule, and this gift is subsequently confirmed by frequent symbolic acts demonstrating that they indeed do have these gifts. As with the religious leader required to demonstrate his powers over the supernatural, confirming his contact with it, so the political leader must, in dramatic acts, symbolically show his powers over the political environment. Other mystical matters are also involved in politics, either as friendly or hostile forces: "socialism," "industrialization," "colonialism," "imperialism," and so on. Each ritual has its own teleology with expressed goals that are to be achieved by performing it.[7] Performing the rituals of, say, industrialization, will "bring about" industrialization.[8]

Ritual consists of symbols that juxtapose the grossly physical and the structurally normative—the organic and the social. They weld together what is obligatory with what is desirable, bringing ethical and legal norms into close contact with strong emotional stimuli. Acting out the ritual, with its accompanying demands and excitement, transmutes politics so that gross emotions become "ennobled" through association with social values. Thus, a steel mill may come to symbolize the highest expression of national virtue; and killing others may come to symbolize the noblest expression of human virtue. Social and personal constraints come to be valued as defining conduct befitting the virtuous man.

The creating of institutions means, in short, establishing symbolic political routines in which "what must be done" is transformed into "what I desire to do."

II

Conditioning to symbols is perhaps the easiest part of the process to describe. It is the creation of an unthinking, automatic reaction to

[5] See particularly Victor Turner, *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1967), chap. 1.
[6] *Ibid.*, 30.
[7] *Ibid.*, 32.
[8] Such rituals may consist of "planning" without facts or without real belief that plans will ever be put into effect.

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a symbol when this is presented, rather like Pavlov's famous experiments with dogs. Symbols are continuously put into a given set of contexts until an automatic emotional response is induced. In our discussion of symbols, two things must be borne in mind: the compression of many meanings into a single symbol—the "condensation of meaning"—and the polarization into "good" and "evil" permitted by symbols. One does not need much imagination to understand the condensation or polarization associated with, say, the hammer and sickle or the dollar sign. The characteristics of symbols serve to give a common political language to those who share them, and to make their practices coherent. They provide a common means of communication without requiring precise definition. Where men do not share the same symbols, even if they are legally united in the same nation, they do not share the same institutions.

Symbols are the basic units of ritual, and in building institutions, symbolic acts of revolt, reconciliation, and regeneration are fundamental. All politics involves conflict, and by permitting the symbolic acting-out of conflict, and allowing the conflicting parties to be reconciled, the symbolic struggle can unite rather than divide the members of an institution. The ritual acts relieve tensions, and the resolution of the conflict enhances the impression that the social order is essentially rational and satisfying.[9] Rituals of rebellion, for instance, are incorporated into elections that allow the subjects to "overthrow" the rulers and to substitute others. Reconciliation follows when winners and losers join hands symbolically (i.e., by goodwill messages and promises of support). At other times, mass demonstrations may fill a similar role, as in Egypt in 1967, when Nasser confessed error and was entreated not to resign by the mass demonstrations that followed his gesture.[10] The election or the mass acclamation symbolizes a rebirth of the polity; in the Egyptian case, the regeneration was to come by rededication to symbols of struggle, sacrifice, suffering, and promise of ultimate victory.

This, then, outlines the problem. If military-administrative regimes are to last, they must make their rule institutional. They must condition their publics to symbols and evolve appropriate political rituals. How do they accomplish this? How do they present themselves as defenders of the community while acting as the source of all good things through progress? Two directions seem worthy of pursuit in

[9] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana 1964); Duncan (fn. 4), 64-65.
[10] Edelman (fn. 9), 79.

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examining these questions: the expressed or implied ideologies of military regimes, and the vehicles through which they seek to establish political ritual. The coherence and intellectual structure of a regime is revealed by its ideology—the symbols confirming its fundamental rationality and emotional content; the ritual shows the required habits of conformity in participation through the motor activity of politics, which enhances the impression that leaders translate public wants into public policies.[11] My foci of inquiry are ideology and mass movement, less as "things in themselves" than as means of disseminating symbols and enacting the rituals of participation.

III

Military regimes have some advantages at the outset. They control force, the means by which they came to power. The regimes they have overthrown were often no more legitimate than those they are establishing. The men they ousted may indeed have been corrupt, and their exposure can be made part of the ritual of regeneration. In the long term, however, none of this suffices. Even though power came to them by force, soldiers have to legitimate themselves by means other than force. If force is the only measure, then if force is used to topple the regime, it is also justified. An ideology can bind rulers and ruled, and myths and utopias can, as David Apter suggests, give the coup scope and dimension.[12] Ideology may lay claim to superior rationales that are highly symbolic in themselves, such as planning and modernization, and it can provide the moral basis for manipulation to these ends. In short, ideology is used to justify the exercise of power by soldiers and administrators within a framework of assertive symbols and symbolic claims—"science," "nationalism," "unity," "anti-imperialism," "freedom from corruption," and many others.

In spite of the importance of coherent ideologies, military officers and their administrative allies seem to have great difficulty in formulating them, as an examination of some examples will show: Argentina under Juan Perón (1946-1955); Burma under Ne Win (1962 to date); Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-1970); Pakistan under Ayub Khan (1958-1969); and Spain under Primo de Rivera (1923-1931). None of these can, of course, be treated exhaustively in an article as short as this; but I hope to prove the point sufficiently to justify their use as illustrations.

The ideologies of military regimes can be arranged on a "nul-left"

[11] David E. Apter, *Ideology and Discontent* (New York 1964), adapted from p. 16.
[12] *Ibid.*, 19.

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spectrum, for they either seem to play down ideology altogether or lean toward a leftist orientation. We can, in this respect, point to the relative absence of any clear ideology in Pakistan and compare this with the Socialist slant of, say, Primo de Rivera or Ne Win. Another interesting aspect is the relatively late appearance of ideology in the regimes under study. Except in the case of Burma, where (for reasons that will become clear below), the officers had an ideology ready, it took a number of years for ideology to emerge. In Egypt, for instance, in spite of its being a land of slogans and labels, it came only after ten years.[13] Even then, at least one authority wondered if Egypt really had an ideology at all.[14] Argentina under Perón developed its ideology after four years; in the Spanish case, ideology was something of an afterthought. It seems, therefore, that ideology *follows* the military seizure of power, and then only after some time has elapsed. Even in the Burmese case (or any other), it is doubtful if the officers associated any definite meanings with the terms they used, and it matters little whether they did or not. What matters is that they came to associate certain symbols with predictable ends and propagated them to achieve these objectives.

No coherent ideology emerged in Pakistan under Ayub Khan, for he, as so many other military politicians, believed that difficult problems, when reduced to essentials, had simple solutions.[15] This did not resolve the problem of belief and routine in politics, and some effort was made to find a basis for an ideology. As in Egypt, the Islamic faith was considered a possibility at first, but it provided little for a basis: political leadership had traditionally been secular, and Islam had no hierarchy of priests.[16] All the regime could claim to offer was honesty and competence; both were soon called in question as real wages declined and Ayub's family and friends grew richer. Complaints were loudest from the Eastern region which, with 56 per cent of the population and earnings of more than two-thirds of the country's foreign exchange, received only one-third of the total development funds. Little effort was expended in creating a structure of symbols that allowed for deeply felt emotional needs for security and social

[13] Carl Leiden, "Egypt: The Drift to the Left," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, XIV (January 1963), 7; see also James Heaphy, "The Organization of Egypt," *World Politics*, XVIII (January 1966), 178.

[14] Leiden (fn. 13), 7.

[15] Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Role of the Military in Modern Pakistan," in Jacques van Doorn, ed., *Armed Forces and Society* (The Hague 1968), 29.

[16] Keith Callard, *Political Forces in Pakistan* (New York 1959), 16-17.

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recognition. Decisions were made from hand to mouth and were found wanting by a largely unsatisfied population.

There is much that is similar in the Spain of Primo de Rivera. He too tended to make decisions from hand to mouth and he was certainly no philosopher. His beliefs centered on a simple set of symbols: "respect for the monarchy," "respectful submission to authority and discipline," "acceptance of and proper discharge of political office," and "vigilance in the carrying out of the laws."[17] These are surely symbols that would have been acceptable to most military rulers. To say this is not, however, to say that Primo had a concrete ideology. His rudimentary political ideas were converted into a mystical credo—*intuicismo*—by his journalistic hacks and were not taken seriously by anyone.[18] At first, crudity of thought stood Primo in good stead because it was interpreted as great political honesty, even though his conception of a Spanish "national will" *à la Rousseau* was disregarded.[19]

Primo's political leanings, although founded on a primitive conservatism, favored the working class; he permitted considerable freedom to the Socialist Party so that his own party—the Patriotic Union, officially the only party in the state—unofficially worked in what was almost a two-party system.[20] Like Juan Perón's regime in Argentina, which was modelled in part on that of Primo de Rivera, it belonged clearly neither to "right" nor to "left," and represents a bridge between an administrative and a political state.

Unlike Primo de Rivera, Juan Perón did fancy himself to be a philosopher and enjoyed lecturing.[21] Nevertheless, his ideology only emerged four years after he had taken power; it was unveiled at an international philosophical conference in Argentina in 1949. It expressed the middle ground between the poles of socialism and capitalism—hardly an inspiring ideological position. Perón was, however, able to dress it in imagery worthy of Madison Avenue, using expressions like "the third position" for the middle ground, and *justicialismo* for the philosophy appropriate to it.[22] It was replete with symbols that could become battle cries: "the dignification of labor," "elevation of social culture," and "humanization of capital."[23] *Justicialismo*, identified with

[17] Dilwyn F. Ratcliff, *Prelude to Franco: Political Aspects of the Dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera* (New York 1957), 42.
[18] Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford 1967), 204.
[19] Ratcliff (fn. 17), 60.
[20] Raymond Carr, *Spain 1808–1939* (London 1966), 570.
[21] George Pendle, *Argentina* (London 1955), 80-81.
[22] Arthur P. Whitaker, *Argentina* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964), 132.
[23] George I. Blanksten, *Perón's Argentina* (Chicago 1953), 93.

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social justice, turned out to be less an intellectual exercise than a means of extending and holding power. The uses to which it was put were no less pragmatic than the loosely formulated ideas of other soldiers in politics. Indeed, its very lack of precision served a purpose, as it allowed for flexibility in interpretation while Perón pursued his opportunist course.[24] So effective was Perón's symbolizing of his regime that even today his followers are a major force in Argentine politics.

Another military ruler whose ideas and regime have survived his rule is Gamal Abdel Nasser.

As I have pointed out previously, Egypt was without an official ideology from 1952 to 1962. When it was finally propounded, the ideology contained, as good ideologies should, what the Egyptian people wished to hear and their rulers wished them to believe. Egypt was pictured as an important world power, leading the Arab world and much of Africa. Where Egypt had not attained her aspirations, it was the fault of corrupt rulers of the past and "imperialists" who had held her back. In constructing their ideology, Egyptian officers were drawn to the patterns of mature communism rather than to revolutionary Marxism. In the former they found lessons on how to build a "one-party state" and how to justify a "cult of the leader." They also learned how to manage the paraphernalia of political propaganda.[25] They were concerned with running an administrative state, and, it has been argued, wished to promote the radicalization of the Egyptian revolution without commitment to socialism.[26]

Nasser was handicapped in establishing his own symbols because they had, in a sense, been preempted by the Muslim Brethren who took all that could be derived from political Islam. Nasser and his fellow officers were therefore obliged to discover a new synthesis of the Islamic faith with symbols of social freedom and social justice based on industrial society rather than on peasant practice.[27] The symbolism was therefore bifurcated into "democratic and cooperative socialism" on one hand and pan-Arab nationalism on the other. Its main goals were to control the economy, to promote rapid development, and to ward off the evil "imperialists" who were plotting the subjugation of the country. There was to be strict control, for "the redistribution of the surplus national work on the basis of justice can never be accomplished

[24] Whitaker (fn. 22), 133-34.
[25] A. V. Sherman, "The Social Roots of Nasser's Egypt," *Commentary*, XXIV (November 1957), 414.
[26] Anuar Abdel-Malek, "The Crisis in Nasser's Egypt," *New Left Review*, XLV (September 1967), 78.
[27] *Ibid.*, 73.

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through voluntary efforts based on good intentions, however sincere they may be."[28]

Military regimes, with or without an overt ideology, distrust the motives of individual men pursuing their own interests. The coup itself is considered justified as a reaction to the selfishness, political and economic, that brought the country to the brink of disaster. But, because men still seem to prefer their own gain, and because a high proportion of the population tends to distrust those in power for all but a short period, the claims of the regime have to be presented in a more attractive format. This format is, as illustrated in the examples above, an attempt to reconcile the conflict between community and opportunity. Nationalism can be held out as a means to a larger community, and socialism as a means to better the life of the individual man. Rulers can present, as their objective, a rational workmanlike society in which men help each other in achieving a common and yet personal goal—greater wealth through industrialization. Purification can, during this process, be achieved by overcoming shadowy foes who aim to frustrate this purpose. Since all this will involve heroic efforts, the leader can assume a mantle of heroism, and can himself become a symbol to be orchestrated with the others.[29]

Such symbolism has its most advanced expression in Burma under Ne Win. This may be because the Burmese officers came to the army from politics, rather than the other way around, and had defined their political position as early as 1945. Many of the ideas they developed then emerged again when the civilian government of U Nu invited the officers to take power in 1958. The "Meiktilla Statement" of that year set out their priorities: to restore peace and order; to implant democracy; and to establish a Socialist economy.[30]

These objectives changed when, in 1962, the army once again came to power, this time by means of a coup. The new ordering of priorities was expressed in a new credo, "The Burmese Way to Socialism," which put socialism first and played down a commitment to democracy that was considered unsuited to Burmese conditions. Democracy on the Burmese model, the officers maintained, had failed to serve socialism which could only be promoted after unity was achieved. The

[28] Heaphy (fn. 13), 180.

[29] See, for instance, Otto Rank, *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero and Other Writings* (New York 1959).

[30] Moshe Lissak, "Social Change and Mobilization, and Exchange of Services Between the Military Establishment and Civil Society: The Burmese Case," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XIII (October 1964), 10. The army had ruled with the consent of civilians from 1958 to 1960.

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symbolism of the military regime emerges in the statement which speaks of "man's endeavor to build a society set free at last from anxieties over food, clothing, and shelter, and able to enjoy life's spiritual satisfactions" proceeding from the "premise of faith in a politico-economic system based on eternal principles of justice, liberty, and equality."[31] Again, the desire to reconcile community with opportunity is evident, as is the semireligious symbolism by which the soldier is depicted as teacher of the nation, as in Egypt and Argentina. The army is to impart to the nation its own principles of patriotism, modernity, and order. The officers see themselves as devoted to the "real interests" of the nation, and this devotion enables them to give expression to its "real will" in some mystical way. The needs of the nation, as they see them, tend to be a strong need for order on the one hand and a more equitable distribution of the national wealth on the other. Order and equity are, of course, in themselves strongly permeated by symbolism, as are the components of the nation—"workers," "peasants," "the oligarchy," and so forth. These may, or indeed may not, resemble workers, peasants, or oligarchs. It is the symbolic presentation of these figures, however, that is important in the formation of belief systems.

In spite of the symbolism they manage to evoke, military rulers seem to have real difficulty in formulating ideologies, and, having formulated them, in winning widespread belief in them. Why is this? It may be due to the character of bureaucratic organization itself.

The fundamental organizing principle in bureaucracies is emulation, particularly vertical emulation. Each man seeks to emulate those above him, from one level to the next, within the entire system of ranks and allegiances. The desire to conform is more than a matter of bureaucratic ritual: It is linked to the desire to live up to the symbolic values of the bureaucracy as a whole, which can be accomplished only through conformity. Preservation of the system itself demands that sanctions be invoked against those who do not conform, thereby reenforcing it from level to level. What happens when the top of the hierarchy is reached? Then who is left to be emulated? In bureaucracies, as in axiom systems, completion must, it seems, come from without. The head of a bureaucratic system receives his instructions from without, from an outside principal, in the form of a "policy." The apparatus as a whole then acts in the name of that principal. This completion from without accounts for the inability of bureaucrats to

[31] Quoted in Fred R. von Mehden, "The Burmese Way to Socialism," *Asian Survey*, III (July 1963), 129.

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formulate an ideology, for in an emulative system the leading members, meaning in effect all members, can function only if ideas come from the outside. The head of a bureaucracy can, by mirroring the symbols obtained from outside, provide a source for emulation by the whole. Because of this tendency to emulate on the basis of outside ideas, bureaucracies themselves seldom are sources of ideas; they look to others for policies.

The system of emulation linked to reward, stifling creativity, does not provide a full description of the situation. Emulation is at the root of bureaucratic cohesion. An individual's conduct in a group or in a society can never be entirely congruent with what is expected of him; therefore corrective mechanisms allow for adjustment. These are the fictions that all agree to treat as real. The maintenance of such fictions, by which men are obligated to consider as true what is not necessarily true in their experience, causes repression of those who deny them. The fictions that sustain organizations are fictions such as "truth," "honor," "rational purpose," and "efficiency." These have to be maintained in the face of an ofttimes stubborn reality because the organization cannot be sustained without them. The pressure of political values (which might call organizational values into question) leads to a denial of the political values, and part of the system of organizational values consists in *not having* political values—a patent fiction, but one necessary for the organization. The aim is to be "apolitical," to "serve the state—not the government," and to be "nonpartisan." Ideological thinking is thus discouraged in order to sustain the organization, and ideologues are viewed with suspicion or hostility. Therefore, when bureaucrats must, in the end, formulate ideologies, they are inexpert and diffident. After many years of emulation, with his mind cast in adherence to rules, the bureaucrat does not have the training to espouse imaginative doctrines that will set men's minds on fire. The bureaucrat then tends to reduce all problems to what he understands—organization—and to find the answer to problems in more and better organization. The polity is seen as organization writ large. However, ideology is inescapable, for, as Erik Erikson has shown, it makes facts amenable to ideas and ideas to facts, creating a world image convincing enough to support a sense of identity.[32] And it is this sense of identity that makes for meaningful participation in the mass party and in the plans of the regime. As it is the aim of military regimes to give pur-

[32] Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (London 1958), 20.

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pose to society, ideology is an ever-present need that is not often met. This emerges with great clarity when we consider the attempts of military regimes to establish mass parties.

In saying all this, I should perhaps include a cautionary note: Military regimes are not *ipso facto* unpopular or at all times unrepresentative of the aspirations of the population. It is too facile an assumption that military regimes at no time echo the desires of the governed. What military regimes symbolize is quite often what is wanted—rationality, order, and security in a frame of community. The question is not that: The question is, when do military regimes fail to create institutions and why, and when do they succeed?

IV

Symbols do not in themselves induce action; men have to be marshalled to act, and in acting reinforce their conditioning to the symbols. Mass publics must, therefore, be organized and induced to act out the ideology through ritual. Meanings hammered home in the ideology must be related to dramatic action emphasizing the unity of the rulers and the ruled. A mass party is often the vehicle by means of which this outcome is sought.

In discussing the mass party, the models of Alvin Gouldner may provide useful analogies.[33] Gouldner speaks of "representative bureaucracy" in which management enforces rules that are obeyed by the workers with little overt conflict. Both support these rules by informal consent, mutual participation, and the education of workers and management. As an alternative he describes a "punishment-centered bureaucracy" in which rules are enforced either by management or by the workers, and evaded by either or both. As rules are enforced by sanctions there is greater tension and conflict. These models can, with some translation, serve for military regimes. Military regimes, one might say, aim at becoming representative bureaucracies, their political record being the extent to which they approach this state. They may begin as punishment-centered bureaucracies, and end as such, but if this is their permanent state, they are bound to fail. Military regimes may also move toward "mock bureaucracy" in which rules are neither enforced by management nor obeyed by workers, where there is little conflict, and where joint evasions and violations of the rules are buttressed by informal consent. Pakistan seems to have ap-

[33] Alvin W. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (New York 1954), 217.

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proached this state toward the end of Ayub Khan's rule. Whatever the reality, military regimes seem to seek to approximate "representative bureaucracies" with officers and administrators as the managers of society.

This clarifies the role of the mass party. It is to create a sense of representation and, in so doing, to mobilize the masses into participating in the rituals of representative bureaucracy. As Anwar es-Sadat once put it, the party was the school that trained men in the functions of government and equipped them with the necessary new mentality.[34] In other words, the purpose of the mass party is to institutionalize the regime. The fact that institutionalization must include vast numbers may account for the preference of ruling officers for the "rally" or "movement" over the "party." Only when the movement has failed to rally effectively, and has proved to be an ineffective means of training, does the party seem to be used as a last resort.

The turn from movement to party is dramatically illustrated by Burma. Even before being invited to take power legally, in 1959, the Burmese officers had thought in terms of a mass movement. They had sought to form a new nationwide political movement, the National Solidarity Organization, which had no official connections but was inspired by the army. It was pledged to a variety of symbolic goals such as "patriotic loyalty" and "good citizenship." It could, however, easily have been converted into a mass party.[35] The need for this was apparently not perceived at the time, so this change was not made.

On seizing power in 1962, the Revolutionary Council, as the officers called themselves, at first tolerated competing parties; but when pressure failed to unify these with a party created by the military, they were banned in 1964. The Burma Socialist Program Party was established as the only legal party in the state. Protest at the establishment of the new dispensation was bloodily suppressed, and there seemed little to prevent the BSPP from habituating the population to responses deemed appropriate by the military regime. The BSPP was, however, to be a cadre party based on tight central control at the top and on the principle of "democratic centralism binding on all members and candidates."[36] The cadres were both military and civilian, but the problem of enlisting the many ethnic minorities of Burma was never solved.

[34] Panayotis J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Bloomington, Ind. 1961), 104.

[35] Frank N. Trager, *Burma: From Kingdom to Republic* (New York 1966), 184-85.

[36] Josef Silverstein, "The Burma Socialist Program Party and its Rivals: A One-Party System," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, VIII (March 1967), 12.

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The party ideology that was binding on members and candidates was "the System of Correlation of Man and Environment."[37]

The people at large were to be trained to political ritual—not only by the cadres of the BSPP but also at mass rallies (which increased in number as the economic difficulties of the regime multiplied). Meetings were held all over the country, exhorting the people, citing evidence of improvements and corrected mistakes, and indicating how the government would promote the interests of workers and peasants.[38] These and other ritual acts were no doubt intended to demonstrate the solidarity of the regime and the masses. But even if the minorities are left out of account, the success of the BSPP is dubious. The soldiers and administrators of Burma seem to be aware of their isolation from the people, and attempts to break down this isolation through the BSPP seem to have been ineffectual. The BSPP does not seem to have succeeded in involving the Burmese public in defined tasks or in acting as a channel for formalized political expression.

Egypt, like Burma, provides some insights into the workings of the mass party in military regimes, especially since the Egyptian mass party has passed through several transformations. On January 17, 1953, political parties were banned in Egypt. Prior to that time, Egypt had been the scene of active party competition, and the military rulers were anxious to fill the glacis due to the banning before the political parties could reorganize. Three attempts were made at organizing an effective mass party: the Liberation Rally of 1953 was replaced by the National Union in 1956; the National Union, in turn, was replaced by the Arab Socialist Union after Syria seceded from the United Arab Republic in 1962. There has been a frustrating search for a formula for obtaining organized mass support, and for a permanent, institutional political structure, which seems to have eluded the government in Nasser's lifetime.[39]

The formation of the Liberation Rally was announced to a crowd said to have numbered some 250,000 in Cairo. They were told that the Rally would replace the parties that had divided the country in the face of British imperialism. It would replace the alliance of King and politicians who had "formed a limited company for theft and robbery in which the people had no shares." The new government, because of its great popular support, needed a body to "organize the people and to foster their unity and to coordinate the efforts of the workers." A fresh

[37] Trager (fn. 35), 202.
[38] *Ibid.*, 207.
[39] Panayotis J. Vatikiotis, *A History of Modern Egypt* (New York 1969), 382.

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start was promised in which the "hand of dishonor" would be removed and the "roots of corruption" torn out.[40] These extracts encapsulate much of the foregoing argument on rituals of revolt, reconciliation, and regeneration.

When the Liberation Rally failed to achieve these objectives, it was replaced by the National Union which had similar aims. It was to stimulate public interest and enthusiasm, to win cooperation, and to liquidate class conflict. It was also to "guarantee" national unity and to be "a vanguard of revolutionary idealism." It was to interpret the leadership at various levels and to replace motives of personal gain with a spirit of public service. The important thing is, however, that the aim of the party was not the winning of majorities or to mirror the public will; it was to direct it by organizing "enthusiastic and pervasive response to the regime's programs and by encouraging public 'discussion' of them not before but after promulgation."[41]

The need for a mass party was serious, as Nasser himself had said, for if a mass party failed to take root, Egypt (i.e., the regime) was doomed. The party was not, however, to be a party like those in democracies, but one that would legitimate change through a larger and more permanent vanguard than was provided by Nasser's person or by any of his associates.[42] As in so many other cases, a "movement" was still preferred to a "party"; the National Union seemed, until its replacement, to meet this specification—being without structure, organization, or program. It was too early in Nasser's regime to make long-term pronouncements about the Arab Socialist Union that followed the demise of the National Union, other than to say that it did not seem to be a more effective vehicle than its predecessors. It was the personal hold of Nasser as a symbolic leader that seems to have institutionalized the regime, as far as this has indeed taken place.

With the formation of the Arab Socialist Union, the role of the army was presented as clearing a path for the revolution which was to find expression in the ASU. The ASU was to represent all "popular forces," defined as "farmers and workers"—a definition that might have seemed very exclusive except for the fact that a "worker" was defined as anyone who worked. This idea was, therefore, compatible with the notion that party and nation were one, and that a sense of national unity would be fostered and preserved by mobilizing all political forces

[40] Don Peretz, "Democracy and Revolution in Egypt," *Middle East Journal*, XIII (1959), 30.

[41] Malcolm H. Kerr, "The Emergence of a Socialist Ideology in Egypt," *Middle East Journal*, XVI (Spring 1962), 141.

[42] Heaphy (fn. 13), 190-91.

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under the umbrella of the Arab Socialist Union.[43] Once again, practice defeated theory however, for the ASU remained an organization run by the dominant officer corps or simply by functionaries of the ruling political machine. Of the Executive Committee of One Hundred, for instance, only two belonged to the traditional Left despite the Socialist professions of the regime.

Perceiving the mass party as the link between rulers and masses is by no means unique to Egypt. A "movement" of the kind described, being without any clear ideology, can unite many factions and clearly threatens few of them. It fits into the symbolism of bureaucracy, for it is political without being ideological. Also, though this may only be imperfectly realized, the mass movement is a better vehicle for training in political ritual when large numbers are to be taught. The greater the number of participants, the more readily thought is suspended in dramatic action, and the more isolated are those who do not accept the ritual. Nonetheless, the logic of events must run its course, and in the end the movement yields to the party, for the very elements that make it useful make it useless. Organization implies that there is a structure, and a structure must have some end; hence the party is formed. The Argentinean and the Spanish cases, like the Egyptian, illustrate this process.

Juan Perón, like his Egyptian counterparts later, held an officer's prejudice against political parties and preferred the idea of a national movement. He soon learned that, in order to work within the national political framework, he would have to form and lead a party: He wished to preserve a symbolic facade of constitutionalism, and Argentines were accustomed to parties and continued to support them. To some extent, therefore, the political habits of the people outweighed the wishes of the *Lider*. Perón nevertheless clung to the imagery of a "movement" even when leading his party. His original models had been the Nazi and Fascist parties, and his "movement" was to some extent based on theirs, but with the Axis defeated, he had to find new friends and new models. His original party, the *Partido Unico*, now seemed too strongly identified with the fallen dictatorships, and so, within a few months of its formation, it was renamed *Partido Peronista*, with Perón making the customary ritual disclaimer of personal ambition, though he was clearly the major prop of the party.[44]

The Peronista party was endowed with an elaborate paper structure

[43] Panayotis J. Vatikiotis, "Some Political Consequences of the 1952 Revolution in Egypt," in P. M. Holt, ed., *Political and Social Change in Egypt* (London 1968), 377.
[44] Robert J. Alexander, *The Perón Era* (New York 1951), 60.

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and terms of membership almost as exclusive as those of the Communist party. Membership was confined to a small minority and was kept secret. In addition, a women's party was founded, led by the dictator's wife, Evita—a step that won him much support among politically conscious Argentine women. The party was intended as a disciplined elite: Breaches of discipline were to be punished with expulsion, which was comparable to excommunication in the Middle Ages.[45] In spite of these measures, the party was no tightly-knit band of brothers. Far from presenting a picture of monolithic unity, the party was riven by factions, and its history was marked by expulsions and electoral splits.[46]

Competition in elections, although circumscribed, made the *Partido Peronista* a less suitable means of training the masses than a single party might have been. The essence of institutionalization, after all, is drill to a common pattern, and previous practice plus remaining competition ruled this out for Perón. Because of this competition, the Peronistas were forced back on the symbols of the leaders, and this was done with considerable effect. Perón and his wife were made symbols of compassion and community, and, as husband and wife divided the political labor, each could symbolize different things. Compassion was expressed through the person of Evita Perón whose charitable foundation helped the poor, and posters of her, with the slogan *Eva Dignifica* (Eva gives dignity to the poor), proliferated. Juan Perón, on the other hand, was able to present himself as an officer and a gentleman to the army, and as a source of economic opportunity to the people. His posters bore the slogan *Perón Cumple* (Perón fulfills his promises).

The symbolic conditioning that was a substitute for the effective mass party can be related to the routinization of charisma; instead of political routine, the myth of the leader acts as the unifying force. Perón gained through his political partnership with his wife, for she was, in Stanislaw Andreski's words, "one of the most effective demagogues in Latin America."[47] Whenever Perón was seriously threatened, his wife could call on the working class to come to his aid, while Perón could depend on the army, particularly the enlisted ranks, whom he made his particular wards. It was the death of Evita Perón in 1952 which demonstrated the fragility of routinized charisma. What can be done when the symbol is removed by death? Deification is a solu-

[45] Whitaker (fn. 22), 131.
[46] *Ibid.*, 130; Blanksten (fn. 23), 100-101.
[47] Andreski, *Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America* (London 1966), 228.

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tion, and Perón attempted with some success to deify his wife; even today her name still has some of its magic. Still, it was not enough to maintain Perón's power in the face of economic decline and changing political demands.

What happens when the mass party is unsuitable as a vehicle for the training of the masses? A principle of political substitution seems to be operative by which another body is used to this end. In the Argentine, the trade unions came increasingly to fill this function. The General Confederation of Labor (*Confederación General de Trabajo*) came to embrace some sixty per cent of Argentine workers by 1963—some 800,000 workers in all. An attempt was made to preserve an appearance of independence and autonomy, though this was not taken seriously by anyone. The unions were the instrument of the regime until economic ills eroded support for the rulers.

Perón seems to have recognized early the strategic position afforded him by being in the War Ministry and the Ministry of Labor at the same time. He was in the unique situation of being able to forge the unlikely alliance between the army and the workers, and at the same time to pull all workers together into a set of trade unions under his control. He attracted labor with promises—largely fulfilled—of dignity, freedom, and higher pay. Workers who in the past had known neglect, indignity, and servitude flocked to the movement as they saw their status enhanced and their powers of collective bargaining multiplied. Perón, of course, lost no opportunity of reminding labor of its debt to him, while acknowledging the part it had played in bringing him to power. In massive May Day rallies, in which rituals of support were played out, he reiterated to the workers that his regime had done more for them than any other in Argentina, an assertion that was given weight by being largely true.[48]

Substitution thus ensured for Perón that vital routinization would take place, for it is the routinization itself that is what counts, not the organizational form by which it is accomplished. Through the trade unions, which were under Perón's control, the masses from the countryside could be offered community within a framework of opportunity, and so be converted into supporters of an institutional regime. Indeed, this may be the reason why *Peronismo* remains a force in Argentine politics today.

Chronologically, the regime of Primo de Rivera came before that of Juan Perón, but the contrasts can be made clearer by treating it second.

Like the other officers we have discussed, Primo de Rivera had an

[48] Whitaker (fn. 22), 114-16.

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almost obsessional hatred of politicians and politics. He regarded them as the prime cause of the ills of Spain, and envisioned a polity free of politicians and parties. Politicians and parties, he thought, had alienated the government from the people, and he vaguely perceived his mission as one in which he was to enter into direct touch with the Spanish nation and so to restore its democratic spirit. Yet this search for direct contact seems in the end to have reduced his impact. The impression that he sought to convey was that of a compassionate despot, doing his best but not always succeeding: "Scribbling pencil notes to his subjects in the small hours of the morning after a hard day's work at his desk."[49] However, much of the broadcasting and writing was done when the dictator was intoxicated. So, far from adding to his stature, it made him appear ridiculous and destroyed his image—a fatal turn for a symbol.

Why, with his known hatred for parties, did Primo organize one of his own? The answer is, perhaps, that political substitution was closed to him. Unlike Perón, who could use the labor organizations as a substitute for an ineffective party, Primo had to depend on other sources. The officers who had been put in political roles were impatient to leave, as the stain of corruption they had been so quick to lay at the doors of the politicians was beginning to spread to them. Other men had to be sought to take up the political leadership, civilianizing the regime while preserving its values.

The Patriotic Union was established to this end. It was to draw on the "men with clean hands"—competent but unqualified civilians—whose chief merit was that they were not politicians. The Patriotic Union was not to be a party, but an apolitical center open to all patriots in order to secure the moral regeneration of Spain through a system of organized conduct.[50] That, at any rate, was the theory. The reality was Primo's recognition that the state required social cohesion and mass support to survive, and this had to be provided by association with a variety of symbolic forms. Primo already had the support of the Socialists, and now the Patriotic Union was to appeal to other than working class support. He needed the propertied classes who were stronger and more numerous in Spain than in many of the other countries we have examined.

A marriage of manipulation and pragmatism, the Patriotic Union failed to draw competent civilians to the regime in any number. It could not, as had been hoped, train the more powerful Spanish classes

[49] Carr (fn. 20), 565.
[50] Ratcliff (fn. 17), 58.

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in moral politics, and it failed to set an example of civic spirit. It could not provide the personnel for government. The party shared the fate of other mass parties we have discussed: it gave neither that mixture of community and compassion that would have institutionalized ritual, nor did it provide an opportunity for the innocent to govern. Great public rallies with the trappings of fascism, rousing speeches, and complete control of all national and local patronage failed to produce support or leaders other than the party bosses of the past and industrialists seeking government contracts.[51] When, in the end, Primo wanted to return to a democratic system, the leaders of the Patriotic Union, fearful for their power, opposed this course. This was disastrous. The only men with sufficient skill to govern Spain were the old politicians; Primo had insulted them for too long to win them over to his side now. Deserted by all supporters, the regime fell in 1931.

The record of military regimes with mass parties seems mixed, but the main trend is clear: Military regimes seldom are able to use mass parties as a vehicle of institutionalization. This is due to the difficulties in formulating an ideology around which appropriate symbols and rituals can be built. In a sense, it may be caused by the rulers' persistent vision of a "real" nation concealed and denied a voice by existing political classes, that will find its voice through symbols provided by the military regime. The symbols and the training are aimed at this "real" nation which, as it does not exist, cannot respond. An appeal to specific groups, around symbols and rituals they accept, is more likely to be institutionalized successfully. Thus, Perón still has a hold on Argentine labor today, whereas other regimes, on wider issues, have vanished without a trace.

V

Human needs, in simplest terms, can be set out on a twofold division: the need to believe and the need to survive. They are the basis of tables of human needs, such as those by Maslow and Lasswell, for instance.[52] The need to believe is possibly the more fundamental of the two, for survival itself rests on belief. Goals are adopted when there is some belief that they will be realized, and techniques to accomplish them are employed in the belief that they will succeed. Symbols and rituals are expressions of belief in something independent of the human will, and it is the function of institutions to routinize this belief.

[51] Carr (fn. 20), 576.

[52] A. H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York 1954), 80-98; Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?* (Cleveland 1961).

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The goals of the institution are accepted by man rather than chosen; they are goals to which he has been conditioned. Commitment to these goals is made routine through stabilizing symbols and rituals that allow for revolt, reconciliation, and regeneration.

The methods of routinizing belief are varied; one way is through mass parties in which individuals are trained as a group in a common ritual built around a common and shared set of symbols, one of which may be a symbolic leader. Institutionalization reaches an apotheosis when no other way of politics is perceived to be possible or desirable. The ritual then legitimates the achievement, making the established goals moral and rational. It provides a means for incorporating men into the body politic, as permissible revolt is resolved in a compassionate reconciliation allowing the reintegration of an individual into the organic society. In such a case, revolt and conflict are both system-confirming and self-confirming acts.

Congruence between bureaucratic and social forms permits military-administrative regimes to work effectively. Beqiraj, discussing Tönnies, speaks of the benevolent and at the same time repressive peasant community:[53] benevolent as a vehicle of conciliation, and repressive as it allows little latitude or discretion to the individual either in handling problems or in disposing of the limited resources of the community. Because of the limitation of resources, expectations must be restricted and sacrifice of self becomes an act of loyalty through which the individual is spared suffering and avoids the seemingly higher costs of individual attainment. Peasant psychodrama and the psychodrama of bureaucracy rest on the social harmony of the whole even where this heightens individual tensions.[54] Individuals may wish to achieve but cannot do so because of piety to the norms of the commune or the organization, and the fear of the costs of independence. To contain this tension so that it does not end in disruption and violence involves its transformation in social occasions which, while apparently expressive of rebellion, in reality do not challenge the principle of rule.[55] Festivals of this sort—rites of passage, the award of diplomas, or rewards for long service—are eagerly seized upon by people, for "their joy, sorrow, or aggressiveness, their hate or love, their humility or dependence, or their pride and self-aggrandizement, all lose proportion and become dramatizations. Yet because the dramatization is by

[53] Beqiraj (fn. 2), 4.

[54] *Ibid.*, 10.

[55] See, for instance, Max Gluckman, *Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa* (New York 1963). In chap. 3, rituals of revolt among the Zulu are described and are shown to strengthen the community.

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the whole group all in the same manner, no one individual can be suspected of expressing his own problems."[56] Real gratifications, being rare, entail the magnification of communal recreation to create some group solidarity, but their effect is not lasting, for the gratifications are not real enough to console individuals more than in a temporary way.[57]

The argument I have advanced provides clues to the failure of the mass party in administrative regimes. It indicates why it is relatively easy to draw crowds, but difficult to make committed followers. The ease with which crowds can be gathered often deludes observers into believing that there are institutions even where none exist, as the myth of the African "one-party state" has so amply proven. We must look deeper if we are to understand the nature of institutions and the more transitory movements or organizations.

On its face, a comparison of bureaucracy and peasant village might seem far-fetched, although it was not unrecognized by Max Weber.[58] If, on the other hand, we use the language of Tönnies, we might argue that bureaucracy is more an appurtenance of *Gesellschaft* than of *Gemeinschaft*. The emphasis in descriptions of bureaucracy is usually on rationality in arrangement, functioning, and purpose. Particular attention is given to hierarchy and discipline. Yet, is the difference that great? Serving an outside source, bureaucracies are both benevolent and coercive, and this is true of the peasant commune as well. A member of a bureaucracy operates on the principle of emulation and is subject to a unified code and system of discipline, as is the man in the traditional peasant commune. Therefore, the "piety" that develops in a bureaucracy is similar to that of a peasant commune; there is the same tendency to value limited expectations as symbols of solidarity and as a means of avoiding suffering. What is absent is a spirit that encourages creativity, which might allow for the development of appropriate symbols that can make a government institutional. Yet, because of the similarity of military-administrative regimes to traditional institutions—a similarity of spirit—military regimes do not at first seem incompatible with the "general will" of some societies. Elsewhere I have argued that in sub-Saharan Africa the most successful form of government—that which became institutional—was the colonial administrative regime. Much of the military upheaval in Africa (leaving aside individual ambitions), can be construed as an attempt

[56] Beqiraj (fn. 2), 19.
[57] *Ibid.*, 9.
[58] See, for instance, Martin Albrow, *Bureaucracy* (New York 1970), 37-49.

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to recover the administrative system without the colonial power.[59] The incompatibility of those administrative systems with representative systems, and their greater compatibility with traditional regimes may be, as Burmese officers in a sense argued, at the root of much of the disturbance in the new nations. This is, however, part of a larger problem suggested by what has been discussed here. A military regime must capture and hold a largely immigrant population—immigrants from the countryside—by offering community and opportunity, and at the same time retain the loyalty of other sections of the society who do not consider these goals to be compatible. The success or failure of military regimes can be said to rest on the combined skills of soldiers and administrators in training the masses in ritual behaviors. For various reasons, some of them suggested here, this baffles soldiers and administrators, who often fail in this area. And with failure to institutionalize comes the end of their rule.

[59] Edward Feit, "Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria," *World Politics*, xx (January 1968), 179-93.

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Research Note

THE COUNTER-CORE ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS IN PROCESSES OF EXTERNAL POLITICAL INTEGRATION

By JEAN BARREA

Introduction

THEORISTS in the field of political integration have already established that first-rank states usually assume leadership of the process of what I term external political integration.[1] (The concept itself is neutral: Several autonomous political units merge into a larger one, which may take the form of a loosely-knit confederation, a full federation, or a unitary state.)[2] To use Karl Deutsch's terminology, the leading states usually operate as "core areas." This phenomenon shows that a first-rank state usually regards its relationship with the process of integration as arising out of the theoretical demands of its prestige. Indeed, I would maintain that a regional first-rank state, as the natural leader of its region, meets the theoretical dictates of its prestige by choosing to use its particular power status in order to assume leadership of the integration process of the region in question; it thereby rejects the logic of power itself, which, by denying the necessity for the creation of a larger and more powerful state, would have caused it to stand aside from any unification movement. The core-area phenomenon, according to my interpretation, raises the (unex-

[1] I propose the term *external political integration* because it is conceptually more neutral than the terms used throughout literature. The term *international integration* presupposes that the political units undergoing integration are nation-states; the term *political unification* implies that the superstate will assume a unitary character; and the term *regional political unification* is not as neutral as *external political integration*. Only the latter refers equally to local, regional, continental, or even universal processes of political integration.

[2] For the purpose of this article there is no need for a more detailed definition. Readers interested in more exhaustive definitions should refer, for example, to Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton 1957), 5-7; Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification* (New York 1965), 4; Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (London 1958), 16; Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford 1963), 6; and to Lindberg and S. A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1970), 32.

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plored) question whether middle powers also tend to "play the card" of the demands of their own prestige, or whether they prefer instead to act in accordance with the logic (if any) of their particular power status when determining their relationship within the process of external integration that has been initiated and guided by a regional first-rank state.

On the one hand, as the natural rival of the leading state of its region, a middle power (especially one that ranks second in strength to the core-area unit) is destined, in theory, to be envious of the leadership assumed by its rival, the first-rank state, and therefore hostile to the integration movement initiated and headed by that state. Thus, the demands of a middle power's prestige are satisfied by a hostile attitude towards a process of integration led by a first-rank state. On the other hand, as the second most powerful unit of a region, or as a unit enjoying at least an intermediate power status, a regional middle power is able, to a greater extent than the smaller powers, to withstand the predominant influence of the first-rank state that operates as the core of leadership in the integration process. The specific power status of a middle power thus enables it—again in theory—not to fear and therefore not to be hostile to the integration movement led by the first-rank unit. We are thus confronted with two contradictory answers.

In my opinion, states ranking second in terms of power status, or enjoying at least intermediate status, usually choose to satisfy the dictates of their own prestige by exhibiting great reluctance towards involvement in political integration movements headed by their rivals, the more powerful units. Indeed, I would maintain that middle powers usually choose to act as what I propose to call *counter-core areas*. This concept designates a pole of relative strength operating as a core of resistance in the process of external political integration. (The role of a counter-core area does not imply, however, that middle powers usually succeed in remaining outside the unification movements led by the regional first-rank units.)

It is worth noting that a political unit enjoys intermediate power status either because it occupies a middle position in respect of the major elements of national power, or because it holds a high place within certain hierarchies and a low or middle place in others. The power status of the first category of middle powers is based upon what is sometimes called "rank-equilibrium"; the power status of those in the second category is based on "rank-disequilibrium." I hypothesize that intermediate power status (whether based upon rank-equilibrium

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or -disequilibrium) is the factor responsible for hostility towards a process of political integration led by a first-rank state.[3] More specifically, hostility is caused by the dictates of the prestige of the political units enjoying such a power status. These dictates, it should be noted, remain identical, regardless of whether such intermediate power status depends on rank-equilibrium or -disequilibrium.

Amitai Etzioni suggests a study of whether "lieutenant countries," i.e., countries enjoying an intermediate power status, usually fulfill—on the analogy of the particular role exercised by "lieutenant units" in certain social power structures—the specific function of initiating the integration movement, so that the "elite country," i.e., the regional first-rank state, can in due course either assume leadership of the enterprise or ignore it, depending upon whether it has or has not been successfully launched by the "lieutenant."[4] To the best of my knowledge, the specialized literature offers no other hypothesis or line of research.

I. THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT OF A COUNTER-CORE AREA

The operationalization of the concept of a counter-core area involves the definition of both positional and behavioral indicators. The two quantitative criteria according to which I shall assess the position or power status of a political unit are population and economic strength, the latter as reflected in public revenue. The third positional indicator is qualitative in character; it relates, for instance, to the prestige conferred upon a political unit by factors in its past history, or to the political standing afforded to a particular unit by its specific geographical position within the system undergoing integration.

The indicators of the function of counter-core area, or core of resistance, in a process of political integration can better be elaborated by defining the indicators of the opposite role, i.e., the role of core area or core of leadership in a movement for external integration. I would suggest the following three indicators of the role of core area: (a) the fact that a first-rank state plays a central role in the events leading to a constitutional convention (or equivalent substitute) which is decisive in creating a new superstate; (b) the fact that this same state remains

[3] This is not the opinion of Galtung, who maintains that "aggression is most likely to arise in social positions in rank-disequilibrium." Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 2 (1964), 98.

[4] Etzioni (fn. 2) 46; see especially his footnote 59.

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central in the debates and the work of such a convention (this position is underscored if that state is successful in imposing on the convention its own draft of the constitution of the superstate to be created); and finally, (c) the fact that this same state, as a consequence of its predominant role in the movement for political integration, succeeds in placing its own political leaders at the head of the new superstate at least during the first decades following its creation. It should be noted that the first two indicators serve to reveal the role of core area itself; the third—which refers to an (intentional or unintentional) *consequence* of the exercise of this role, not to the role itself—serves to verify or confirm the conclusion that a given powerful state is or has been the core of leadership in a process of political integration.

The suggested indicators of the role of core area lead me now to propose, in order to test for the role of *counter*-core area, the following three behavioral criteria, which (like those from which they derive) "grasp" the movement for integration during its development, at its consummation at the time of the adoption of the fundamental law instituting the larger state, and at its end result, the newly constituted superstate: (a) the fact that a particular state repeatedly tries to obstruct the process of integration without necessarily going to the length of opposing the convocation of a constitutional convention (or an equivalent substitute); (b) the fact that the same state, without necessarily going to the length of rejecting the constitution drafted by the convention, offers strong resistance to the adoption of that constitution (or to any substitute for it, e.g., a law of annexation); and finally (c) the fact that the same state often succeeds in placing its own political leaders at the head of the central government of the new superstate as soon as the pilot unit desists from such action. (It should be noted here, as revealed by the application of the third indicator of a core area, that first-rank states which operate as cores of leadership in processes of integration usually succeed in placing their political leaders at the head of the new, larger state at least during the first decades following its creation.)

The fact brought to light by the third indicator (whose function it is to reveal the *reason* why middle powers usually operate as counter-core areas) seems paradoxical in conjunction with those elucidated by the first two criteria (which are designed, for their part, to reveal the *role* of the counter-core area). In fact, however, the former is the logical consequence of the latter. Indeed, I maintain that if the hostile attitude usually adopted by middle powers towards the integration movement

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actually stems from considerations of prestige—more specifically, from disappointed aspirations to leadership of the movement, which usually falls to the regional first-rank state—it follows logically that these middle powers will try to compensate for the blow to their prestige at the earliest opportunity: As soon as the leaders of the rival states (the core areas) withdraw from supreme office, the middle powers will place their own political leaders at the head of the new superstates.

I propose to test the suggested indicators and the validity of the counter-core area hypothesis itself by examining, as examples of political integration, the processes that resulted in the formation of the Canadian, Australian, and South African superstates. I shall add the case of the German political integration movement as a non–English-speaking example.

II. NOVA SCOTIA AS THE COUNTER-CORE AREA OF THE EXTERNAL POLITICAL INTEGRATION PROCESS OF THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES

Among the British North American possessions, the Province of Nova Scotia was an outstanding example of a regional middle-rank power: its power status was lower than that of the Province of (Upper and Lower) Canada, but higher than that of the other Atlantic Provinces. Nova Scotia, with a population numbering 354,000 in 1865, was by far less populous than the Province of Canada, which had two and one-half million inhabitants, but more highly populated than New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island, which had about 270,000, 140,000 and 90,000 inhabitants respectively. In 1863, Nova Scotia's local revenue amounted to a total of $107,000; that of the other Atlantic Provinces varied from $5,000 to about $90,000, and that of the Province of Canada amounted to about $1,300,000.[5] Thanks to its geographic position and an important naval base, Nova Scotia was the strategic center of British North America. It was proud of having been the first British colony to enjoy responsible government.

Nova Scotia's status as an intermediate power was based upon rank-disequilibrium of a special kind, which derived from a high place in one regional power hierarchy and a lower place in another one. Within the region consisting only of the four Atlantic Provinces, Nova Scotia qualified as a first-rank state, but in the region consisting of the

[5] P. B. Waite, *The Life and Times of the Confederation, 1864–1867* (Toronto 1962), 6, 193-94; Stewart J. H. Reid, Kenneth McNaught, and Harry S. Crowe, *A Source-Book of Canadian History* (Toronto 1959), 229; William L. Morton, *The Critical Years. The Union of British North America* (Toronto 1964), 44.

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Atlantic Provinces and the two parts of the powerful Province of Canada, it was considered one of the small states, albeit the largest of these.

Application of the behavioral indicators reveals that Nova Scotia operated first as a core area (assuming leadership of a local movement of external political integration), and thereby as a lieutenant state paving the way for a broader enterprise of political unification; later, it acted as a core of resistance to this larger enterprise. Nova Scotia fulfilled the first of these functions by heading the political unification movement of the Atlantic Provinces. It was the Halifax Assembly which, in 1854 and later, inspired this movement by passing several important motions that favored the principle of political unification. Moreover, it seems that the Prime Minister of Nova Scotia, Charles Tupper, was responsible for convening the Charlottetown Conference which discussed the political union of the Maritime Provinces.[6] Thus, as a result of Nova Scotian initiative and leadership, the Maritimers at that conference found themselves seriously considering the possibility of merging into a "legislative union."

Viewed from the standpoint of the broader framework of the process of external political integration that involved the Maritime Provinces and the two sections of the Province of Canada, Nova Scotia functioned as a lieutenant unit, paving the way for further political integration: that is, the fruits of Nova Scotian initiative and leadership and the activity and positive orientation of the members of the Charlottetown Conference toward political integration served to prepare the ground for Canada to assume control of the wide-scale unification movement. Thus, when the Canadians joined the Charlottetown Conference and suggested that the Maritimers enlarge their movement to include the Province of Canada and that a new conference at Quebec discuss this possibility, they were speaking to people already favorably disposed towards the idea of political integration and therefore receptive to the Canadian proposition.

At this point, Canadian leaders took control of the federal movement. Nova Scotia reacted by systematically offering resistance to the process of federation. In its own way, therefore, Nova Scotia meets the requirements of the second counter-core area indicator: It strongly contested the Quebec Scheme, conceived and promoted by the Canadians to effect the Dominion. In respect of the British North America

[6] *The Cambridge History of the British Empire.* VI, *Canada and Newfoundland* (Cambridge 1930), 439.

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Act, which largely derives its essence from the Quebec Scheme, Nova Scotian members of the Federal Parliament in Ottawa went so far as to propose a resolution demanding that Great Britain rescind the article in the Act that bound Nova Scotia politically to the rest of the Dominion. Indeed, representatives of Nova Scotia went on to propose a plan whereby the Maritime Provinces would form their own political union.[7] Thus, Nova Scotia, which had been the core of leadership within the limited framework of the Atlantic Provinces' unification process, functioned as a core of resistance within the larger political integration movement.

Application of the last indicator reveals that the first Prime Ministers of the Dominion who were not from Upper or Lower Canada were from Nova Scotia. The Prime Ministers who succeeded the initial Canadians (John Alexander Macdonald, Alexander Mackenzie, and John J. C. Abbott) were John S. D. Thompson of Nova Scotia (1892–94), Mackenzie Bowell of Upper Canada (1894–96), Charles Tupper of Nova Scotia (May 1896–July 1896), Wilfrid Laurier of Lower Canada (1896–1911), and Robert L. Borden of Nova Scotia (1911–1920).[8] The governments headed by the Canadians, Bowell and Laurier, are to be seen as delayed results of the core-area function performed by the Province of Canada. The three ministries formed by the Nova Scotians, Thompson, Tupper, and Borden, support the thesis that a state with intermediate power status will usually attempt to place its political leaders at the head of a newly constituted superstate as soon as the core area unit desists from such action. In my opinion this fact reveals that Nova Scotia's reluctance to join the Dominion stemmed from considerations of prestige: that is, from its failure to retain leadership of the federal movement of British North America—which was offset, however, when Thompson, a Nova Scotian, became Prime Minister of the Dominion.

The hostility of Nova Scotia—a political unit whose intermediate power status was based upon a form of rank-disequilibrium—towards the federal movement seems to validate the hypothesis that rank-disequilibrium is the factor responsible for aggressiveness. In actual fact, however, it is not possible to answer the question whether Nova Scotia's function as a counter-core area stemmed from its status as an intermediate power as such, or, more specifically, from the rank-disequilibrium upon which this status was based.

[7] Edgar McInnis, *Canada, a Political and Social History* (Toronto 1954), 306.
[8] See W. Stewart Wallace, *The Dictionary of Canadian Biography* (Toronto 1945).

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III. NEW SOUTH WALES AND QUEENSLAND AS THE COUNTER-CORE AREAS OF THE EXTERNAL POLITICAL INTEGRATION PROCESS OF THE AUSTRALIAN COLONIES

In 1897, three years before the creation of the Australian Commonwealth, New South Wales and Victoria had a population of 1,277,870 and 1,181,769 respectively; Queensland and South Australia each had around 360,000 inhabitants, and Western Australia and Tasmania each had about 100,000. In 1899, the public revenue of New South Wales and Victoria amounted to a total of £9,974,000 and £7,379,000 respectively; that of Queensland was around £4,175,000, that of South Australia and Western Australia about £2,730,000 and 2,480,000 respectively, and that of Tasmania only about £900,000.[9] The third criterion shows that New South Wales derived great prestige from the fact that it was the first English colony to be founded in Australia, while Queensland, for its part, ranked second to Victoria as the leader in progressive social legislation. In regard to the suggested power criteria, the Australian political units may thus be divided into three categories: the first-rank colonies, Victoria (which fulfilled the core-area function) and New South Wales; the colonies with middle power status, Queensland and, to a lesser extent, South Australia; and finally the small states, Western Australia and Tasmania. The specific power status of New South Wales (one of the two regional first-rank units) and of Queensland (a regional middle power whose power status was based upon rank-equilibrium) leads us to designate these units as the two likely cores of resistance to the process of political integration that was headed by Victoria.

Application of the first behavioral indicator shows that New South Wales repeatedly adopted a hostile attitude toward the movement for political integration. It succeeded in its attempts to prevent the several Victorian "Select Committees" from producing any concrete results. In 1883, it refused to participate in the Federal Council, the forerunner of the federal government. Finally, in 1881, its Provincial Assembly rejected the first draft of an Australian federal constitution. Examination of the situation in terms of the second criterion brings to light the fact that New South Wales reluctantly approved the second constitutional draft in 1899. The people of New South Wales expressed their general lack of enthusiasm for the federal project by creating an

[9] B. R. Wise, *The Commonwealth of Australia* (London 1909), 236; Wise, *The Making of the Australian Commonwealth, 1889-1900* (London 1913), 240.

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"Anti-Convention Bill League," by rejecting the second constitutional draft in an initial referendum, and finally, by adopting a further revision of this draft in a second referendum by a small majority (56.4 per cent)—whereas 93.3 per cent of the populace of Victoria, the core-area unit, approved the constitution. In Tasmania, South Australia, and Queensland, 94.4 per cent, 79.4 per cent, and 55.5 per cent of the people, respectively, ratified the constitution.[10] New South Wales thus functioned as a real counter-core area, trying systematically to obstruct progress toward the process of political integration led by Victoria.

The third indicator reveals that New South Wales, the core of resistance in the movement for Australian unification, succeeded from the earliest days of the Federation in placing its own politicians at the head of the central government. Edmund Barton, the first Australian Prime Minister, came from New South Wales. Moreover, Alfred Deakin and Allen McLean, from Victoria, shared the office of Prime Minister during the first ten years of the Federation with J. C. Watson and George Houston Reid, both of whom were of New South Wales origin.[11] In short, the case of New South Wales fulfills the requirements of the third indicator of a counter-core area. Indeed, it meets them so completely that it might be more correct to say that, together with Victoria, the case of New South Wales actually fulfills the requirements of the third criterion of a core area.

Application of the proposed indicators to the case of Queensland reveals that in 1883, when James Service, the Premier of Victoria, proposed full federation, Samuel Griffith, the Queensland Prime Minister, countered by suggesting a federal council only. At the first national convention, which met in 1891, Queensland accepted the principle of full federation, but at the same time gave voice to the "small state" view by demanding that federal laws receive the assent of both the House of Representatives and the Senate; the principle of equal representation was in force in the latter. (The "large state" view, which gave the House of Representatives priority over the Senate, was supported by Victoria and New South Wales.) Queensland sent no delegates to the constitutional convention of 1897-98 and, in consequence, did not take part in the first referendum on the draft constitution. At the second referendum—in which Queensland decided to participate—it adopted the constitution by a very small majority, 55.5 per cent.[12] The case of

[10] Sir John Quick and Sir Robert R. Garran, *The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth* (Melbourne and London 1901), 97-99, 145-46, 225; H. L. Hall, *Victoria's Part in the Australian Federation Movement, 1849–1900* (London 1931), 140, 151.

[11] See Percival Serle, *Dictionary of Australian Biography* (Sydney 1949).

[12] *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, VII (1), *Australia* (Cambridge 1933), 432-34, 440; Hall (fn. 10), 151.

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Queensland meets the last indicator in the sense that, during the decade immediately following the creation of the Federation, the only Australian Premier who came neither from Victoria nor from New South Wales was Andrew Fisher, from Queensland.

It remains to be said that Queensland adopted a negative attitude towards the integration process, despite the fact that its intermediate power status was based on rank-equilibrium. This contradicts the hypothesis that rank-disequilibrium (not intermediate power status as such) favors some form of aggressiveness.

IV. THE SPECIAL CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA

Among the South African colonies, Cape Colony may be regarded either as the weak part of the regional pole of power or, at least, as the region's middle power. With a white population numbering about 582,000 in 1911, it was more populated than the Transvaal, which had about 420,000 white inhabitants; but Cape Colony's white population remained almost static, whereas that of the Transvaal expanded rapidly. Between 1904 and 1911, more than 120,000 European immigrants had settled in the Transvaal, while during the same period the white population of Cape Colony increased by only 2,600.[13] In the economic sphere, Cape Colony was also far less dynamic than the Transvaal. On this subject, W. Hancock observed that "Economic recovery . . . was very well under way before the end of 1908 in agriculture, mining, commerce—indeed, throughout the whole economy of the Transvaal. Contrariwise, in the coastal colonies, particularly in the Cape, which was afflicted at this time by a collapse of the diamond market, recovery was still lagging, if indeed it had ever begun. These contrasts of economic fortune . . . were reflected in the public finances; the Transvaal was enjoying surpluses while the coastal colonies were enduring deficits."[14] Although Cape Colony was less dynamic than the Transvaal, it was more powerful than the two smaller colonies, Orange River and Natal. Their white population in 1911 together only amounted to about 273,000 inhabitants, i.e., less than half of Cape Colony's. Application of the power criteria reveals that Cape Colony's power status was marked by rank-disequilibrium: on the one hand, its population was the highest (although practically static); on the other hand, it suffered from a stagnant economy, deficits, etc.

Application of the first behavioral indicator—which is not validated

[13] Leonard M. Thompson, *The Unification of South Africa, 1902–1910* (Oxford 1960), 486.

[14] William K. Hancock, *Smuts*, I. *The Sanguine Years, 1870–1919* (New York 1962), 236.

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in the case of Cape Colony—reveals that the relationship between Cape Colony and the Transvaal (the core area) was generally one of cooperation. There was only one serious disagreement between the two colonies in regard to the unification movement. Application of the second criterion brings to light the fact that this disagreement occurred when the draft of the South African constitution was submitted to the parliaments for ratification. In Cape Colony a large movement developed in favor of substantial modifications in the proposed organic law, so that Parliament adopted the constitution only after extensive amendment. In the Transvaal, public opinion as reflected in the newspapers and the Assembly was completely in favor of the draft constitution. Later on, however, the two colonies adopted similar attitudes toward the revised version of the constitution: the Parliament of Cape Colony approved it almost unanimously, and the Assembly of the Transvaal did so without one dissenting voice.[15] All things considered, therefore, the case of Cape Colony meets the requirements of the second criterion only partially.

With the Transvaal's leadership remaining unchallenged, the case of South Africa provides an instance in which the emergence and functioning of a core of leadership in the process of external political integration was not followed by the development of a powerful core of resistance. Cape Colony chose to ignore the theoretical dictates of prestige which would have prompted it to stand aside from a unification movement guided by the Transvaal. Since there was no powerful core of resistance to the movement for South African political integration, the last indicator, which is designed to reveal the reason why middle powers usually act as counter-core areas, is inapplicable.

Finally, it should be noted that Cape Colony's rank-disequilibrium, as revealed by application of the power indicators, did not lead to a lasting display of hostility towards the unification movement. Consequently, the case of Cape Colony not only invalidates the hypothesis of the counter-core area, but also disproves the hypothesis that rank-disequilibrium favors some form of aggressiveness.

V. BAVARIA AS THE COUNTER-CORE AREA OF THE EXTERNAL POLITICAL INTEGRATION PROCESS OF THE GERMAN STATES

Among the German political units, Bavaria stands out as the regional second-ranking state in terms of the size of its territory and of its population; in the 1850's the latter numbered about 4,000,000, while

[15] Thompson (fn. 13), 315, 348, 396.

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that of Prussia, the regional first-rank state, was about 9,000,000. Bavaria also ranked second to Prussia in terms of military power, and derived great prestige from the fact that the Wittelsbach dynasty, which ruled in Bavaria, was the oldest royal house in Germany. Moreover, it enjoyed a developed national consciousness which predisposed it in favor of autonomy and against any German political integration movement, especially one led by its rival, Prussia.[16] Application of the power indicators shows that Bavaria's intermediate power status was based upon rank-equilibrium.

Bavaria staunchly and persistently offered strong resistance to the Prussian-directed movement for economic and political integration. The application of the first criterion reveals that Bavaria exhibited great reluctance to enter the *Zollverein*; that, in 1849, it refused to join the Alliance of the Three Kings (Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover); that it was reluctant to sign a military alliance with the Prussian-inspired Northern Confederation; and that, before finally yielding to pressure from Prussia, it made a concerted effort to create and lead a Southern Confederation to counterbalance the Prussian movement. In terms of an indicator analogous to the second of those suggested, historical facts show that public opinion in Bavaria came to favor autonomy so strongly that in 1871 the Munich parliamentarians were very reluctant to ratify the agreements on political unification which their government had negotiated with Berlin.[17] The case of Bavaria is thus in conformity with the terms of the first two counter-core area indicators.

The third criterion reveals the fact that Bavaria functioned as a counter-core area because it failed to gain control of the movement for political unification. The German middle power compensated for this failure in two different ways. First, King Louis II of Bavaria agreed to give allegiance to William I of Prussia, who became the German Kaiser, only on explicit conditions, one of which assured that the Imperial Crown would revert to the Bavarian royal house if the Hohenzollerns, who from 1871 reigned over the whole German Empire, should die out.[18] Second, the only one of Bismarck's immediate successors as Chancellor of Germany who was not a Prussian was the Prince-Chancellor Chlodwig von Hohenlohe, a Bavarian who held the office from 1894 to 1900.

[16] Ernest Denis, *La fondation de l'empire allemand, 1852–1871* (Paris 1906), 47-48; Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany* (Princeton 1963), 36.
[17] Pflanze (fn. 16), 495-96; Denis (fn. 16), 395, 482.
[18] Pierre Gaxotte, *Histoire de l'Allemagne* (Paris 1963), II, 246.

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Finally, it should be pointed out that, notwithstanding its rank-equilibrium, Bavaria exhibited considerable hostility towards the unification movement. The case of Bavaria thus appears to be inconsistent with the hypothesis that rank-disequilibrium (not intermediate power status as such) will generate some form of aggressiveness.

Conclusions

To sum up, the case of Nova Scotia fully meets the terms of the two applicable indicators of the function of a counter-core area (the last two); it thus confirms the central hypothesis of this article. The cases of New South Wales and Queensland fulfill all three indicators and consequently illustrate the concept of a counter-core area. The case of Cape Colony only meets the terms of the second criterion half-way; it thus invalidates my hypothesis. The case of Bavaria, which fully meets the three indicators, is consistent with the hypothesis that middle powers are usually hostile to a process of political integration led by a regional first-rank state, thereby satisfying the dictates of their prestige. Lack of space prevents a similar investigation of the cases of New York, a middle power among the original thirteen American states, and of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, an Italian state that enjoyed an intermediate power status. I would like to point out, however, that application of the suggested counter-core area indicators to these additional examples shows that the case of New York fully meets the first two criteria while it partly fulfills the third, and that the case of Tuscany is in conformity with the first indicator, but only partly fulfills the last two. By and large, these two additional cases thus verify the hypothesis of a counter-core area.

The case of Nova Scotia, which exemplifies an intermediate power status based upon rank-disequilibrium and hostility towards the process of integration, would seem to confirm the hypothesis that rank-disequilibrium generates aggressiveness in one form or another. On the other hand, the three cases of New South Wales, Queensland, and Bavaria, which reveal hostility towards political integration in spite of an intermediate power status based upon rank-equilibrium, and of Cape Colony, which shows a favorable attitude towards political unification despite rank-disequilibrium, are inconsistent with the hypothesis. However, the two unexplored cases of New York and Tuscany, which display rank-disequilibrium and hostility towards the process of integration, would seem to confirm the hypothesis. It remains to be stressed that all instances of reluctance towards involvement in a proc-

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ess of integration have their common denominator in intermediate power status, whether based on rank-equilibrium or -disequilibrium.

The foregoing leads me to formulate the following theoretical statements:

a) middle powers usually operate as counter-core areas in, or cores of resistance to, processes of external political integration that are headed by regional first-rank states; thus, contrary to the specific function performed by "lieutenant units" (to use Etzioni's terminology) in certain social power structures, it seems that states ranking second in terms of power or enjoying at least an intermediate status do not usually fulfill a "lieutenant function" within the process of external political integration: they do not usually pave the way for the regional first-rank state to assume, in due course, leadership of an enterprise of integration in which there is little possibility of failure;

b) the relevant factor in accounting for a hostile attitude toward the process of integration lies in the intermediate power status (whether based on rank-equilibrium or -disequilibrum) of the political units that adopt this attitude;

c) more specifically, it lies—as revealed by the third indicator—in the dictates of the prestige of the political units enjoying an intermediate power status. Thus, middle powers do not usually operate, during processes of integration, in accordance with the logic of their particular power status—a status which should enable them not to fear the leadership assumed by regional first-rank states and, consequently, not to manifest reluctance and hostility towards involvement in these processes.

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Review Articles

ON CLAUSEWITZ:

A Passion for War

By BERNARD BRODIE

Roger Parkinson, *Clausewitz: A Biography*. New York, Stein and Day, 1971, 352 pp., $10.00.

WE are especially indebted to the author of this book because of the extraordinary paucity of biographies of the great man who is its subject. As the British military historian, Michael Howard, says in the foreword: "Clausewitz as a man remains almost completely unknown." And again: "As yet there has appeared no serious biography in English and for this reason alone Roger Parkinson's book breaks important new ground."

In quoting Howard, however, I must note that the second statement above does not quite make up for what seems to be a slip in the first, where the words "until now" seem oddly omitted though no doubt intended. Professor Howard would not have contributed a foreword to the book, even though it is his own former (and deeply admiring) student who wrote it, unless he felt it to be a contribution to scholarship. Still, I sense some reserve, and if I am not utterly mistaken in this, I think I can also guess a reason for it—one that I share.

This book has notable virtues, which I shall not fail to mention. However, the author has within a rather short span of years published two books prior to this one and already another one since, and none of the others bears any relation in period, and very little in locale or field of interest, to the matter of this book. To slip in and out of a subject like Carl von Clausewitz betrays to any thorough historical scholar an undue note of bravura. Clearly the author is not a specialist on the period of the Prussian military reforms, and one should not expect from him the kind of primary scholarship in the field that one gets from a Peter Paret, or, for a later date, from Howard himself.[1] Professor Paret, after having published a book on General Yorck which

[1] See Peter Paret, *Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807–1815* (Princeton 1966). Howard is the author, among other things, of *The Franco-Prussian War* (New York and London 1962). Parkinson has leaned heavily on Paret's book on Yorck, as he has also on Gordon A. Craig's *The Politics of the Prussian Army* (New York 1955).

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remarkably illuminates the period of Clausewitz, has now turned his attention to Clausewitz himself, but it will not be a biography. Tentatively entitled "Clausewitz, War, and the State," it is scheduled for publication during 1973.

Apart from writing books, Parkinson's vocation seems to be that of a war correspondent (there have indeed been enough wars to keep a man going between scholarly pursuits), in which respect he stands in some excellent historical and contemporary company—beginning, I suppose, with Friedrich Engels. The latter, incidentally, once remarked in a letter to Marx that he was then reading Clausewitz's *On War* and said of it: "A strange way of philosophizing, but very good on his subject."[2] At any rate, Parkinson belongs with the best of this breed, and his vocation has no doubt assisted him in developing a talent which would in itself make him a worthy pupil of Howard's: he writes extremely well. The present book is a pleasure to read, and if the author is not as insightful about the challenging psychological aspects of Clausewitz's nature as he ought to be—one should be able to recognize deep depression as a morbid symptom—he does at least as well in that area as the great majority of scholarly specialists in the field could do. One of the very few exceptions happens to be Paret, with his multiple family attachments to psychoanalysis and his own studies in that field.

In any case, if I may use a word which Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has made popular if not altogether meaningful, Parkinson has done what might be called a "sufficiency" of research,[3] to which I will try to give meaning by suggesting that he could profitably have done more, but for the present it will do. His research would naturally have had to include a reading of all of Clausewitz's own work, most of which has never been translated into English; and while he may have skipped an item or two, what he has read he has read perceptively, and he has been deft in weaving the resulting insights into his narrative.

Still, every now and then some dubious conjecture or evidence of carelessness or outright error pops up which is visible even to this non-specialist reviewer. On the side of carelessness, one of the worst examples is Parkinson's consistently understating the age of Clausewitz's great friend and protector, the Field Marshal August Gneisenau,

[2] Sigmund Neumann, "Engels and Marx: Military Concepts of the Social Revolutionaries," in Edward M. Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton 1943), 158. Paret coincidentally quotes the same passage at greater length in his "Clausewitz: A Bibliographical Survey," *World Politics*, XVII (January 1965), 278.

[3] In retiring as Deputy Secretary of Defense in January 1972, Mr. David Packard stated publicly concerning the word "sufficiency" so often used by Secretary Laird: "It sounds good in speeches but it doesn't mean a damn thing."

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even after correctly stating (p. 97) the year of his birth as 1760! Gneisenau was not ten but twenty years older than Clausewitz, and only five years younger than the latter's other great and equally famous friend, General Gerhard von Scharnhorst. This is important because the author makes much of the alleged closeness of age of Clausewitz with Gneisenau as contrasted with Scharnhorst. Perhaps also this reviewer feels some annoyance at being told (p. 326) that a man specifically stated to be only sixty-one years old (in 1831) is already showing signs of senility. Less important, but still perhaps worth mentioning, is another slip. There have been homosexual kings who managed to beget heirs (James I of England, for instance), but Frederick II of Prussia was not one of them. The kind of performance that won him the title "the Great" seems to have been confined to the battlefield. Thus his successor, Friedrich Wilhelm II, was not his son (as is stated on p. 20) but his nephew. That monarch seems to have been great in nothing *except* his sensuality, which happened, however, to be heterosexual. It was his son, Friedrich Wilhelm III—unimaginative, obstinate, and quite unequal to the great crises of his reign which began in 1797, concurrent with the beginning of the Napoleonic phenomenon—who was to cause Clausewitz so much anguish and misery, though the fault was far from being entirely the King's.

Less definitely provable but in my opinion equally erroneous is Parkinson's observation (derived from Karl Schwarz, Clausewitz's chief German biographer) that it was Kant who should be or at least has been "held responsible for the logical methods and dialectical sharpnesss in Clausewitz's own work" (p. 35). No doubt Clausewitz in his desperate hunger for knowledge read Kant along with the other German philosophers of the time. But the one he obviously followed with the most respect and whose dialectical method he unfortunately adopted, however superficially, was clearly Hegel, who is not mentioned in Parkinson's book at all. Hegel began lecturing at the University of Berlin in 1818, at which time he was already famous, especially for his two volumes on logic, and that coincided exactly with the beginning of Clausewitz's long stay in Berlin where his light duties as director of the *Allgemeine Kriegsschule* (general war academy) must have left him much time to attend lectures. Hegel's philosophy of history and of the state was certainly more congenial to Clausewitz than the entire teaching of Kant, who was after all the author of the tract on *Perpetual Peace* (1795), where in his moral scheme of things war has no place—an idea that Hegel explicitly and emphatically rejected. The well-known Hegelian troika of thesis, antithesis, and syn-

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thesis is apparent in Clausewitz's presentation, especially in the "finished" first chapter of *On War*, and has helped to confound the great majority of his readers, many of whom needed no encouragement to be confounded.[4]

And now to Clausewitz. To quote Howard again, "The description of him as 'a Prussian General' conjures up for most people so stereotyped and disagreeable an image that Clausewitz's portrait [reproduced on the cover of the book] usually comes as a pleasant surprise. The high forehead; the large, intelligent, rather mournful eyes; the sensitive and faintly humorous mouth: this might be a poet or composer of the early Romantic period rather than a man who had first put on uniform at the age of twelve and who served as a professional soldier from beginning to end of the Revolutionary Wars of 1792–1815." And, one should add, as the man who wrote *Vom Kriege*, not simply the greatest book on war but the one truly great book on that subject yet written. The fact that he looked intelligent should not surprise us, because he was in truth a genius, but what Howard is also suggesting is that his portrait shows him looking tender and perhaps compassionate. Looks in these matters are notoriously deceiving, but we do know—especially from his letters to his wife, Marie, as well as to friends like Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, to whom he formed almost excessively dependent attachments—that tenderness and compassion were truly in him, but, as we shall see, they were in conflict with something else. It is this conflict, mostly shut out of his awareness but resulting in melancholy and depression, that becomes an important key to understanding Clausewitz the man.

It is an old story that no one suffers more than Clausewitz from a superficial approach to his major work. I have already referred to his unfortunate admiration and imitation of the Hegelian style of reasoning—or rather of presentation, because the reasoning has already been done behind the screen. This treatment or method committed him to statements which, especially when read out of context, have him breathing words of fire as though he felt a perverse love for them. It is literally on the first page of what is as yet the standard English translation of *On War* that we find the following sentence: "Now philanthropic souls might easily imagine that there was an artistic way of disarming or overthrowing our adversary without too much bloodshed

[4] On the subject of Clausewitz's early education, Parkinson seems to have ignored entirely Peter Paret's "Education, Politics, and War in the Life of Clausewitz," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXIX, No. 3 (1968). Paret, however, leans less to the idea of Hegel's influence than I do.

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and that this was what the art of war should seek to achieve. However agreeable this may sound, it is a false idea which must be demolished." On the next page he adds: "Never in the philosophy of war itself can we introduce a modifying principle without committing an absurdity."[5]

It should be clear that Clausewitz was not toying with words or ideas. He had seen far too much at first hand of the desperate horrors of war to suffer any illusions about what war was like or what it demanded by way of ruthlessness on the part of the leader who chose to win. Also, there is no doubt that there was something about war which Clausewitz found deeply exciting, and it may well have been not the glory in it but the violence. He may indeed have had a perverse love for those fiery words and the thoughts they conjured up. I am now more ready to assume that than I was before reading Parkinson's book—much more so, I am sure, than Parkinson is himself.

Nevertheless, Clausewitz proceeds almost immediately after the last sentence quoted above to introduce modifying principles, and he continues to do so throughout the book. By his own conscious choice of formal logic there is no inconsistency in his doing so. For he points out that it is only in "the abstract realm of pure conception" (that is, in the "idealistic" realm of Plato and his too numerous followers, including Hegel) that war permits of no modifying principles; in the real world, in which war is a political act to achieve a valid political purpose or else quite meaningless in an altogether abhorrent fashion, we are dealing with a quite different brew. It is still a devil's brew, but that is neither Clausewitz's fault nor his intellectual concern. He lived, like the rest of us, in a world he never made; but unlike many living today, he could not really imagine an alternative world and likely did not want to. In the first two of the sentences quoted above he is probably reacting to the words of his famous predecessor of a century earlier, the Marshal Maurice de Saxe, whose *Mes rêveries* is most often quoted for the sentence that reads: "I do not favor pitched battles, especially at the beginning of a war, and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one."[6] Well, it was a different age and a different outlook, though

[5] Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. by O. J. Matthijs Jolles (New York 1943), 3f. In this edition, p. 3 is actually the first page. A new translation is being prepared by Peter Paret working jointly with Michael Howard, and should be available within a year or two. The Jolles translation was based on the corrupt third German edition; Paret and Howard are using the original German edition of 1832, reissued in 1935 by A. W. Bode, Leipzig.

[6] *Mes rêveries sur la guerre* is contained in its entirety in English translation in Maj. Thomas R. Phillips, ed., *Roots of Strategy* (Harrisburg, Pa. 1940), 177-300. The passage quoted is on p. 298.

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Maurice too had his Fontenoy, at which plenty of blood was shed despite the legendary flourishes at the outset; and he had other battles as well. We know that Clausewitz tended to treat military writers of his own and preceding periods with some contempt, except—of all people—Niccolò Machiavelli, who had written, besides his more famous *Il Principe*, the *Arte della Guerra* and the *Discorsi*, the first being obviously and the second quite largely on the art of war. Clausewitz treated Machiavelli with respect because, like him, "he was convinced that the validity of any special analysis of military problems depended on a general perception, on a correct concept of the nature of war."[7]

But back to the young Clausewitz who, as we have noted from Howard's words, was introduced into the Prussian army at the tender age of twelve—as a *Fahnenjunker*, or ensign. Such was the custom of the times, and not only in Prussia. Parkinson attributes this very early entry into his hard career as also being due to his father's lack of money. Anyway, in the following year, 1793, this mere boy was already marching as a standard bearer into revolutionary France in what was the second campaign of the War of the First Coalition. He later noted in *On War* that, while in the previous year "a sort of chivalrous spirit had been enough to inspire the march into Champagne" (which ended with the Battle of Valmy), that had now been used up, and inasmuch as "Prussia had neither anything to conquer nor to defend in Alsace . . . she continued the war with very little interest."[8]

It is interesting that Clausewitz, whose whole life from boyhood on was spent in military service and who as a scholar and philosopher was totally self-taught, was able to grasp the essence of the issue, the nexus between politics and strategy, so much more clearly than virtually all of his contemporaries and successors. The basic reason undoubtedly lies in his native intellectual prowess, the extraordinary power and reach of his mind. However, he also had some bitter personal experiences to help him along the way. His entry into the Prussian army coincided with the beginning, in France, of the Terror. He was to be deeply immersed in the whole vast Napoleonic cataclysm. Although he certainly did not identify with the *ancien régime*, and even saw some good in the original revolutionary principles, he soon came to look upon Napoleon (whom he always referred to as "Bonaparte") about as our own generation looked upon Hitler—the enemy

[7] Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy* (fn. 2), 25.
[8] *On War* (fn. 5), 624.

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of Europe and of mankind. He was nevertheless objective enough always to credit this detested man with being a superlative general.

In 1805 Clausewitz saw his sovereign cling to his neutrality while Napoleon, in the campaign culminating with Austerlitz, defeated Austria and Russia. Now facing Napoleon alone, the Prussian King found the Emperor's new demands upon him unacceptable and foolishly declared war. The script somehow appears familiar in our time. With an army that still believed in the invincibility of the tactics bequeathed to it by Frederick the Great—meaning an army that had learned nothing from the events of the past decade[9]—this King marched off in 1806 to utter defeat and humiliation in the campaign of Jena and Auerstädt. General Hermann von Boyen, later Minister of War, was to write of it: "There have been few campaigns in which such numerous, and often incomprehensive, blunders piled on top of each other" (p. 102).

Clausewitz, then twenty-six and an *aide-de-camp* to one of the King's sons, Prince August, wrote in his *Nachrichten* on the campaign a fierce denunciation not only of the tactics but also of the strategy that led to the defeat, which he attributed partly to an outworn "pedantry" that deceived itself with "hollow phrases and false similes, like 'wing bastions' and 'active defensive' in such important matters, where only the clearest and most precise expressions should be used" (p. 54).[10] To realize that time-hallowed and deference-evoking words may have little or no meaning showed remarkable insight for a young man; he was to return to that point again often. He was also experiencing the fact that defeat, although bitter, was a marvelous incentive to clear thinking.

As an aide to Prince August, Clausewitz spent a curiously idyllic ten months as prisoner of war at a chateau in Switzerland presided over by the notorious and brilliant Madame de Staël, whose entourage at that time included August Wilhelm Schlegel, Benjamin Constant,

[9] The changes during that time, which were by no means the contribution of Napoleon alone but owed a great deal to others as well, demonstrate that tactics can change significantly without comparable innovations in technology. Frederick the Great, being interested in having his soldiers fire as rapidly as possible and not in having them aim carefully, used a musket which was not balanced well for good aiming—but he could easily have used a better one. For an excellent treatment of the relevant tactical changes (upon which Parkinson also relies), see Paret's *Yorck* (fn. 1), especially chap. 2 and the appendices.

[10] The full title of the *Nachrichten* referred to in the text is *Nachrichten über Preussen in seiner grossen Katastrophe*. Parkinson cites this as having been published in 1825, before Clausewitz's death, but Paret, who is certainly more reliable in these matters, has it as first published by the Historical Section of the Great General Staff in 1888! Clausewitz did publish in 1807 some articles entitled: "Historische Briefe über die grossen Kriegs-Ereignisse im Oktober 1806," *Minerva*, I and II (Berlin 1807).

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and, perhaps oddly, the famously and fabulously beautiful Madame Juliette Récamier. With the latter, Prince August promptly fell in love, thus causing the stay to be so prolonged. Madame de Staël probably knew better than to try to add to her list of lovers the serious and puritanical young man who was the Prince's aide, but she did draw him out intellectually. In any case, under the circumstances of defeat Clausewitz could hardly have enjoyed his long stay there.

Afterwards Clausewitz participated with his revered Generals Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the drastic reforms of the Prussian army, which included, along with changes in tactics, the elimination of the requirement of nobility for officer status. In 1809 Austria, observing Napoleon's difficulties in Iberia, once more took up arms against him and this time made a good showing, though not yet good enough, and Napoleon added Wagram to his victories. Clausewitz and his colleagues were beside themselves in despair because their King did not go to Austria's aid. But the King would not move without Russian support. Again he was left alone to face a victorious Napoleon, who now asked him to yield up Silesia or to raise the funds to pay the indemnity he owed from the previous war, which Napoleon thought could be done by reducing the Prussian army to 6,000 men. The immediate crisis was avoided by drastic new measures of taxation; but meanwhile an exodus of professional soldiers from the Prussian army had begun, mostly to the army of Austria. The Fatherland meant more than the King who personified it, and the Fatherland could best be served from abroad. Clausewitz was wholly sympathetic to this movement, but remained in Prussia because of his loyalty to Scharnhorst, who, though officially deposed from his post at the War Ministry by order of Napoleon, was still informally working on the army reforms. Clausewitz had now been appointed an instructor at the war academy and a tutor in tactics to the Crown Prince. Clearly his special talents were being recognized.

The crowning blow came in 1811. With war developing between Napoleon and the Czar Alexander I, Friedrich Wilhelm no longer had the option of neutrality and was forced to choose sides. He opted for an alliance with Napoleon, to whose *Grande Armée* he committed 20,000 men, which was half his army, and secretly promised not to augment the other half. At this, Clausewitz resigned his commission, left his devoted and talented wife to whom after long years of waiting he had recently been married[11] and, along with a number of the

[11] He had married Marie, née von Brühl, in December 1810 after a courtship of over six years.

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other leading reformist soldiers of Prussia, went over to the Russians. He thus became nominally the enemy of his own King and of that King's army, in which his two brothers were in the contingent assigned to Napoleon.[12]

We should notice that, in view of the odds against him, the Prussian King was acting more shrewdly—that is, in accordance with Clausewitz's own later-developed thesis that military actions should always be guided by the political end—than Clausewitz would have had him act. In this instance, the latter wrote to a friend: "One is obliged to undertake an operation against chance of success when it is impossible to do anything else" (p. 133). By "impossible" he meant "dishonorable," because the King was indeed doing something else, which turned out to be far the better course for Prussia. He was not really giving much help to Napoleon, who knew the Prussian troops assigned to him could not be seriously relied upon and left most of them behind under General Yorck's command when he entered Russia. Yorck was indeed operating under Marshal Macdonald's orders—so long as things seemed to be going well for the French. True, as we shall see below, Clausewitz was to write that a favorable outcome is not necessarily proof of the wisdom of the decision that led to it. Nevertheless, we must take note that there is a good deal of the romantic in Clausewitz, which is only natural considering the times.

He fought on the side of the Russians in the great campaign of 1812, in which the *Grande Armée* went to Moscow and then perished in the retreat. He witnessed with his own eyes and was torn to the core by the unspeakable horrors of that flight, especially the awful scenes of the crossing of the Berezina River. "What ghastly scenes have I witnessed here," he wrote to Marie. "If my feelings had not been hardened it would have sent me mad. Even so, it will take many years before I can remember what I have seen without feeling a shuddering horror." And in his memoirs he wrote: "I felt as if I could never be released from the terrible impressions of the spectacle" (p. 194). No one would ever have to tell him how terrible war could be. But as a true son of his times and of his profession, what he saw did not affect his acceptance of war as a fact of life. It did no doubt accentuate his feelings that the adequate and correct use of thought in the handling of it deserved a very high priority. Even about the Berezina crossing which caused him so much genuine anguish, he was later to write, in criticism of General Wittgenstein (the Russian commander nearest the scene),

[12] Clausewitz's brothers, however, were not sent into Russia. Both later became major generals, like their more famous brother.

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that if he had attacked more forthrightly "he might have made the French loss much greater" (p. 193).

For him it was enough that Napoleon had caused the war and thus the enormous suffering on *both* sides. He had also been guilty of a colossal strategic blunder, a large part of which had been the purely political error of assuming that simply by placing himself and his army in one of the Czar's two capitals he would cause the latter to come suing for terms. "A capital," he had said, "which is occupied by an enemy is like a girl who loses her virginity" (p. 157). Parkinson, incidentally, in a manner unusual for him, fails to give his source for this quotation. One wonders what Napoleon meant by that—that the girl's father would be bound to rush to the defense of her honor? Anyway, it was neither the first nor the last time that a senseless or frivolous analogy helped to inspire bad strategy.

It is significant that in *On War*, Clausewitz, always scrupulously fair, defends Napoleon's strategy to a considerable degree, and does so on political grounds. The campaign failed, he says, "because the only means to secure success failed. . . . It was only by reaching Moscow with the force of his blow that Bonaparte could hope to shake the courage of the government and the loyalty and steadfastness of the people." He then points out: "It is permissible to judge an event according to the result, as that is the best criticism upon it, but this judgment, derived merely from the result, must not be passed off as evidence of human wisdom." This idea is startling because it is simple, correct, and rarely observed. He adds, "The campaign of 1812 did not succeed because the enemy's government remained firm, the people loyal and steadfast, because it therefore could not succeed." He agrees that "the result has shown that [Bonaparte] deceived himself in his calculations," and concedes that he did not make sufficient provision against the failure of his major premise—that Alexander would seek a treaty in Moscow.[18]

Because his reputation had preceded him, Clausewitz held a succession of staff posts near or at the top of the Russian command structure. He was therefore in a position to see how close to defeat the Russians had several times come, mostly because of their impatience to fight battles for the sake of honor. The idea of falling back deep into Russia before offering serious resistance to the invader did not sit well with the Czar and with various of his generals, including his original commander-in-chief, the incompetent von Phull (a former Prussian to whom Clausewitz had been assigned as aide). As he later put it in *On*

[18] *On War* (fn. 5), 620f.

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War, "The most profound sagacity could, therefore, not have devised a better plan of war than that which the Russians followed unintentionally."[14] It was not until General Mikhail Kutuzov took command that a Russian retreat deep enough to let Bonaparte take Moscow became part of their designed strategy, and even Kutuzov knew he would have to fight one full-scale battle before Moscow, though he was determined not to fight more. That battle was fought at Borodino, where the Russians lost—to no purpose—58,000 men out of their original force of 112,000. The French too suffered severely in this bloodiest of battles, but so long as the Russians held to the Kutuzov strategy, the French army was doomed anyway.

Even after the French had begun their tardy retreat late in October, Clausewitz, though foreseeing the triumphant result, still expressed concern in his letters to his wife that the Russians might yet throw everything away. "It will be through human failings, not fate, if Europe is not saved now," he wrote, adding that if the worst happened, he would "go with the German Legion to England" (p. 183). It may have been his native melancholy that made him apprehensive even though he saw so clearly the ruin that Napoleon had brought upon himself, but he had also grown painfully accustomed to seeing stupidity in high places. He knew of the heavy pressures upon Kutuzov, and he probably considered the cunning and wisdom of that general too good to be true; besides, in addition, the latter's place in command was always subject to the somewhat suspect will of the Czar. When, however, the French retreat began to founder in starvation even before the descent of the fierce cold of the Russian winter, Clausewitz was all for pressing the attack.

Following Napoleon's disaster in Russia, King Friedrich Wilhelm, pushed by his own semi-rebellious officers (now including his top commander Yorck who had previously condemned the expatriate officers), broke his treaty with Napoleon and allied himself with the Czar. The resentful King, however, annoyed with Clausewitz not only for his expatriate service but possibly also because he may have known that it was Clausewitz who had personally treated with Yorck to produce the latter's switch, postponed his readmission to the Prussian army for over a year. This deeply wounded Clausewitz, who continued fighting the French alongside the Prussians while nominally in the

[14] *Ibid.*, 608. Before leaving Prussia he had talked with Scharnhorst about the coming campaign and had agreed entirely with the latter's conception that the only sound strategy for the Russians was to fall back deeply into their own territory and delay a full-scale battle with the French as long as possible. As aide to von Phull he had tried to convey this view not only to his commander but also to the Czar.

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Russian service. Thus he participated in the furious campaigns which ended with Napoleon's first abdication on April 11, 1814, the day that Friedrich Wilhelm happened to sign the Royal Order readmitting Clausewitz to the Prussian army as an infantry colonel. Upon Napoleon's return for the "Hundred Days," Clausewitz took part in his fourth campaign against the French which ended at Waterloo, though his own fighting on the day of the great battle took place at nearby Wavre. There, as chief of staff to the Prussian corps commander Thielmann, he played a key role in helping to prevent Marshal Grouchy from giving desperately needed support to his Emperor.

Such searing experiences, including his participation in the occupation of Paris where he was appalled at the desire of his military colleagues simply for revenge,[15] burnt the idea of the necessary unity of war with its objective deeply into the conciousness of this sensitive, retiring, and deeply emotional man. He knew well enough that war winning. He also knew the worth of his own ideas. Still, he had was a deadly serious matter, not a game to be played for the sake of the thirst for achieving "honor" on the battlefield by conspicuous (and recognized) bravery which was too much the curse of his age and which has only gradually faded with time. All men are entitled to their ambivalences, but Clausewitz's actually went much deeper than that.

The sixteen years of life remaining to him were externally uneventful—no doubt a good thing for his literary production—but left him ever more deeply dissatisfied. After serving a while as chief of staff to Gneisenau, and then to the latter's much less admired successor, General von Hake, Clausewitz was promoted to Major-General in 1818, at the age of 38, and made director of the *Allgemeine Kriegsschule* in Berlin. It is characteristic that his immediate reaction to this appointment should have been one of bitterness at the fact that the King had seen fit, before sanctioning it, to seek a recommendation from Clausewitz's recent commander. "It is humiliating," he complained in a letter to Gneisenau, "to be so little recognized by the King that the opinion of General Hake had to be requested" (p. 295). What we see here is not very far from paranoia. Clausewitz was not yet known as the author of *On War*, which, along with most of his other work, was still to be written, and to be published after his death. The very few pieces he had already published had indeed had their full measure of

[15] Clausewitz may indeed have succumbed somewhat to the beauty of Paris, and may therefore have let slip some of his habitual resentment and detestation of the French. In one letter to his wife he speaks of another bridge somewhere that reminded him of the extraordinary beauty of the Pont Neuf across the Seine.

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respectful attention, but what should be more natural than that the King should have sought the opinion of the man who had been Clausewitz's commanding officer for the past two years? Here as elsewhere Parkinson seems to be unaware of the significance of what he is reporting.

Clausewitz's ideas for the reform of the school of which he was now in charge characteristically included the introduction of a course in logic. It was just as well it was turned down. A course in Hegelian logic would have bewildered most of the cadets and spoiled the rest. He found that his duties excluded teaching and were confined to administration. This gave him more time for his writing but heightened his gloom. Fortunately for his creative pursuits, his efforts to get an ambassadorship first to London and then to Munich also failed, resulting, naturally, in increased melancholy and bitterness. All sorts of honors and other recognitions—perhaps tardy but nevertheless substantial—were beginning to pour in from at home and abroad. He was again made military tutor to the Crown Prince, which certainly showed some mark of royal favor, and in 1827 his noble status and that of his brothers was at last fully authorized. But Clausewitz still felt not sufficiently noticed. And he was always sad.

A note that he sent to Marie while visiting Potsdam in 1820 is deeply revealing: "I am now well used to the fact that Potsdam always tends to remind me of many sad and serious things. It was always so, and it is natural enough, since I always feel strange and lonely here. I have returned to the house where I stayed with my father when he brought me to begin my twenty-nine years with the regiments. Not least, I have the deepest gratitude for all the happiness which Fate has given me since then, and which was first founded by that journey. But on the other hand I still have the same sadness which so filled my heart at that time, and which has never really left me. I admit that Fate so often smiled upon my life that I took it for granted. Yet, for all that, I have certainly never been quite free from that sadness" (p. 307). Here we see a remarkable moment of insight about himself overlaid with depression, and the depression is almost consciously tied to a sense of abandonment. Small wonder that he had looked upon Scharnhorst as a beloved father, and later on Gneisenau in the same way. And neglect, real or fancied, was always likely to touch that lurking sense of abandonment.

It was about this time also that Gneisenau wrote him asking whether, in the event of a new war, he, Gneisenau, should apply for a post in the supreme command and if so, whether Clausewitz would promise

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to be his chief of staff again. Clausewitz of course replied affirmatively to both questions, the latter part being characteristic: "With the second part, concerning myself, I confess I would rather have won fame at the point of a body of troops, with sword in hand [that is, to be a commander rather than someone's chief of staff]. An honorable death would end a weary and paralyzed life. But I will gladly admit that even this wish would be silenced by the jealousy of seeing another stand by your side. Not because I understand you better than anyone else, but rather because I feel nobody would serve you with as much loyalty, sincerity and self-sacrifice as I" (p. 321).

The warm attachment to his friend with its open admission of jealousy is genuine, though there is also, no doubt, some culturally-dictated hyperbole. Yet what catches one's eye, and is truly stunning, is that at the age of forty he is already looking forward to the end of "a weary and paralyzed life"! Today there would be no doubt that a man who spoke thus while in possession of full physical health, with extraordinary honors and accomplishments to his credit and above all a happy (though childless) marriage, would be a subject for intensive mental therapy. One wonders especially at the word "paralyzed"![16] He had already written and privately circulated a substantial amount and even published some of it; almost all of it was well received. Within the next decade he would write much more, all of it obviously having high value in his own eyes and those of the few others who saw it. Concerning what activity did he feel paralyzed?

We skip over the next decade, during which he was transferred to another post in Berlin. In 1830, events occurred that caused Clausewitz to spring to animated life and, for a while, to become almost deliriously happy. The troubles that broke out all over Europe in that year, and especially the new revolution in France (which saw the overthrow of Charles X, the last of Louis XVI's brothers, and of the senior line of the Bourbons), seemed to bring the likelihood of a new war. His father-in-law reported Clausewitz as being positively cheerful at the thought of war, which was expected to break out with his own old enemy, France. His arrangement with Gneisenau of a decade earlier still held; the latter was given a command as a field marshal and Clausewitz was made his chief of staff. Then the realiza-

[16] My attention has been called to the fact that the word "paralyzed" may well have read *gelähmt* in the German original; as such, it might be interpreted as carrying a connotation of frustrated or thwarted. If it was indeed the latter idea that Clausewitz meant to convey, it would imply that he perceived his condition as being externally rather than internally imposed. Unfortunately, I do not have access to the German original to check the point, but it would actually change things very little. The question would then be: why, and in respect to what, did he feel so frustrated?

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tion came that they were not going to the French frontier but east to Posen, adjacent to the part of Poland that was held by Russia, where revolution had also broken out. Clausewitz detested the Poles as much as he hated the French, but it was the French he wanted to fight—perhaps because there was more glory in it. Anyway, it soon turned out that the Prussians were to fight neither. Their army remained on the eastern frontier as an observation force; there were no military operations, and "Clausewitz's depression returned far deeper than ever before" (p. 325).

Again we must pause in astonishment. It is an old story that professional officers, when their country finds itself again at war, feel it to be both their duty and their desire to take part. There will be new excitement, new chances for glory and honors, and, not least, for promotion. Among the young especially, whether professional or not, there are (or used to be) all sorts of thrills of expectation, marked by a good deal of vocal braggadocio. But Clausewitz's case is wholly different.

We must confront the fact that this man, who had seen so much of the worst horrors of war, whose face still bore the marks of the frostbite he had acquired in the Russian campaign, had been brought from chronic depression into positive exultation at the thought of going to war again, especially against the French. When he found this was not to be, that there was going to be no war at all, he was plunged back into the deepest gloom. Again there were endless "premonitions" of death, which he said he welcomed.

This is an extraordinary demonstration! Why this relapse? To a chief of staff aged fifty, who must have known in his heart that he was cut out to be a staff officer and not a commander, a new war could bring no special honors. Did he really have a passion for glory, or did he feel that as a soldier his real fulfillment in life could only be found in campaigning? Or did he simply love war? If the latter, we must again ask, why? Someone who loves war must love, among other things, aggression and violence, terrible violence, which he can both witness and partake of. Such a taste is common enough, but is by no means to be considered normal. It argues some inner rage—repressed, unconscious, but alive.

We can no longer hide our thoughts and questions behind "thesis" and "antithesis." The bloody phrases so often quoted out of context from his great posthumous work burn with their own fierce fire. They are kindled by something within. They are indeed countered and, on intellectual balance, overcome with other words in which the in-

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tellect is at work rather than passion; and the intellect in this case is tremendously strong. This intellect is guided by a firm honesty, so that he will not refrain from going where it directs him and from expressing every thought that it brings to him. But the destructive passion against which that intellect is working is also strong.

We are dealing here with a deep internal conflict, and there can be no doubt that this conflict is directly linked to his growing depression. That is about all we can say on the basis of what we know, and it is really not very much. Let those who take fright at the thought of "analyzing" the dead notice that our speculative thrust has not penetrated very deep, and that it is based on tell-tale signs of the most unquestionable singularity and importance. Chronic depression as Clausewitz knew it, only fitfully interrupted by rather odd stimuli, does not suggest a state of emotional health.

It is not easy to judge how much Parkinson himself senses in the letters he quotes. A high proportion of the relatively few he uses contain significant signals, which indicates a natural sensitivity in his selection, but not necessarily true understanding. For example, he quotes one which Clausewitz had written about the Poles while traveling through their territory in 1812: "A thousand times I have thought: if only a fire would consume them all, so that the purifying flames would change this mound of dirt into clean ashes" (p. 324). Parkinson describes this statement as showing Clausewitz's "contempt" for the Poles, but, since he sees fit to quote them, Parkinson probably feels more than contempt in these words. They certainly speak not of mere contempt but of destructive hatred. Did he often use such expressions in his letters to his beloved wife? One wonders how much Parkinson missed by not reporting from other letters that might have told us much more. The letters, incidentally, have been largely collected but not translated.[17]

One wonders also how a man in the throes of such conflict and depression could produce as much writing as Clausewitz did. He did speak about feeling "paralyzed," and such a feeling and also the con-

[17] Parkinson in his bibliography cites a number of books which, it is clear from their titles, contain either all of Clausewitz's letters that have survived, or at least considerable portions of them. Those that seem most worth mentioning are: W. Hahlweg, *Carl von Clausewitz, Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe* (Göttingen 1957), a book which Parkinson describes as being more concerned with Clausewitz's career than with his private life; Otto Heuschele, *Carl und Marie von Clausewitz* (Leipzig 1935); K. Linnebach, *Karl und Marie von Clausewitz: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebuchblättern* (Berlin 1916). (Incidentally, one notices that even in German the name is spelled either Karl or Carl.) Paret (fn. 2) notes that "a fairly sizable body of manuscripts and letters remains unpublished today."

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nected behavior are the common consequence of attempting to cope with strong unconscious conflicts. But he was not paralyzed in actuality. Perhaps the fact that the writing was always about war gave him the needed release. Just as Machiavelli's great work was inevitably a projection of himself acting as a prince, and as a prince who knows when and how to refrain from mercy (which is just about always), so Clausewitz's was a projection of himself acting not as chief of staff but as a field marshal, and the occupation contemplated was not statecraft but war. In his case, however, the slaughter and destructiveness inherent in war were made good by the fact that a superb intelligence was guiding everything towards a politically wise end. Slaughter can at least be dedicated to statecraft, and the use of intelligence can achieve economies in the necessary acts of destruction.

There is not much left to tell about the life, nor much of it left to live. While they were still in Posen, a cholera epidemic broke out. In August 1831, the seventy-one-year-old Field Marshal contracted it, and after a long fight succumbed. Clausewitz was both deeply aggrieved at his loss and characteristically bitter that the King seemed to take so little notice of Gneisenau's death—or of his own work in writing Gneisenau's reports! Concerning those reports, he wrote the following revealing comment in a letter to his wife: "The Field-Marshal has never added the slightest idea to them. I have always presented matters as I saw them . . . he has never made the slightest change. Even if the King does not know this, and even though I like the fact that the main credit is given to the Field-Marshal, I still believe that I could have expected the King to recognize that I too had something to do with them. And I will not deny that it is very painful for me. *I seem to vanish completely* . . . I confess that such a disgust has taken hold of my soul that I have lost all joy and all courage" (p. 328; italics added). Neither could he forget that Scharnhorst's passing had been treated with similar neglect. One feels in Clausewitz a positive need to feel bitter and resentful of this King, especially for the latter's failure to take sufficient notice either of him or of those who are so close and dear as to be projections of himself.

Marie came out to be with him. He showed delight to have her with him again, but shortly thereafter, in November, he too felt ill and went to bed with what was diagnosed as a "touch" of cholera. Within nine hours of the first symptoms he was dead, at the age of fifty-one. The doctors said he had died because he lacked the will to live, and Marie agreed with this. Cholera can take the lives also of

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those who want to live, and can do so very fast; but it is significant that the doctors and Marie could entertain their own special convictions on the matter.

To a friend, she was to write her own statement of why he died. As Parkinson puts it: "Marie knew very well the reason for her husband's death. 'Life for him was a nearly uninterrupted succession of disappointments, of suffering, of mortification. . . . Oh yes, on the whole, he had achieved much more than he could expect when it started. He was well aware of that, and grateful. But nevertheless, he never reached the summit. And every satisfaction always had a thorn in it, to add pain to the pleasure. He had friendship, to a rare degree, with the excellent men of his period. But not recognition. . . . And how much he suffered for his happiness. . . . And he was heartbroken with the way he believed the King, with indifference and disdain, treated the poor Field-Marshal's [Gneisenau's] memory. . . .'" The letter continues in the same vein (p. 331).

It is easy enough to understand a devoted wife sharing her recently deceased husband's views about his misfortunes, but Parkinson, in reporting them, ought not to have accepted those views as representing anything like reality. Clausewitz had indeed "achieved much more than he could expect when it started," and if that left him with a feeling of "a nearly uninterrupted succession of disappointments," then, as one would put it today, he had a problem—one that was internal to himself and not external. And how characteristic of such a problem that "every satisfaction always had a thorn in it." It is most certainly not true that he lacked recognition. The King and the Crown Prince, incidentally, did not omit to express their condolences publicly as well as privately to Marie on her husband's death. And why, in heaven's name, should he have expected to reach "the summit"? As Clausewitz had said over and over again, she, Marie, would publish his work after his death. Back in Berlin she had packets of papers, his *Hinterlassene Werke* (posthumous works), which would ultimately reach ten volumes, the first three of which would be *On War*. In the scarcely more than four years remaining to her, Marie would herself prepare and edit eight of these ten volumes. At the time of Clausewitz's death, few if any had read this great bulk of writing. He did in fact reach the summit, in the only way possible to a man whose gifts are mainly if not exclusively intellectual, but he was bound to reach it posthumously.

The intriguing question is how much this man's neurosis affected his final work, especially that important segment of it which is the

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only portion we know in English. The answer, to be sure, is that we shall never know. But, as is usual in these matters, we do have impressive hints.

The most important single idea in *On War*, the one that suffuses so much of it and makes it great, is the idea that war must never be an act of blind violence but must be dedicated to achieving the supreme goals of statecraft and must therefore be controlled by that dedication. Parkinson shares the view that this is Clausewitz's basic contribution, and he cites some appropriate passages from the work to underline it, one of which is: "As war is no act of blind passion, but is dominated by the political object, the value of that object therefore determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased" (p. 315). We have long known that Clausewitz too shared the view that this was his most important contribution. Marie's brother, Heinrich von Brühl, in helping his sister to edit her late husband's work, came upon a note written by Clausewitz in 1827 that read as follows: "I regard the first six books, of which a fair copy has now been made, as only a rather formless mass which will be thoroughly revised once more." Clausewitz stressed in this note the primary importance he attached to the conception according to which war is regarded as "*nothing but the continuation of state policy with other means*" (emphasis in original). He then added: "This point of view, everywhere maintained, will bring much more unity into our investigation, and everything will be easier to disentangle. Although this point of view will chiefly find its application in Book VIII, nevertheless it must be fully explained in Book I and also contribute to the revision of the first six Books. By such a revision the first six Books will be freed from many a piece of dross; many a fissure and gap will be closed; and many a generality can be converted into more definite thoughts and forms." He later states: "If by the revision of Book VIII [where his ideas on political control of military action are mainly developed] I have cleared up my ideas, and the main features of war will be properly established, it will then be the easier for me to infuse the same spirit into the first six Books, and there, too, to make those features everywhere visible."[18]

All this Clausewitz failed to do before his death; however, the first chapter of the first book, which is the only chapter he considered completed, does bring in very prominently and almost at once the idea mentioned above as his basic conception, and in the later pages of that

[18] Though Parkinson refers to this note and quotes a part of it, I have used the full note as presented in the Jolles translation (fn. 5), xxixf. I also have in hand the manuscript version of the new translation of this note by Howard and Paret.

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same chapter it is developed considerably. It is then virtually lost to view until the last part, Book VIII, where it comes to the fore again and is developed much further. We know now that he would have suffused the relevant ideas through the remainder of the book, where it would have been much less easy to lose sight of them—and much less easy also for later editors deliberately to blur or delete them.

We can conjecture what happened. It is what happens, on a more nearly trivial scale, to anyone in writing an important letter, article, or book on a matter where one's emotions are deeply committed. The first draft is "from the heart," or from wherever it is that the emotions reside. If one's feelings are angry or reproachful, the first draft will show it most. Then, given time—and perhaps the intervention of friendly critics—one's judgment intervenes, and the toning down process begins, assuming, of course, that one has a proper grip on oneself. What finally emerges still carries the important message, but the arguments are far better balanced and more reasonable; the vitriol, if any, has been cast out or largely neutralized.

This example may be too homely to give us much insight into an accomplishment so monumental, even in its unfinished state, as *On War*, which no doubt had already been subjected to some considerable degree of revision and refinement by the author even in the state in which he left it. But surely the process is familiar to us all, and just as surely it was at work with Clausewitz, as the above-quoted note so clearly reveals. The bulk of the work in its present state is devoted to describing how to *win* wars. He was intent on developing further what is inevitably, when we talk about war, a modifying principle: the idea that the *purpose* of winning must always be at the forefront, influencing and when necessary dominating our entire perception of appropriate military action.

What would have been the results if he had accomplished his goal? We know that the military profession has always been, at least until quite recently, allergic to the idea which Clausewitz considered his most important one. The elder von Moltke, who had been a student officer at the Berlin War Academy while Clausewitz was director of it and who subsequently read *On War* fervently, was nevertheless able, as a field marshal, to declare: "The politician should fall silent the moment that mobilization begins" (p. 337). That was certainly the idea of the generals who prepared for and who fought World War I. In the various condensations of *On War* that were published under military auspices in the nineteenth century and down to World War II, the sections which contain Clausewitz's thoughts on the primacy of the

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political objective—the basic idea that war is too important to be left to the generals—are either obscured, corrupted, or entirely eliminated.

Well, one might say, what can one expect of the military, who, among other things, don't like to have control taken away from them? But the fact is that even so distinguished a German military scholar as the late Dr. Herbert Rosinski was able to make substantially the same error. He asserts that the basic teaching of Clausewitz (as he puts it: it was only when "he turned back to seek his foundations in the inner logic of his subject that he found himself on firm ground at last") is—what? That the aim of war is "the overthrow of the enemy's power of resistance." That is what Rosinski calls Clausewitz's "unique achievement."[19] Achievement it may be, unique it certainly is not. And if is not unique, it is hardly much of an achievement, although it makes more sense than "winning ground" or gaining "the honor of the battlefield." Rosinski certainly saw a great deal more in Clausewitz than these few words of his indicate, but the basic message passed him by. Clausewitz, had he lived to finish his work, would at least have caught the Rosinskis of this world. And even the military would have found it more difficult to escape. His book would also be more alive today for scholars.

Nevertheless, Clausewitz's basic wish was fulfilled. It is not at all a modest one, though it seems so when we look at it now. "My ambition," he stated in another note found among his papers, "was to write a book that would not be forgotten in two or three years, and which anyone interested in the subject would certainly take up more than once."

[19] Quoted in Col. Joseph I. Greene's Introduction, *ibid.*, xiii. The late Col. Greene states that the quotation comes from the revised (1944) edition of Rosinski's *The German Army*, but though the language is undoubtedly Rosinskian, I have satisfied myself that it is not to be found in either the original (London 1939, New York 1940) edition or the revised one. In the latter, Rosinski does refer to "a more detailed independent study" of Clausewitz that he is planning, and I suspect Greene is quoting from the manuscript of that. See Rosinski, *The German Army* (Washington 1944), 73.

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THE MILITARY DECADE IN AFRICA

By ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG

Ruth First, *Power in Africa*. New York, Pantheon Books, 1970, 513 pp., $10.00.

Cléophas Kamitatu, *La grande mystification du Congo-Kinshasa: les crimes de Mobutu*. Paris, François Maspéro, 1971, 298 pp., 18.10F.

J. M. Lee, *African Armies and Civil Order*. New York, Praeger, 1969 (Studies in International Security: 13, published for the Institute for Strategic Studies), 198 pp., $6.00.

Ernest W. Lefever, *Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa*. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1970, 251 pp., $6.50.

S. K. Panter-Brick, ed., *Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War*. London, The Athlone Press, 1970 (University of London, published for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Commonwealth Papers No. 13), 276 pp., $9.00 (U.S. distributor: Oxford University Press).

Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change*. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970, 320 pp., $9.00.

AFTER a decade of play, the score in the match pitting men in uniform against politicians is nearly even. About half of the new states of Black Africa have remained uninterruptedly under civilian rule while in the other half each has experienced at least one coup in which armed forces—military and police—have played a prominent role. Most of the coups were followed by the establishment of some form of military government. Sometimes the original coup leaders were overthrown by others; sometimes they returned to their barracks, hovering about the seats of power; sometimes they or others abruptly interrupted "civilianization." At present, men in uniform govern approximately one-third of the countries in the region; in a few cases, they have done so for over half of their country's history as an independent state.

If Africa was hardly mentioned in the early works on the military in developing countries, and if the military hardly appeared in the early works on African politics, the behavior of men in uniform throughout the continent in recent years has revealed the glaring character of these omissions and prompted a rush of publications comparable to the earlier wave of literature on the one-party syndrome. It is therefore not surprising, as Ruth First quips in the book under review, that "Coups have become a growth industry for academics as

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well as for military men" (p. 13). But what products does this industry dispense to the consumer?

The authors and editors of the present sample have attempted to analyze the behavior of men in uniform within the more general context of African politics. First and Lefever have written genuine books, with general sections and comparative analyses based on their own case studies of Ghana, Sudan, and Nigeria, and of Ghana, Ethiopia, and Zaïre respectively. First's is a witty and generally intelligent view from the left, although occasionally marred by fashionable innuendo and exaggerated charges; Lefever's is a cliché-ridden, flatfooted expression of the Washington establishment's outlook, which nevertheless contains some sound points. Lee presents a general essay crammed with useful information on the background, present characteristics, and current activities of African armies, especially in Anglophone countries, somewhat in the manner of an extended *Adelphi Paper*. Welch contributes a well-written and thorough analytic introduction to case studies by other authors of Ghana, Zaïre, Dahomey, Upper Volta, and Algeria; he has also included a perfunctory concluding essay by Pierre Van den Berghe and a useful chronicle of events (through 1968). Panter-Brick has edited (and co-authored) a series of papers on the Nigerian case up to May 1967, and combined them with a valuable collection of documents. Finally, Kamitatu has issued a virulent pamphlet which was withdrawn from circulation under pressure from the French government a week after publication.

Topically, the works cover just about every question that is of interest and provide at least some information to feed the discussion.[1] In particular, they address themselves to the phenomenon of military intervention in African politics by categorizing the events and by seeking to identify their causes and consequences. To a lesser extent, they attempt to assess the performance of military governments and, more generally, the future of both civilian and military rule in relation to political and economic development. In addition, most of the works also view Africa as an international subsystem and examine such processes as "contagion," the consequences of external influences (ranging from military assistance to surreptitious intervention by non-African powers or private groups), and the consequences of governmental change on foreign policy. These three subjects provide the framework for the present review.

[1] In terms of regional coverage, however, the case studies contained in these books cover only about one-third of the new states of Black Africa in which men in uniform have achieved prominence.

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I

Having recovered from their initial surprise, most observers of the African scene have tried to make sense of the role of the military in politics by categorizing events, particularly the successful and unsuccessful interventions. Although this is a useful starting point (since typologies require tentative decisions as to what are significant dimensions of the universe under consideration), Lee properly reminds us that "An adequate classification of the types of military intervention in African politics would by its very nature carry an explanation of events" (p. 171).

Most of the authors, as others before them, focus initially on the apparent motives which prompt the military to irrupt on the political scene. Lefever does so most explicitly, distinguishing between: (1) "The security coup," sometimes also called "custodial action" which is "undertaken to replace a regime judged incapable of defending the state from internal or external challenges"; (2) "The reform coup" which "is prompted by dissatisfaction with the character or policies (as opposed to competence) of the existing regime; (3) "The new elite coup" which "is motivated primarily by ambitious men who use the army to gain power and its rewards"; and (4) "The punitive coup" which "is motivated by real or pretended grievances in the military establishment against the regime" (p. 28). These categories appear reasonably exhaustive, but they raise more questions than they answer. How are the motives to be identified? To what extent does this approach lead us to accept the military's own assessment of the situation and its (often *post hoc*) justifications for intervention? Does it allow for the possibility of identifying variations in ideology between and within civilian and military actors? Should we not distinguish between motive (what prompts them to act) and intention (what they mean to accomplish)?

On the latter point, Ruth First warns that "the typing of the coups d'état has limited efficacy; they are often born in a muddle of motives, and they displace their own motives midway as they switch from one type to another and back again in the course of action" (p. 205). Nevertheless, a distinction is to be made between a variety of "political establishment revolutions" and coups of Lefever's third type, within which she asks further whether the coups "serve as levers for change, or against it" (p. 218). By this time we have moved away from a unidimensional classification based on motivation, since the classification entails an evaluation of the character of the government against which military action is directed, as well as of the scope and consequences of

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that action. Within the general category of actions limited to change in the political establishment, First also includes a possibility omitted by Lefever altogether: "hand-overs to the army, when the army is used as a political sheet-anchor," usually to rescue the government from its opposition (p. 210). Once having been called in, however, the military may stay in.

Dissatisfied with the dimension of motivation because it assumes that the military is a cohesive actor, Lee adds another one—the degree to which military action is corporate. He points out that some interventions attract a broad degree of support inside the armed forces (especially pay mutinies), while others "are primarily the expression of group or sectional interests" (p. 175). He combines the first dichotomy with a second one that is related to two broad categories of political problems in new states: the problem of access to spoils, and the more general problem of authority and order (pp. 176-177). This second dimension places motivation of the military where it belongs within the more general context of an analysis of political process and conflict in African countries.

Although we are no closer to an adequate set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories of military intervention, the confrontation of these several typologies points to several dimensions of analysis that might be followed up. We might also add a historical dimension: When do the coups occur? Within what sequence of events do they fit? Do different kinds of intervention tend to occur in a certain order? Do they cluster in time? These questions should be asked with reference to each country, and also within the region as a whole. It may well be, as Welch suggests, that there has been a movement, from an initial concern to share in the spoils to full-scale military involvement in politics, as a concomitant of the weakening of the institutional arrangements common to most African countries around the time of independence. Whether political parties were powerful institutions which declined, or whether their inherent weakness became more obvious to observers—including men in uniform—in the course of time is a debatable point. In any case, the two processes are not mutually exclusive and probably developed concurrently in a mutually reinforcing way. Hence, as Lee puts it, "The army, when it changes the composition of the people in power, is not destroying a widely accepted system for the conduct of public business" (p. 158). Characteristics of the military matter little because the task of taking over is well within the range of possibilities even for poorly organized and equipped forces. Echoing the Hobbesian note struck by Dankwart Rustow in

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connection with the Middle East, Welch concludes that "In politics, if no other card is agreed upon, clubs become trump" (p. 5).

On the fragility of the African state, making it an environment favorable to military intervention, there is general agreement among Welch, Lee, and First. First differs, however, in viewing "the profound dependence of Africa on external forces" as a first cause of coups —a subject to which we shall return in the last section—and in attributing the tensions and fragility of the African state, which make for the possibility of coups without outside intervention, to the phenomenon of class formation. She argues, along lines sketched out by Frantz Fanon a decade ago and in a manner consistent with Dahrendorf's view of class, that although there was no indigenous dominant class with power grounded in economic control at the time of independence, the rulers promptly set about transforming political dominance into economic power.[2] Seeking to provide a more theoretically-grounded understanding of what is usually viewed eclectically as corruption, she goes on to demonstrate how the success of the "politician-businessmen" stimulated competition among other elites, especially civil servants. But civil servants cannot act directly to seize state power; at best, they can create conditions—such as protracted strikes—that provide opportunities for takeover by the military, which shares their class interest.

Whatever their differences, Lee, Welch, and First view the African situation in universalistic terms, that is, as resulting from a specific (and perhaps unique) combination of factors that are themselves not culturally indigenous to the continent. Lefever alone also advances a cultural explanation, which could have been a most welcome and useful addition to the literature if it had been done well. Unfortunately, he degrades that approach by reducing it to three pages of stereotypes that verge on racism. Africa is described as a continent where "fledgling leaders with little experience in the art of state politics" inherited "political responsibility" from "mature metropolitan governments in Europe" as the result of a "premature transfer of sovereignty." These mature Europeans barely had time to foster some civilization in an area where "Animism was the dominant religion. . . . Tribal wars were frequent and savage by modern Western standards. Ritual cannibalism and indigenous slavery were widespread" (pp. 2-3). Considering Russel Warren Howe's statement, "A female continent, Black Africa was

[2] The phenomenon of class formation has been analyzed by Michael Cohen in "Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa: A Study of the Ivory Coast," unpubl. Ph. D. diss. (University of Chicago 1971).

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to be 'discovered,' penetrated and dominated by others," as authoritative, Lefever summarizes his cultural analysis: "Physically and politically, tropical Africa was passive" (p. 3). He later compounds the offense by making invidious comparisons that explode into unwitting irony: "In the Congo, Nigeria, the Sudan and elsewhere, Western rules of war—respect for civilians, fair treatment for prisoners, etc.—have given way to atavistic and brutal behavior that shows no mercy for civilians or prisoners . . ." (p. 21). Nevertheless, in his overall view of the interaction between African political structures and the military, he rejoins the others: "In this situation a little coercion goes a long way. Even a small army or a well-organized police force is a 'heavy institution' in a light environment" (p. 173).

Absence of civil order, conflicts among predatory elites, waning of support: these are the mutually reinforcing factors that contribute to a process of which military intervention is a part. They are so widespread among the new states of tropical Africa that what is surprising is not that military interventions occur, but that they have not occurred everywhere. Why in Sierra Leone and not in Gambia? Why in Rwanda but not in Burundi? Why in Mali but not in Guinea? In Upper Volta but not in Niger? Why so soon in some countries, and not yet in others? We are no closer to the resolution of that puzzle than before. So far, the probability of the occurrence of coups appears to be independent of characteristics of countries (such as area, population size, raw material resources, or levels of social and economic development); of the characteristics of incumbent governments (such as general ideological orientation, presence or absence of mass parties, qualities of the bureaucracy, or espousal of particular strategies of economic or political development); and even of the characteristics of military and police establishments (such as size, composition of officer corps, or regional distribution of the origins of enlisted men). Given the dynamics recognized by most authors, one critical variable might be the degree of legitimacy established and retained by the founding elite. But how is that to be evaluated? Unfortunately, the general tendency is to provide evidence *ex post facto*: A coup occurs, therefore we know that it was preceded by loss of trust, and/or decline of moral authority, support, or popularity. Decline from what levels? And is it greater than in countries where coups have not occurred?

Some of the more sophisticated statistical manipulations of variables based on aggregate data that are currently under way may eventually reveal more clearly the weight of specific factors which can be quantified, and point to a combination of conditions that make coups more

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or less likely. It may well be, on the other hand, that the partition of two and one-half dozen new states into "coup" and "non-coup" sets is not very useful from the point of view of social science analysis. Perhaps the variance singled out by such a categorization cannot be accounted for by means of a parsimonious theory.

II

In any case, what difference does it make? When the military takes over, does anything happen other than the replacement of some politicians by new rulers in uniform? For one thing, the men in uniform do not rule alone. They cannot. Welch points out that, given the characteristics of African armies, the military "usually can fill only a few top administrative posts with officers, without risking diluting its energies or neglecting army command functions" (p. 56). He and others note that the men in uniform naturally turn to civil servants, with whom they share ideological affinities as the result of common training. Since the civil servants also view themselves as more suitable rulers than the politicians and are motivated by the same desire to share in the spoils as the military, they welcome the alliance. If, in addition, traditional chiefs (or, more appropriately, "native authorities") are brought in to fill the vacuum left by the elimination of party officials at the local level, the restoration of a familiar colonial framework of authority is nearly complete.

What do these new governments accomplish with respect to political development? On this question the authors vary widely. Lefever expects a great deal, much as observers once did of the "mass parties." He asserts that "African armies tend to be the most detribalized, Westernized, modernized, integrated, and cohesive institutions in their respective states. The army is usually the most disciplined agency in the state. It often enjoys a greater sense of national identity than other institutions. In technical skills, including the capacity to coerce and to communicate, the army is the most modern agency in the country. . . . A more vivid symbol of sovereignty than the flag, the constitution, or the parliament, the army often evokes more popular sentiment than a political leader" (p. 21).

Given the characteristics he attributes to the military, it is not surprising that he concludes that in Ghana, both while in office and afterwards (from 1966 up to the completion of his book), "By any reasonable standards the NLC made a solid contribution to a viable, just, and democratic state" (p. 72). In Zaïre, Mobutu, "young, intelligent, politically astute and proud" (p. 81), is described as an admirer of John F.

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Kennedy and of Ataturk, who has "stabilized the Congo and put it on a steadier course"; and if the country has not moved very far, "under Mobutu it has gained its first chance to move since independence day" (p. 125). As for Ethiopia, "The armed services have made a greater contribution to state-building . . . than they have in Ghana or the Congo, primarily because of the low level of educational, economic, and political development in this ancient land" (p. 164). There, in contrast with the other two states, the military had done so by *not* taking over: "Assuming that the continuation of the dynasty is essential to unity and stability and that Haile Selassie has been an effective leader, the military services have contributed to the viability of the state by upholding the authority of the Emperor" (p. 164). Why assume? Why in *this* case and not in others?

Lefever further demonstrates his belief that the military can do no wrong—it takes over when it is good for the country, and does not when it is not—by his one-sided assessment of the military's contributions to state- and nation-building as well as to domestic and foreign policy. Where Lefever cannot credit the military with distinctive activities, he credits it with a general contribution to modernization and development through the functions it performs as a symbol and as an example: "In many African countries the army is the most virile symbol of the state . . ." (p. 175). This virile symbol obviously has a vital function to perform for a female continent.

In what way has the Ghanaian military contributed more significantly to economic modernization "by their example of what is technically possible" than the Nkrumah regime which, Lefever acknowledges, "left behind the Volta River Dam and Hydro-electric Scheme with its great potential" (p. 33)? Granted, the military performs some symbolic functions. But in terms of opportunity costs, what is the relative price of military contributions to state- and nation-building, as against that of politicians or soccer players? Lefever concedes, in a discussion of the value of civic action projects, that work done by soldiers costs three to five times more than work done by civilians (p. 179) unless the soldiers were otherwise underemployed. He also generally believes that the armed forces in each of the countries studied could be reduced in size without loss. But he rejects the allegation that third-world armies "receive a disproportionately high share of scarce resources to the detriment of economic development" (p. 187). If expenditures to maintain the military establishments are greater than might reasonably be necessary, that is the result of *civilian* policies: "To maintain high morale and loyalty in the services, military men

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may need more psychic and material fringe benefits than civil servants. Evidence suggests that most of the pressures for a high level of material support of the armed forces in Ghana, the Congo, and Ethiopia have come from the top political leaders who recognize that a satisfied army is as essential to their continued political control as it is to state security" (p. 188). Has Lefever never heard of the protection racket or of blackmail?

Lee, who bears no ideological grudge against the military, certainly has: "A brutal fact about the allocation of state resources is that the army seems to be in the best position to exploit whatever is available" (p. 89). Not only does the fear of what armies might do lead to the maintenance of European pay scales after independence, but after coups have occurred, "In any reconstruction of the budget, the salaries of the army seem the least likely to be touched" (p. 92). This affects not only officers; by most definitions, "the average non-commissioned officer in African armies belongs to the elite" (p. 93). Lee contradicts Lefever in concluding "Although it may figure prominently in explanations given for their action, the desire to provide efficient administration does not seem part of the normal African military make-up. There is little evidence to indicate that African armies make better instruments of 'modernization' than their civil servant counterparts. Indeed, all the organizations of the state appear to face a common set of problems" (p. 184). Welch, pointing out that "the 'modern' organizational characteristics of the armed forces . . . may readily break down under the stresses of military intervention" (p. 38), also concludes that "In short, coup leaders face the same difficulties over which their civilian predecessors stumbled—without necessarily benefiting from greater advantages" (p. 59).

How can we explain the extraordinary disparity between the appraisals set forth by Lefever on the one hand, and Lee or Welch on the other? Part of the answer is obvious: Lee and Welch cover the entire ground (or as much as there is to cover, given limited information), while Lefever generalizes from three selected cases. The question is, then, why were those three cases selected? Whatever we might think of Lefever's assessment of Ethiopia, Zaïre, and Ghana, we would find his conclusions more persuasive had he specified that the selection was guided by the principle of edification, as in inspirational literature. The author tells us that was not the case, however; that these countries were selected "to represent a wide range of diverse elements and because of their importance in the area and their significance to the United States relative to other states in the region" (p. 22). If so, we

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wonder why Nigeria was not included. Is it because, as Ruth First puts it, "If the armed men of Africa's military governments have an ultimate achievement, it was this wretched war" (p. 362)?

However one chooses to appraise the merits of various sides in the Nigerian civil war, one overwhelming fact stands out: it erupted *after* "a small group of army officers staged a coup, murdering in the process several leading politicians and senior military officers" (Panter-Brick, p. 14). What was the military's contribution to this African tragedy? Luckham, in the Panter-Brick volume, traces the disastrous interactions between the "partially institutionalized" military organization of Nigeria and the political context some of its leaders created by their very assumption of power in 1966. Objecting to my exaggerated characterization of the armies of Africa as "an assemblage of armed men who may or may not obey their officers,"[3] he argues persuasively that prior to the coup, "existing sources of cleavage" within the army "did not have the strength or compulsiveness in and of themselves to stimulate overt expressions of antagonism within the military in the face of the well-enforced and internalized fraternal norms of the officer corps." What did the army in was "a contextual effect." He goes on: "One major source of tension was political, namely that the accession of soldiers to office also represented a transfer of power between the Regions, away from the North. Not only had the officer corps exposed itself by virtue of its newly acquired political role to unaccustomed political demands and pressures; it had also done so under circumstances which increased the intensity of these pressures . . ." (p. 76).

But that is precisely the point which has been made by so many, including the authors of the present books and the reviewer, concerning *civilian* structures of authority in Africa—parties, governments, and bureaucracies. Parties in particular were quite capable of mobilizing and channeling resentment against colonial authorities; but their organizational capability was severely limited, and the "cleavages" and "strains" the parties contained were exacerbated by the "contextual effect" of the assumption of governmental responsibilities. M. J. Dent points out in another chapter of the Panter-Brick volume that, much as the resources and techniques suitable for effective party activity during the nationalist phase are inadequate to the tasks that must be faced later on, so, for the political tasks in underdeveloped countries, "the means which have proved adequate for running a regiment are

[3] Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (March 1968), 72 (quoted by Luckham in Panter-Brick, p. 58).

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insufficient" (p. 80). In the face of growing evidence of their own failure, the Nigerian military called in intellectuals, civil servants, and politicians. But by then it was too late.

The arrogant self-assurance of military officers that they can govern with greater wisdom and skill than their civilian countrymen leads them to come down with a heavy step where angels fear to tread. They hesitate even less than do other authoritarian leaders to destroy the tenuous institutional fabric of African political life. The Nigerian tragedy demonstrates the consequences of their temerity. As Ruth First has summarized, "Dislodged from parties and government, where they had formerly manipulated communal support, political forces continued their manipulations, but without the old outlets afforded by regional and federal government. Disputes that were once settled by a process of bargaining among the parties or by deals of political expediency now flared into street action . . . or came for arbitration before civil servants and soldiers. If expediency was the way of the politicians, the combination of civil servants and army was infinitely more lethal. It is hard to say whether Nigeria might not have gone to war with itself under a civilian government; but surely it would not have done so with such deadly swiftness" (p. 352).

As a category, the military governors of Africa are unlikely to rule better, more justly, or more effectively than their civilian predecessors. Beneath their uniforms, the Gowons, Lamizanas, Bokassas, and Mobutus are men with the same range of virtues and vices, wisdom and foolishness as the Balewas, Olympios, Yameogos, and Nkrumahs they replaced. In a given country, the officers may rule better or worse than the politicians. Some will successfully transform themselves into politicians; a few will become statesmen or tyrants; others will fall victim to rivalries within the military itself. More often than not—since the direct exercise of power further weakens the armed forces—the men in uniform may opt to return to their barracks, at least for a time, thus confirming the lasting power of the key group about which we know least, the civilian bureaucrats. In spite of their imperfections, civil servants come closer than any other group in Africa to satisfying the perceived needs of the population at the least cost to the society; possibly because of this, they are in the process of becoming recognized as the truly indispensable partners of any government. Having experienced the rule of European technocrats, of African politicians, and of African men in uniform, Africans may find government by a new generation of indigenous technocrats the lesser evil. In that sense, Lee

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may be correct in predicting that "Perhaps African armies will undertake a leading role in effecting the changeover from one set of civilians to another" (p. 185).

Meanwhile, to whose benefit is the rule by coalitions dominated by the military? Ruth First, as might be expected, has no doubt about the answer. For her, the NLC in Ghana, "far from restoring the health of a dependent economy, has delivered it to the system responsible for the poverty and exploitation of all the Third World" (p. 407). Like Kamitatu, she argues that Mobutu's rule similarly "stabilized the Congo for international capital" (p. 421). Others, less ideologically prejudiced, view the same policy record as evidence of the military's earnest concern with economic development. Lee, for example, believes that, like the colonial powers, "Military regimes have tended to emphasize the value of economic activity being preserved from disturbances of the peace" (p. 127). The record so far is extremely difficult to assess because, as is generally the case in Africa, there is a great discrepancy between announced decisions or programs and their implementation. Furthermore, the poor quality of economic and other data makes trend analyses very unreliable; they are almost useless in relation to questions concerning differential benefits to various groups within the population. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that a recent study based on cross-national data for the period 1957–62 has cast serious doubt on the overall commitment and on the actual contributions of military rulers to the social and economic development of underdeveloped countries. It concludes that "They were not convinced reformers to begin with; they simply used the call for economic and social changes for the realization of their own class and status interests."[4] Interestingly, of all regions, tropical Africa alone shows positive correlations between the military's political strength and indicators of social and economic growth. But, the author points out, this may be because the African officers' corporate interests and military values are so weak that they "only moderately detract from their modernizing inclinations."[5] For the time being, then, we may conclude that the most reasonable answer to the question "*Cui bono?*" remains "Their own."

III

However conceptualized, the weakness of African states implies their permeability to external influences. It does not require adherence

[4] Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (December 1970), 1148.

[5] *Ibid.*, 1147. He also mentions that the correlation may be spurious (note 51).

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to devil theories for the authors to entertain the possibility that external factors, including the open or surreptitious activities of non-African powers, account at least in part for the fate of particular African governments and for their domestic or foreign policies. Although none of the works under consideration pursues this theme methodically, the subject of the military is conducive to greater sensitivity to the problem of dependence than is usually found in the literature on African politics.

Generally speaking, as Lee points out, the absence of civil order in Africa means that the interests of the states, which are the foundation stone of normal diplomatic intercourse, are not well established. Since "outside powers can hardly pursue systematic alliances with new states until it is clear what interests such states represent" (p. 182), there is a tendency to focus on particular governments. We can draw a further implication from Lee's suggestion: To the extent that African governments do not constitute corporate groups, we might expect that outside powers will focus on the various factions and elite components which potentially constitute governments, seeking to anticipate their behavior in terms of attributed interests. In addition to this organizational aspect, Lee also points to a technological factor of great importance: "The fact that the new states have hardly any capacity in the manufacture of modern armaments involves outside powers in the question of arms supply for any major operation" such as civil wars or foreign incursions (p. 183). Indeed, the experiences of Zaïre from 1960 to 1965 and of Nigeria from 1966 to 1970 demonstrate quite clearly that the study of political development in Africa, including an understanding of the process whereby territorial integrity is altered or maintained, requires an approach that overcomes the recent separation of comparative from international politics. This is hardly surprising in the light of the European experience of state-building, for example, in which one is not likely to find a single case of state-builders relying exclusively on the military resources (technology and manpower) available within their realm. Mercenaries were not invented by Moise Tshombe.

Because the military has emerged as a dominant actor in African government, and because it is believed to bear an identifiable interest, it tends to become a major component in the policy calculus of external powers in the pursuit of their objectives. Supporters and critics of Western policies toward Africa meet on analytic grounds. Lefever, for example, concludes that "The accumulated evidence indicates that military aid has been an effective instrument for serving U.S. foreign

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policy objectives and the parallel goals of Ghana, the Congo, and Ethiopia" (p. 210). The objectives of the United States are blandly defined by the president of The Brookings Institution in a foreword to Lefever's book: "To encourage African leaders in their determination to create modern states" (p. vii). But *which* leaders? Nkrumah or Busia? Lumumba or Mobutu? Given Lee's suggestion, can one identify the goals of Ghana, Zaïre, and Ethiopia, or only the goals of particular leaders and groups in those countries? There is little doubt as to *which* leaders are preferred by Lefever, and why: "It seems reasonable to assume that since most armies tend to be more prudent and less volatile than political leaders in the underdeveloped world, the army will have a moderating influence on foreign policy" —meaning that it will tend to be at least pro-Western neutral. He continues: "This influence is reinforced by increased contact with Western advisers and increased dependence on Western aid" (p. 194). He concludes that the "moderation" of post-1966 Ghana, of post-1965 Zaïre, and of Ethiopia since 1960 "is both a cause and effect of Western military aid" (p. 209).

Lefever's belief that the military's interest in foreign and domestic policy parallels that of the Western powers, and that the men in uniform therefore warrant Western support, is shared by Ruth First: "How can the United States economic advisers and investors not try to maintain and revive systems in which international business can best function? The coup d'état often presents them with the finest opportunity. . . . It is striking how the coup d'état in Africa, with rare exceptions like Egypt, the Sudan and Libya, converges toward the stabilization of the situation for overseas capital" (pp. 464-65).

Eschewing "the indiscriminate use of the conspiracy explanation" which attributes to the CIA or others a direct role in bringing down some governments and bringing others to power, she argues that "The basic structures of African society in new states, Ghana and Mali included, hold the seeds of a coup d'état within themselves. It is precisely because foreign powers and bodies like the CIA understand this well, that their interventions, even very indirect ones, are so effective" (p. 414). She concludes, from the analysis of a CIA statement to a Council on Foreign Relations audience (which, she says, was obtained illegally by Columbia University students), that for the CIA—and presumably for similar agencies from other countries—"Local allies, not agents, are the key" (p. 417). Rejoining the analyses put forth by Lee and Lefever, she draws the inference that "When it comes to the internal power balance so scrupulously observed by foreign powers, African

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armies are pivotal" (p. 422). Although she warns that rejoicing in Washington over the fall of Nkrumah, for example, is not evidence that the CIA intervened, she does believe that the anticipation of this joy may have encouraged the plotters to act, and that support of the NLC in the form of emergency assistance is evidence (available not only to observers but to the military in Ghana and elsewhere), of the rewards awaiting them when they undertake to overthrow "radical" governments. Paralleling Lefever's reasoning, she calculates that such support also enhances the likelihood that military governments will adopt a policy orientation toward which they are inclined in any case. That she does not view that orientation as "moderate" is indicated by her assessments of Ghana and Zaïre quoted in the preceding section.

This general agreement on the parallel interests—by whatever name—of Western powers and of the African military, as well as on the contribution of Western policies to the strengthening of a military presence in the foreground or in the background of African governments, brings us back to a problem that was discussed in a previous section: Why is it so difficult to put forth a set of structural factors that account for the variance between coup and non-coup countries? Foreign intervention, either in the form of support that furthers the development of military capability, or in the form of direct encouragement of military intervention, may account for enough of the variance to affect the placement of a country in one or the other category. That may be obvious. It is perhaps less obvious that the present consideration may explain why military-related variables are not necessarily more predictive than others. As quoted by Lefever (p. 187, note 6), Henry Bienen concluded in an analysis published in 1969 "that no correlation can be established between coup propensity in Africa and the size of the army, defense budget, or the source, character, or amount of external military aid." But what the research design did not take into consideration is that in some cases the military may have been *encouraged* to intervene and in other cases not, or even severely warned *against* intervention because the country (or countries) by which it is supported is generally satisfied with the incumbent civilian government.

Evidence for the latter possibility is scattered throughout the works under consideration. For example, Lefever clearly indicates that in the Ethiopian upheaval of 1960, U.S. military attachés and advisers contributed to the success of the loyalist elements in putting down the coup. Surely it has been known in Ethiopia ever since that the United States would frown on any attempt to bring down the Haile Selassie regime. Has this knowledge not contributed to the maintenance of

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

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QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

Editorial Office:
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Subscription Rates: £4 or U.S. $10.00 a year
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Ethiopia in the category of stable countries? Great Britain intervened to quell mutinies in all three East African states in 1964, at a time when Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya could all be viewed as "moderates" in Lefever's sense; but there was no intervention on behalf of the Obote government in the recent Ugandan coup. What had changed, in Britain and in Uganda? Welch believes that former colonial powers are less likely "to become embroiled in protecting future African politicians from the ire of discontented armed forces" (p. 26), except in cases where their interest is clearly affected. But surely, they can restrain the military by preventive measures? All of the authors attribute great importance to military agreements between France and her former dependencies, and point to French intervention to restore the Gabon government in 1964. Since then, the French military presence has diminished and—with the significant exception of Chad—there is no hard evidence concerning the current role of the *French* military in African politics. But why has the *African* military intervened in some French-speaking countries and not in others? Ruth First argues that "France . . . remains the arbiter of which regimes in Africa are to endure, and which to fall, whether sooner or later" (p. 424). Indeed, there is good reason to believe that in some countries, including Gabon, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal, the message from Paris to the barracks has long been clear: "Stay out." On the other hand, at various times France probably adopted a much more neutral stance toward the survival of civilian governments in such countries as Upper Volta, Congo-Brazzaville, or Dahomey.[6] Western powers welcomed and probably encouraged the first Mobutu referee intervention in 1960; the United States and Belgium later invested heavily in the building up of the ANC as a relatively cohesive force, and it is likely that they encouraged Mobutu to take over in 1965. Surely his survival since that date—and, more abstractly, the sudden passage of the Congo from the unstable to the stable category of African states—cannot be understood without reference to the intentions of external powers.

In short, the effect of military variables, including external assistance, can vary from country to country and even within the same country at different times. And if the same cause can have different effects, the variance in outcomes is not amenable to multivariate analysis of the usual sort. An appropriate typology for the analysis of stability and instability in Africa should include, as *one* of its dimensions,

[6] The exchange of overt signals between the Malagasy Army and the French Government in 1972 confirms the process under discussion. The army completed its intervention only after the French indicated that they were no longer overly concerned with the political survival of a friendly, but increasingly ineffective, civilian president.

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A MAGAZINE FOR ACTIVISTS VOLUME 1, NUMBER 3

NEW PRIORITIES

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GORDON AND BREACH
440 Park Avenue South
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INTRODUCTORY SUBSCRIPTION PRICES—USA and Canada: $7.50 per volume for individuals who warrant the magazine is for their own use and *purchase directly from the publisher.* $18.00 per volume for Libraries and Institutions. *Elsewhere:* £4.55 per volume for individuals who warrant the *magazine is for their own use and* purchase directly from the publisher. £8.70 per volume for Libraries and Institutions. Copyright © 1972 GORDON AND BREACH, Science Publishers Ltd. 41-42 William IV Street, London W.C.2, England.

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A Quarterly Published by
The University of Notre Dame

Vol. 35 · January, 1973 · No. 1

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the political calculus of external powers: There are countries with governments whose survival is important to specified powers for specified reasons; countries with governments whose survival is unimportant; and countries with governments whose downfall is hoped for. Lest this appear to be another form of conspiracy theory, it is necessary to add that African military leaders may sometimes act in such a way as to create an irreversible situation—regardless of the preferences of external powers—as was probably the case in Nigeria in 1966 and in Ghana in 1972. Furthermore, it is not always true that Western powers prefer Lefever's "moderates," or even that Western powers are, as viewed by First, an undifferentiated group with a single interest. Antagonisms between an incumbent government and one Western power, for example, provide opportunities for others to fill the vacuum at little cost. Some Western powers learn to live with militants and may even come to rely on their survival because they are known quantities which do not seriously threaten their salient interests. This was obvious as far as the United States was concerned, for example, in the cases of Guinea and Mali in the early 1960's. Lee reminds us that "The United States came to the assistance of Mali in 1961, really its first important venture in Africa outside Ethiopia, when the French withdrew" (p. 116). Since his book was completed before the military coup, however, he has nothing to say about the possible effects on the events of 1968 of U.S. military assistance to that country. These considerations also apply to Communist powers that have at various times supported specific groups on the basis of attributed interests; they too have learned to live with and even support governments whose ideological orientation diverges from their own.

Although outside powers may reckon on the possibility of achieving their interests in Africa by affecting governmental change or by affecting the outcome of territorial struggles, they are as impotent as are other actors, including the military, to alter fundamental processes of African political life. It would require massive intervention, comparable in intensity and duration to the colonial period, to influence patterns of political development. In any case, do any outsiders genuinely care to do so? Lefever believes that the interest of the United States lies in the prevalence of "moderate" over "militant" governments; Lee concludes that the chief interest of unspecified outside powers "seems to be in preventing any large-scale conflagration" (p. 183), especially in relation to Southern Africa. Although First thinks that the United States welcomes some conflagrations, such as the Nigerian, because they increase dependence (p. 419), she identifies the dominant Western interest as short-term availability of markets for capital and goods.

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Even if one considers additional concerns, such as the outcome of United Nations votes, it is most striking that all of these interests can be pursued without much regard for the long-term fate of the independent states of tropical Africa. So far as the United States is concerned, the aspirations defined by First and by Lefever are extremely modest; they stand in great contrast to the aspirations of the early 1960's, the age of development, when it was believed that only a fundamental transformation of underdeveloped societies could insure the security of the West, and that such a transformation could be achieved rapidly.

The earlier, maximal, belief led to horror in another part of the Third World. Paradoxically, its disappearance from the terms of reference of contemporary policies toward Africa may lead to horror of another sort: Africa is not in danger of too much intervention, but of too little. Lefever argues that "The larger significance of political developments in that vast area has been exaggerated in the recent past by the competition between the West and the Communist states for 'allies' in the Third World, and the importance of the African actors is often inflated because the United States and the Soviet Union seek to woo their votes on key issues before the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly" (p. 12). He points out further that "Peaceful competition between Washington and Moscow, for example, has doubtless increased economic aid to Africa" (p. 13) because African leaders became adept at maximizing their "temporary alliance potential" (p. 14). Others have pointed to the value of this currency in relation to de Gaulle's France, or to Israel. But the situation has changed. As Lefever puts it, "Both superpowers now operate under a more sober assessment of tropical Africa's strategic value, the reduced interest and commitment of each reinforcing the other" (p. 12). The France of Pompidou has already begun to adopt a more modest international stance; some long-pending United Nations issues, such as the admission of China, have been resolved; others, involving the Middle East, will be decided by a concert of powers in which the one-country, one-vote principle will not be followed.

Is it surprising, under these conditions, that some African leaders are seeking to revalue their "temporary alliance potential" by engaging in "dialogue" with the powerfully armed racist state which has a vital stake in the future of the continent? What a cruel blow it is to the dignity of black men! But it is merely the first visible consequence of the practice of benign neglect.

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